FRIDAY, JULY 14, 1995

At the 11 a.m. briefing in Zagreb that day, General Janvier annonnced that he had ordered the Ukrainian peacekeepers in Zepa to withdraw from their observation posts immediately. The Muslims forced him to do it, he explained, not the attacking Serbs. The Ukrainians were to pull out to "avoid a situation as it was in Srebrenica where [the] BH wouldn't let us withdraw from OPs."

Zepa, which had only seventy-nine peacekeepers, was indefensible, according to the French general. "It is absolutely clear that we can't reinforce Zepa," Janvier said, referring to sending the still not fully deployed Rapid Resction Force to the area. "We can't defend Zepa as a result." Janvier made no mention of defending the enclave's population of 15,000 with NATO air strikes.

UN and U.S. officials were also publicly predicting the town would fall within forty-eight hours. But Janvier went further and also ruled out defending Gorazde, the third and largest enclave in eastern Bosnia, which was home to 60,000 people. "The BH has 6,000 soldiers [in Gorazde]," Janvier said, using a slightly inflated figure. "They are perfectly capable of defending Gorazde against the BSA. The Bosnian government can do something now if they want." The UN was only strong enough to act in Sarajevo.

The French general was still pushing the proposal he had made to the UN Security Council in May: that the UN withdraw from Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. Unless Janvier was receiving secret instructions, he was apparently doing everything in his power to abandon the safe areas without the permission of the Security Council.

After the Dutch departed, the hunt continued in the woods around Srebrenica. Hundreds of men were still alive. Local Serb military units carried out daily patrols to find them. Fear that the Muslims would attack and kill Serb civilians was one motivation; revenge was another. Almost all Muslims captured were executed.

Three days after the London conference ignored them, Zepa's defenders were still doggedly holding off General Mladic's troops. But Janvier, incensed that Bosnian soldiers had taken over UN positions and held Ukrainian peacekeepers hostage, opposed using airpower to defend Zepa. Before departing on a two-day leave, Janvier stated in a July 14 letter to General Smith that because Zepa could not be reinforced by land "CAS cannot be considered." The letter also asked Smith to "propose possible course of action" in Gorazde and stated tbat "the option of immediately withdrawing the pointless forces would avoid being placed in the same situation as in Srebrenica and Zepa."

In a meeting, Admiral Leighton Smith asked Janvier what he wanted NATO to do to aid Zepa. Janvier stated that "I can't do anything" because "in order to get to Zepa I've got to fight my way through Serb territory and I'm not combat ready." Janvier again appeared to be doing what he could to enact his proposal in May of withdrawing from Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, that the UN Security Council had rejected.

On July 24, the UN special rapporteur for human rights, former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, completed a week of investigations into the fall of Srebrenica. Mazowiecki said 7,000 of Srebrenica's 40,000 residents seemed to have "disappeared." He urged Western leaders not to let the same fate befall Zepa's 15,000 inhabitants.

More survivors emerged from the woods. The middle-aged man and teenage boy who suffered through the second mass execution of July 14, at the Red Mud Dam in Dulici north of Karakaj, were interviewed by UN investigators after they crossed the front lines. An investigator relayed the account of the old man to the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, in Zagreb. Galbraith sent a highly classified "no distribution, cable directly to Secretary of State Christopher on July 25 using the survivor's tale to argue that many of the 5,000 men from Srebrenica captured by the Serbs had been massacred. The ambassador urged Christopher to save Zepa's men from the same fate.

"The London Declaration implicitly writes off Zepa," Galbraith wrote. "In view of the numerous accounts of atrocities in Srebrenica and the possibility of a major massacre there, I urge reconsideration of air strikes to help Zepa." After giving a detailed account of the man's story, Galbraith continued: "Again, it is not too late to prevent a similar tragedy at Zepa. ZepaÕs defenders valiantly continue to hold on. Undoubtedly they realize the fate tbat awaits them. They should not be abandoned." Galbraith's cable resulted in no change in the U.S. policy of defending only Gorazde, but Christopher did order Asistant Secretary of State John Shattuck to travel to Tuzla and interview Srebrenica survivors.

AFTERMATH

On August 8, UN Special Representative Yasushi Akashi and Force Commander Janvier met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade. The meeting focused on the UN's role in the one remaining piece of Croatia held by Serb nationalists - eastern Slavonian oil-rich strip of territory which bordered Milosevic's Serbia. They feared a final Croat offensive to retake the area.

Near the end of the meeting, Akashi brought up Mladic's promise from the July 15 meeting, which he then gave in writing on July 17, to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross access to prisoners from Srebrenica. "The agreement was not implemented," Akashi said. "There are many questions regarding the missing. Mladic should give access to them."

"He must stick to his promises," replied the Serbian President, whose extensive state security apparatus was probably well aware tbat the prisoners were already dead. " IÕll do everything I can to make him respect his promises."

Milosevic then asked the UN to help provide supplies for the 800 Muslim men from Zepa who had crossed the Drina River and entered Serbia. They were being well treated, he assured Akashi and Janvier. In truth, the imprisoned Muslims were being beaten and were rarely fed.

After the meeting, the group retired to a hunting lodge outside Belgrade where Milosevic frequently took visiting dignitar-ies. They had lunch on a deck overlooking the forest and Milosevic insisted everyone have a traditional sip of sljivovica, or plum brandy. Milosevic, Akashi, Janvier and their senior aides filled the table.

"Do vou see bear and deer from the deck we're on?" Akashi asked.

"Yes, from time to time," Milosevic replied. "But there's no hunting next to the lodge. You have to go one or two kilometers away."

"A safe area for animals," Akashi joked. The entire table burst out laughing.