SUNDAY, JULY 9, 1995 That mormng, UN Force Commander Janvier was returmng to Zagreb from Paris. Janvier had just suffered the latest in a series of setbacks. The new 13,000-troop Rapid Reaceion Force created by France, Britain and Holland in the wake of the hostage crisis would not change its name. He feared "Rapid" would raise expectations that the UN would go to war against the Serbs and had asked that the new force be called the less provocative Theater Reaction Force. After Janvier's proposal leaked to the press and was criticized as another example of UN timidity, the name was set as the Rapid Reaction Force.
What Janvier feared was that pressure would quickly mount to use the force to create corridors to funnel supplies to the enclaves. More than anything else the fifty-four-year-old Janvier, a Foreign Legionnaire and commander in the Gulf War, was cautious. He complained to his friends about the loneliness of his position, the crushing responsibility he had and the lack of clear political guidance. At meetings, he often appeared tortured, furrowing his brow and grimacing.
Janvier's top priority was the safety of his peacekeepers. Largely reflecting Akashi's view of the conflict, he was extremely hesitant to use force or to appear to be taking sides. And like Akashi, he believed that the role of the UN was to pacify the situation, not inflame it.
Janvier refused to speak with the media, but on May 22 he expressed his views on the safe areas in a closed-door session of the UN Security Council. Every six months the mandate of the peacekeeping mission expired. UN officials in New York and the former Yugoslavia had prepared an exhaustive report on the troubled mission UNPROFOR and were recommending that it be urgently reformed, or it would soon be forced to withdraw.
The safe areas, especially Sarajevo and Bihac, were routinely shelled or attacked by Serb troops; at times, Bihac was even bombed by Serb airplanes in violation of the NATO-enforced "no-fly zone." Peacekeepers were routinely sniped at. The three year death toll for the mission, now at a UN record 173 peacekeepers, was steadily rising.
The Serbs had allowed 30 percent of UN aid convoys to reach their destinations. Food supplies in all of the enclaves were dangerously low. Sensing the UN's weakness that spring, Serbs, Croats and Muslims commandeered over 500 UN vehicles.
Humiliated, nearly all UN officials in the former Yugoslavia were desperate for a new, clearer mandate that lightly armed UN peacekeepers could actually carry out.
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali laid out several options for the Security Council to reform the dying mission's mandate. Increase the number of peacekeepers and use force to deliver aid and protect safe areas; keep the number of peacekeepers the same but decrease the UN's responsibilities; or stay the course. Boutros-Ghali recommended reducing the scope of mission-diplomatic language for abandoning the safe area concept.
The safe areas became the Achilles' heel of the UN peacekeeping mission. After limited support in 1993, NATO countries were no longer willing to deploy troops in them. French forces had pulled out of Bihac and been replaced by Bangladeshis in 1994. Canadian troops pulled out of Srebrenica in January 1994 and were replaced by the Dutch. Now the British and Dutch governments said they were pulling their soldiers out of Srebrenica and Gorazde by January 1996. After a long and difficult search, Ukraine had offered to send its peacekeepers to the two isolated enclaves. But the Ukrainians, who were already in Zepa and Sarajevo, were infamous for corruption, black marketeering and their failure to enforce UN mandates.
In his briefing to the UN Security Council, Janvier recommended that all but a handful of UN peacekeepers who were Forward Air Controllers withdraw from the eastern enclaves. A small group of the specially trained peacekeepers would be left in the enclave to guide NATO air strikes if needed. British general Rupert Smith backed the proposal because it would allow the UN to use force against the Serbs without being handicapped by the existence of hundreds of potential hostages.
"Let us be pragmatic . . . and above all let us be honest with ourselves and those we have pledged to protect," Janvier had told the Security Council. "One shouldn't play in the storm if one cannot throw lightning bolts."
The military situation had changed since 1993, Janvier asserted. Bosnian government forces were now strong enough to defend the enclaves themselves. With the support of the Russian ambassador, he alleged that the Bosnian Army had repeatedly abused the safe area concept and used the enclaves to launch offensives. He also pointed out that it was the Bosaian government that had broken a four-month cease-fire negotiated by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter the previous December. The last three French soldiers killed by snipers in Sarajevo were shot by Bosnian Muslims, he asserted. In fact, only one of the shots was confirmed to have come from the Bosnian side. The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, chided Janvier for criticizing the Bosnian government for fighting back against the Bosnian Serbs; the Muslims had a right to defend themselves, she maintained. The United States would oppose any reduction in the commitment to the safe areas. But at the same time the Clinton administration refused to send any U.S. ground troops to bolster the flagging mission.
Janvier's proposal to effectively withdraw from the safe areas was flatly rejected. Unable to agree on how to change the mandate and unwilling to commit additional troops, the Security Council instructed UN officials and commanders to simply soldier on as they had for the last two years. As Janvier arrived in Zagreb, Srebrenica presented him with yet another watershed.
MONDAY, JULY 10, 1995 The daily briefing convenead in UN headquarters in Zagreb at ll a.m. Force Commander Janvier opened the meeting. "A Kenyan soldier died in a car accident," he said through a translator. "In BH [Bosnia], the situation is quiet except in Srebrenica. The BSA [Bosnian Serb Army] attacked south to northÑin retaliation per-haps for last week's attack by the BH [Bosnian Army] out of Srebrenica."
"I spoke yesterday with General Tolimir," he continned. "He explained that the Dutch are free and have their weapons. They are in Bratunac and not POWs."
In truth, all of the Dutch hostages had been disarmed. Twenty were under armed guard in the Hotel Fontana in Bra-tunac and ten were under armed guard in a house in Milici. None were allowed to leave.
"The Dutch asked to be taken in by the BSA for their own safety," Janvier went on. "I demanded the BSA stop their action and hope to talk with the BSA this morning."
Colonel De Jonge, the chief of operations, then gave a more detailed report on the attack and the situation in Bosnia and Croatia.
Janvier spoke up after he concluded. "The BH blocked Canadian resupplies to two observation posts, fired rounds against [UN] troops in Sarajevo and killed a [UN] soldier in a deliberate attack in Srebrenica. I will report this to New York," Janvier pledged. "In Sarajevo, [UN and UNHCR] convoys reached Sa-rajevo without firing by the BSA."
Since arriving as Force Commander in February, Janvier had repeatedly criticized the Bosnian Army for launching offensives and sniping at UN troops while blaming it on the Serbs. Janvier's suspicions about the Muslims were not unusaal. Many Western military officers serving in the UN mission felt that the Bosnian Muslims were not the helpless, outguuned victims of Serb "geno-cide" that the media portrayed. The Muslims were better armed than the press realized and highly effective at getting fabricated or exaggerared accounts of Serb war crimes publicized.
Some officers went further and believed that the Muslims fired shells at their own people to demonize the Serbs and generate international sympathy, including the one that killed seventy-two people in the infamous February 1993 Sarajevo marketplace massacre which led to the creation of the heavy weapons exclusion zone around the besieged capital. No proof of the allegations was ever produced, but suspicion ran deep among some senior French officers and UN officials that the Bosnian Muslims were trying to draw the UN and NATO into waging war against the Serbs.
As the July 10 daily briefing drew to a close, Janvier accused the Bosnians of trying to draw the UN into fighting in Srebrenica.
"I remind everyone that the BH troops are strong enough to defend themselves. Also, access to Srebrenica is not being defended by the Bosnians. The situation is not the same as 1993," Janvier said. "I've just reccived information that [Bosnian soldiers] are shooting on Dutch troops blocking the route into Srebrenica and shooting at NATO planes over Srebrenica."
The claim that the Bosnians fired on a plane over Srebrenica was false. Serbs may have been firing on the planes, but no Dutch reported seeing Bosnian soldiers shooting at them. The report of the Bosnians firing on the Dutch was apparently a reference to the "Muslim hand grenade" that the Dutch thought had knocked their APC off the road near Camila Omanovic's house thar morning.
"The Bosnian Army is trying to push us into a path that we don't want," Janvier warned.
Yasushi Akashi agreed. "The BH initiates actions," he said, "and then calls on the UN and international community to respond and take care of their faulty judgment."
The request for Close Air Support reached Sarajevo at 7:15 p.m. Knowing how hesitant Janvier was to use airpower, General Nicolai had denied any request he thought Janvier would not approve. He had waited for a clear-cut signal that Zagreb could not question. This was it. The Dutch general took the request to the acting UN commander in Bosnia, General Herve Gobilliard, and recommended that it be approved. Gobilliard signed the form immediately.
In Zagreb, Colonel De Jonge received the request at 7:30 p.m. He had been waiting for this moment since he came up with the blocking position idea. De Jonge rushed into the office of Force Commander Janvier and announced that a company of Serb infantry was on a hill overlooking Srebrenica. The Serbs were advancing toward the town. The Dutch blocking position was firing over their heads.
TUESDAY, JULY 11, 1995 Janvier, who was notoriously indecisive, hesitated. The French general called a meeting of his Crisis Action Team. The forms for the Close Air Support, code-named Blue Sword, were ready. They needed only Janvier's signature. Yasushi Akashi was in the Croatian city of Dubrovnik for the day and had delegated the authority to approve Close Air Support to Janvier.
By 7:50 p.m., Janvier's ornate, wood-paneled office, located on the third floor of Building A in the UN headquarters complex in tranquil Zagreb, was filled with the senior military and civilian leadership of the UN mission. Akashi was represented by his special assistant, John Almstrom.
General Ton Kolsteren, the chief of staff, opened the meeting. "Fifteen minutes ago, sixty to eighty BSA infantry attacked the southern end of Srebrenica town. Two tanks are one and a half kilometers behind them with three trucks and they are moving toward the confrontation line."
"How soon can the planes be ready?" asked Janvier, speaking through his interpreter.
"In less than an hour," answered Colonel Cranny Butler, of the U.S. Air Force, the acting NATO liaison officer.
"We can ask them to change to cockpit standby," said Colonel Robert, the UN's chief of air operations.
"Have them stand next to the cockpits," Janvier said.
The NATO liaison officer left the room.
"Last night we issued an ultimatum," Janvier said. "They've fired on it, but the problem is we have no targets."
"We have two tanks, we don't need a smoking gun," De Jonge retorted. He was referring to a nuance in UN rules that allowed NATO Close Air Support to destroy a tank that was approaching a UN position in a hostile manner even if it had not fired yet.
"If the TACPs [Forward Air Controllers] can't see them we can change to an airborne Forward Air Controller," said air operations chief Robert.
"We have two TACPs in the area," De Jonge said.
"We can also spot artillery from the air," added Robert.
"Are we in a SAM ring?" Janvier asked, referring to surface- to-air missiles only a few miles away from Srebrenica in Serbia and in the Bosnian Serb Army headquarters in Han Pilesak.
"We're not sure, but we'd go in with a formation that included SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses] planes," Robert replied.
"Would there be any preemptive strikes against SAMs?" inquired Colonel Thierry Mone, one of Janvier's military aides. "Not unless they locked on to us," Robert answered.
"What is the Dutch government's position?" Janvier asked General Kolsreren. Many of them expected the Serbs to threaten to kill the thirty Dutch hostages if Close Air Support was carried out.
"It is focused on avoiding casualties among its own soldiers," Kolsteren responded. Janvier asked Kolsteren to telephone the Dutch government to confirm their position on the use of Close Air Support.
"What do you recommend?" Janvier asked De Jonge.
"Because you made a strong statement to Mladic yesterday and he is countering it, I believe you must launch CAS [Close Air Support]," De Jonge said.
"I agree that the troops are at risk," added Robert. "Although there is a risk to those detained, we must act."
"There's no choice if troops are under attack," said Almstrom, Akashi's deputy. "If they're not under attack, it's different. Then the question is how much shelling can civilians stand? There's also a problem being near FRY [Serbian] airspace. We don't need to wait for the SRSG [Akashi]. We only need him to authorize air strikes not CAS."
"It is absolutely necessary to speak with Mr. Akashi," Janvier said.
Colonel Butler, the NATO liaison officer, entered the room. Butler said he had spoken to the Coordinated Air Operations Center in Naples, Italy. After having planes circle over the Adriatic from 10:30 a.m. to 2 p.m. that day without being called on, the head of NATO's southern command, U.S. admiral Leighton Smith, said he needed a signed Close Air Support request before he would launch more planes.
"Are their planes on alert?" Janvier asked.
"If the Force Commander calls, the planes will be ready, responded Butler.
"Despite the risks, it's a situation where CAS is necessary," said Colonel Francois Dureau, Janvier's military assistant. "But the targets must be confirmed. The FAC [Forward Air Controller] has the last word on launching the attack."
Janvier asked to have a call placed to Sarajevo so he could speak with General Gobilliard, the acting UN commander in Bosnia, who had already approved the request. Gobilliard was not in and Janvier did not want to speak to General Nicolai, the Dutch chief of staff.
Janvier's assistant military assistant, Colonel Mone, was the first to oppose the request. "I'm in favor of CAS, but not tonight. Once the BSA infantry advances there will be confusion. There's also a problem with targets. It's better to do it tomorrow morning."
The meeting was interrupted. Janvier had a phone call. He went into an adjacent room with Mone.
Colonel De Jonge began to fidget. The light outside was fading. The debate continued without Janvier.
"We can also attack infantry with aircraft," said air operations chief Robert. "We need F-18s swooping down right now!"
"I agree. We need action," said General Kolsteren. "I don't agree with Mone."
"The aircraft will choose their targets based on attackability and economy of effort," said Robert. "It's always better to choose a single target like a tank; infantry requires several passes. It's about a twenty-minute flight. NATO would love the ability to do its job."
As Colonel Mone came out of the adjacent room, Janvier was heard raising his voice to whomever he was speaking to. It was a heated discussion. At 8:30 p.m., General Gobilliard returned Janvier's call from Sarajevo. Janvier ended his conversation and began speaking with Gobilliard.
The 7 p.m. request for Close Air Support was now an hour and a half old. Colonel Karremans in Srebrenica was calling General Nicolai in Sarajevo every fifteen minutes to see if it had finally been approved. Nicolai had no answer for him. De Jonge, whose idea it was to create the blocking position, could not believe how long it was taking.
At 8:45 p.m., Janvier was still on the phone. One of De Jonge's aides annonnced that the Dutch were now firing directly at the Serbs. A few minutes later, a report arrived that the Dutch and the Muslims, fighting side by side, were engaged in a heavy firefight with the Serbs.
Kolsteren went to his office. Like his British, French and American counterparts, Kolsteren had a secure telephone line to the Ministry of Defense in his home country. In previous UN missions it had been clear that a military officer's primary loyalty lay with his home country. But the mission in the former Yugoslavia had set new standards for intervention by individual countries in UN decision making.
Janvier's request that Kolsteren call his goverument was an overt admission of what was well known in UN headquartersÑ the country with the most at stake on the ground in Bosnia had tacit control over UN decision making. During the May hostage crisisÑwhen most of the hostages were FrenchÑit had been clear that the French government determined how the crisis would be handled.
Srebrenica was a Dutch dilemma. Carrying out Close Air Support might result in the Serbs killing thirty Dutch hostages. The flag-draped coffins would be returning to Holland, not UN headquarters in New York. In the end, Dutch politicians would suffer the consequences of the decision.
Kolsteren found Defense Minister Joris Voorhoeve in the basement bunker of the Dutch Defense Ministry at approximately 8:50 p.m. During every stage of the crisis all of the Dutch commandersÑKarremans in Srebrenica, Brantz in Tuzla, Nicolai in Sarajevo and Kolsteren and De Jonge in ZagrebÑhad been conferring with their superiors in Holland on all major decisions.
The conversation was brief. Voorhoeve had known for days he might have to face this decision. After consulting with Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok and Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo, Voorhoeve made one of the few courageous decisions surrounding the attack on Srebrenica. He decided that the lives of thirty Dutch peacekeepers were not worth more than the lives of 30,000 Muslims. The UN safe area and its people should be defended, Voorhoeve had concluded, no matter what the consequences were for the Dutch hostages. He told Kolsteren tbat the Dutch goverument had no objections to Close Air Support.
After the phone call ended, the mood in the Defense Ministry bunker was bleak. Dutch military officials expected the worst from the Serbs. Voorhoeve's press aides sketched out the rough draft of a press release announcing the deaths of Dutch peacekeepers.
Over 450 Dutch lives hung in the balance. The Defense Minister appeared on the national news at 10 p.m. Over the last three days the Netherlands had become increasingly focused on Srebrenica.
Air strikes appear to be "inevitable," a somber Voorhoeve warned. There is a "strong possibility" of Dutch casualties.
But in Zagreb, Janvier had not yet made up his mind. After speaking to Gobilliard in Sarajevo, the Force Commander continued to be on the phone. The unsigned forms waited on his desk.
At 9:05 p.m., Janvier spoke with Yasushi Akashi. He then spoke with Bosnian Serb general Zdravko Tolimir, the man who the day before denied to Nicolai that the Serbs were even attacking Srebrenica.
At 9:40 p.m., Janvier finally came back to the meeting. "We wiill be able to atrack in half an hour," he said. "The night option is OK if we have tanks or artillery attacking."
Then one of Janvier's aides entered the room and announced that fighting had stopped in Srebrenica. The Serbs had withdrawn from the hill overlooking the town. But the Serbs had issued an ultimatum of their own at 9 p.m. If the UN and all aid organizations surrendered all their weapons and equipment, they would be free to leave the enclave the next morning. All Muslims would be free to leave within forty-eight hours. But if the enclave did not surrender, the Serbs would resume their attack. Karremans himself, the aide said, had held a meeting with the Serb officer in command in the southern part of the enclave.
"If there is no move by the NGOs [aid groups] in the morning, the commanding officer said the Serbs will attack," the aide warned. "The Dutch commanding officer does not consider it useful to have Close Air Support tonight. He wants it tomorrow morning."
Karremans also wanted to know if he should abandon his remaining observation posts, which he felt should be "a command decision," Janvier's aide said, "not a tactical decision, because of the military and political impact."
"No, I refuse to accept that," Janvier said. "It's a decision to be made on the ground."
"It's out of the question to leave the OPs at night anywav," Janvier's aide said.
As the discussion dragged on, a waiter in a red blazer began serving canapes and pouring red wine for each participant. The UN officers and officials had missed dinner and Janvier or one of his staff had ordered refreshments. As Srebrenica's fate hung in the balance, Janvier's Crisis Action Team sipped wine and nibbled on gourmet sandwiches.
Air operations chief Robert continued to lobby Janvier to approve Close Air Support. "The aircraft are already airborne over the Adriatic," he said.
The planes were from the USS Theodore Roosevelt and were circling over the sea, awaiting orders. U.S. F-l5s and other aircraft were equipped to carry out attacks at night. The flight to Srebrenica would take only twenty minutes.
"Can they keep them up all night?" Janvier asked.
"No. They wouldn't have anything left for tomorrow," he replied.
"If firing has stopped, it's an indication tbat maybe the attack has stopped," Janvier said. "Maybe Mladic has given an order."
"If the fighting has stopped it is not due to Mladic's order," a frustrated De Jonge retorted. "It's due to the fact that they can't advance because of the Dutch blocking position."
Janvier had finally made his decision. "If someone asks why there was no CAS," he said, "we sav it was an infantry attack and CAS was too dangerous." Janvier ignored che UN air operations chief's and NATO liaison's opinions tbat it was not dangerous.
De Jonge rerused to give up. "The question is why is the BSA acting this way," he said. "Is it to conquer Srebrenica? If so, the attack will continue."
Robert warned that an air arrack in the morning wouldn't work. "There will be fog in Srebrenica tomorrow morning."
Janvier ignored him. "I do not think Mladic wants to punish the enclave. He wants to punish Bosnia," Janvier said, referring to the offensive to break the siege of Sarajevo and two others launched by the Muslim-led Bosnian Army that spring. "The Serbs are now involed in a process of negotiation, so it's very strange they act this way.Ó
"The attack started on Thursday," said one of De Jonge's aides." Maybe it was because of Lanxade's comments on the RRF." He was referring ro French Army chief of staff Admiral Jacques Lanxade's statement that rhe Rapid Reaction Force would be used to open up corridors ro Sarajevo and then the other surrounded safe areas.
Janvier disagreed. "It's very, very clear that the BSA and Mladic have no fear of rhe RRF," he said. "I've spoken to Mladic at length on this."
John Almstrom, Akashi's special assistant, indicated that he too was opposed to Close Air Support. ÒI think we're in a good pause now," he said, referring to the halt in the fighting in Srebrenica.
Janvier agreed and later disclosed what General Tolimir had told him.
"I spoke to Tolimir and he says they do not intend to take the enclave," Janvier said. "I believe him. If they do take the enclave, IÕll draw my conclusions."
WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1995 While Mladic met with the Dutch officers and Muslim representatives in Bratunac, the daily briefing was held in Zagreb.
Akashi was concerned that the UN was being blamed for the lack of NATO Close Air Support. "There's criticism of our CAS as too late and too little, but the Dutch put up a strong defense. It was very admirable," he added. "When the Dutch Minister of Defense asked that air actions be suspended because of threats against his soldiers who were held captive, we had no choice."
The Dutch Ministry of Defense had launched what would become an extremely effective public relations effort. Colonel Karremans had repeatedly requested Close Air Support, the Dutch stated, but it was denied by his superiors. The Dutch Ministry of Defense made no mention of the fact that a Dutch generalÑGeneral Nicolai in SarajevoÑhad turned down three of the four CAS requests. The mistakes made by the Dutch chain of commandÑranging from using the wrong forms to erroneously promising massive air strikes that were never discussed in ZagrebÑwere never aired.
"There is a very good military argument for stopping CAS," Janvier said. It was inappropriate to use force "when units were so close to each other. It made it impossible to continue CAS."
"I don't know that we saw any lucrative targets that we could have attacked, except for two tanks," Akashi's special assistant, John Almstrom, continued in the same vein. "Airpower is not at all effective against infantry."
Air Commodore Mike Rudd, the British NATO liaison, interrupted. "I spoke to Admiral Smith. He doesn't want to debate. He's been repeatedly asked why CAS was so late. He said he only sends airplanes when asked," Rudd said. "But if we do get into a debate, he said CAS was too late, there were targets and it could have worked."
"I would totally contest this approach," Janvier retorted.
Later that day, Akashi would send a cable and sample letter to the UN in New York criticizing the French Security Conncil resolution calling for the UN to use force to retake the safe area. Akashi said the resolution raised "unrealistic expectations" and it "blurs the lines" between neutral "peacekeeping" and taking sides or "peace enforcement." The Rapid Reaction Force's Anglo-French multinational brigade would be operational in three days but was not "strong enough to reach Srebrenica and resolve the situation" and was "more likely to compound than solve the problem."
In the Zagreb meeting, Akashi partially blamed the Bosnian government for the situation. "We must remember that the BH arms, trains and equips troops in safe areas and launches attacks out of them," Akashi said, "which is a provocation to the Serbs. "
Tomiko Ichikawa, an aide who almost never spoke at meetings, challenged her superior, Akashi. She pointed out that the Bosnian government had promised to demilitarize the safe areas if the UN would defend them. The six-month report on the mission Zagreb submitted to the Security Council in May had said the demilitarization of Srebrenica was a model even if everyone knew it wasn't complete. "Srebrenica has very strong symbolic value," she warned. "We're likely to have a very strong reaction from the international community."
"It would help," Akashi said, "if we had some TV pictures showing the Dutch feeding refugees."