PARAS.

I. INTRODUCTION 1 - 9

II. BACKGROUND

A. Break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 10 - 14

B. Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the outbreak of war 15 - 19

C. Humanitarian Activities 20 - 23

D. Proposals for a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 24 - 28

E. The peace process 29 - 32

F. Srebrenica prior to the safe area resolutions 33 - 40

III. THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTIONS 819 (1993), 824 (1993) AND 836 (1993)

A. Minimal consensus within the Security Council 41 - 44

B. The concept of >safe areas= 45 - 51

C. Security Council resolution 819 (1993) 52 - 58

D. The Srebrenica demilitarization agreement of 18 April 1993 59 - 62

E. Security Council Mission to Srebrenica; agreement of 8 May 63 - 65

F. Security Council resolution 824 (1993) 66 - 69

G. The end of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan 70 - 77

H. Security Council resolution 836 (1993) 78 - 79

I. Security Council members= positions on resolution 836 80 - 92

J. Reluctance to use force to deter attacks on safe areas 93 - 95

K. Secretary-General=s report (S/25939) pursuant to resolution 836 96 - 98

L. Efforts to lift the arms embargo 99 - 102

IV. EVOLUTION OF THE SAFE AREA POLICY: JUNE 93-DEC. 94

A. Initial implementation of the safe area policy 103 - 105

B. The Igman crisis 106 - 113

C. Proposals to exchange Srebrenica and ðepa 114 - 116

D. Markale massacre and disagreements on the use of air power 117 - 123

E. United Nations assessment of the safe area policy as of March 94 124 - 130

F. The attack on Gorañde: March-April 1994 131 - 145

G. Secretary-General=s report of 9 May 1994 (S/1994/555) 146 - 152

H. The Contact Group peace plan 153 - 156

I. Serb assault on the safe area of Biha°: October-December 1994 157 - 163

J. Secretary-General=s report of 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389) 164 - 174

V. EVENTS OF JANUARY TO JUNE 1995

A. Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and its collapse 175 - 184

B. Air strikes around Sarajevo 185 - 189

C. UNPROFOR hostage crisis 190 - 200

D. Secretary-General=s report of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444) 201 - 209

E. Bosniac attempt to break the siege of Sarajevo 210 - 212

F. The Rapid Reaction Force 213 - 220

G. Fighting around Srebrenica 221 - 225

VI. OVERVIEW OF DEPLOYMENT IN SREBRENICA: FEB-JULY 95 226 -238

VII. THE FALL OF SREBRENICA: 6-11 JULY 1995

A. 6 July: Attack on OP Foxtrot; request for Close Air Support 239 - 245

B. 7 July: Momentary pause in Serb attack 246 - 249

C. 8 July: Request for CAS discouraged; BSA over-run OP;

ARBiH kill Dutchbat soldier 250 - 261

D. 9 July: Events leading to blocking position and warning to Serbs 262 - 276

E. 10 July: BSA violates warning; use of close air support deferred 277 - 296

F. 11 July: Initial confusion over air support; Srebrenica falls 297 - 317

VIII. THE AFTERMATH OF THE FALL OF SREBRENICA

A. 12 July: Meetings with Mladi°; deportation commences 318 - 328

B. 12 July: Security Council resolution 1004 (1995) 329 - 339

C. Night of 12 July -- Sporadic killing begins 340 - 345

D. 13 July: killing of hundreds of unarmed men and boys begins 346 - 360

E. 14 July: mass executions commence; EU Negotiator meets Mladi° 361 - 374

F. 15 July: massacres continue; Aagreement@ reached with Mladi° 375 - 382

G. 16-18 July: reports of atrocities begin to surface 383 - 390

H. 19 July: Mladi° and UNPROFOR agreement 391 - 393

IX. THE FALL OF ðEPA AND THE >NEW= SAFE AREA POLICY:

JULY-OCTOBER 1995

A. Preparations for the attack on ðepa: 11 to 14 July 1995 394 - 396

B. Attack, resistance and negotiations in ðepa: 14-20 July 1995 397 - 402

C. First formal reports of atrocities from Srebrenica 403 - 404

D. The London Meeting 405 - 410

E. Operational arrangements resulting from the London Meeting 411 - 414

F. The Fall of ðepa and the flight to Serbia 415 - 431

G. Operation >Storm= and the United States-led peace initiative 432 - 437

H. Attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo 438 - 441

I. Operation Deliberate Force 442 - 445

J. Serb assessment of Operation Deliberate Force 446 - 447

K. The pause; a new peace map; opening a road into Sarajevo 448 - 450

L. Resumption of air and ground attacks 451 - 455

M. The United States-led peace initiative; concerns about the mandate 456 - 459

N. Croatian offensive and the end of hostilities 460 - 464

X. PEACEKEEPING AND THE PEACE AGREEMENT: 465 - 466

OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1995

XI. THE FALL OF SREBRENICA: AN ASSESSMENT 467 - 506

Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway) May 1993-December 1993

Mr. Yasushi Akashi (Japan) January 1994-October 1995

Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar (India) March 1992-March 1993

Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren (Sweden) March 1993-June 1993

Lieutenant-General Jean Cot (France) June 1993-March 1994

Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Lapresle (France) March 1994-February 1995

Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier (France) March 1995-January 1996

Lieutenant-General Philippe Morillon (France) September 1992-July 1993

Lieutenant-General Francis Briquemont (Belgium) July 1993-January 1994

Lieutenant-General Michael Rose (United Kingdom) January 1994-January 1995

Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith (United Kingdom) January 1995-December 1995

I. INTRODUCTION

 1. This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of General Assembly resolution 53/35 of 30 November 1998. In that paragraph, the General Assembly requested:

***

2. On 16 November 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted Radovan Karadñi° (APresident of the Republika Srpska@) and Ratko Mladi° (Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army) for their alleged direct responsibility for the a>

Transfer interrupted!

3. The United Nations had a mandate to Adeter attacks@ on Srebrenica and five other Asafe areas@ in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite that mandate, up to 20,000 people, overwhelmingly from the Bosnian Muslim community, were killed in and around the safe areas. In addition, a majority of the 117 members of UNPROFOR who lost their lives in Bosnia and Herzegovina died in or around the safe areas. In requesting the submission of the present report, the General Assembly has afforded me the opportunity to explain why the United Nations failed to deter the Serb attack on Srebrenica and the appalling events that followed.

4. In my effort to get closer to the truth, I have returned to the origins of the safe area policy, discussing the evolution of that policy over a period of several years. I have drawn the attention of the reader to the resolutions of the Security Council and to the resources made available to implement those resolutions; I have reviewed how the policy was implemented on the ground, as well as the attacks that took place on other safe areas: Sarajevo, Gorañde, Biha°. I have reviewed the debate that took place within the international community on the use of force and, in particular, on the use of air power by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I have also reviewed the role of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the fall of Srebrenica, and in the almost-forgotten case of ðepa. Finally, I recall how, having failed to act decisively during all of these events, the international community found a new will after the fall of Srebrenica and how, after the last Serb attack on the safe area of Sarajevo, a concerted military operation was launched to ensure that no such attacks would take place again.

5. In reviewing these events, I have in no way sought to deflect criticism directed at the United Nations Secretariat. Having served as Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations during much of the period under review, I am fully cognizant of the mandate entrusted to the United Nations and only too painfully aware of the Organization=s failures in implementing that mandate. Rather, my purpose in going over the background of the failure of the safe area policy has been to illuminate the process by which the United Nations found itself, in July 1995, confronted with these shocking events. There is an issue of responsibility, and we in the United Nations share in that responsibility, as the assessment at the end of this report records. Equally important, there are lessons to be drawn by all of those involved in the formulation and implementation of international responses to events such as the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are lessons for the Secretariat, and there are lessons for the Member States that shaped the international response to the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.

6. Before beginning with the account of the events in question, it is important to recall that much of the history of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be touched upon at all in the body of this report. The war began on 6 April 1992. Most of the territory captured by the Serbs was secured by them within the first 60 days of the war, before UNPROFOR had any significant presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During those 60 days, approximately one million people were displaced from their homes. Several tens of thousands of people, most of them Bosnian Muslims, were killed. The accompanying scenes of barbarity were, in general, not witnessed by UNPROFOR or by other representatives of the international community, and do not form a part of this report. In addition, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina included nine months of open warfare between the mainly Muslim forces of the Bosnian Government and the mainly Croat forces of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO). This fighting, although important to understanding the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not generally involve the safe areas that are the central focus of this report. The record of that conflict, therefore, does not appear in this document.

7. At the outset, I wish to point out that certain sections of this report may bear similarity to accounts of the fall of Srebrenica that have already appeared in a number of incisive books, journal articles, and press reports on the subject. Those secondary accounts were not used as a source of information for this report. The questions and account of events which they present, however, were independently revisited and examined from the United Nations= perspective. I hope that the confirmation or clarification of those accounts contributes to the historical record on this subject. I also wish to point out that I have not been able to answer all the hitherto unanswered questions about the fall of Srebrenica, despite a sincere effort to do so.

8. This report has been prepared on the basis of archival research within the United Nations system, as well as on the basis of interviews with individuals who, in one capacity or another, participated in, or had knowledge of the events in question. In the interest of gaining a clearer understanding of these events, I have taken the exceptional step of entering into the public record information from the classified files of the United Nations. In addition, I would like to record my thanks to those Member States, organizations and individuals who provided information for this report. A list of persons interviewed in this connection is attached as Annex 1. While that list is fairly extensive, time, as well as budgetary and other constraints precluded interviewing many other individuals who would be in a position to offer important perspectives on the subject at hand. In most cases, the interviews were conducted on a non-attribution basis to encourage as candid a disclosure as possible. I have also honoured the request of those individuals who provided information for this report on the condition that they not be identified.

9. All of these exceptional measures that I have taken in preparing this report reflect the importance which I attach to shedding light on what Judge Riad described as the Adarkest pages of human history.@

II. BACKGROUND

10. The break-up of the SFRY accelerated in 1991, with declarations of independence by the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia on 25 June 1991. The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, was generally measured in his reaction to these events, as he later expressed the concern that Aearly, selective recognition would widen the [ongoing] conflict and fuel an explosive situation, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina.@ (S/1991/23280, Annex IV). The one principal cause for caution was an awareness that recognizing the independence of the Yugoslav republics would leave substantial communities of Serbs and others as vulnerable minorities in Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and, in particular, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This concern was initially shared by the Member States of the European Community (EC), which established a Commission to examine whether or not Yugoslav republics seeking international recognition met a number of criteria, particularly regarding the constitutional protection of minorities. Later, however, these States proceeded with recognition of all three Republics despite a concern that only Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had met the established criteria.

11. Following the declaration of independence by Slovenia, fighting broke out between Slovenian forces and the predominantly Serb forces of the Yugoslav People=s Army (JNA). The fighting, however, lasted for only ten days, with light casualties on both sides. The conflict ended with the Brioni agreement of 7 July 1991, and was followed, over the coming months, by the withdrawal of JNA forces and de facto independence for Slovenia. In Croatia, the fighting was much more serious. The declaration of independence led to an increase in the armed clashes which had been taking place for several months, pitting Croatian forces against both the JNA and Croatian Serb militias. These clashes descended into full-scale warfare in August 1991 and continued until 2 January 1992, when a cease-fire was signed in Sarajevo under the auspices of the United Nations. Shortly thereafter, the parties to the conflict in Croatia Afully and unconditionally@ accepted the AConcept for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Yugoslavia@ presented by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus Vance (Athe Vance Plan@). At the end of this phase of the fighting in Croatia, Serb forces remained in de facto control of approximately one third of the Republic of Croatia.

12. On 25 September 1991, when the fighting in Croatia was at its height, the Security Council adopted resolution 713 (1992) which decided that, AAll States shall, for purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise ...@ The resolution was adopted unanimously, though several observers noted at the time that the major effect of the embargo would be to freeze the military holdings of each of the parties -- a move which would overwhelmingly benefit the Serbs, who were dominant both in the Yugoslav military and, to a lesser extent, in the arms industry.

13. On 15 February 1992, the then Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who served in this position from 1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996), submitted a report to the Security Council proposing the establishment of a peacekeeping force to implement the Vance Plan. He made the following observation:

14. The Security Council approved the Secretary-General=s report and, on 21 February, decided, by resolution 743 (1992), to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to assist in the implementation of the Vance Plan. UNPROFOR=s headquarters was established in Sarajevo on 13 March 1992. Sarajevo was seen, at that time, as a neutral location, and it was hoped that UNPROFOR=s presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina would prove a stabilizing factor amid the increasing tensions in the country. Although resolution 743 (1992) provided for United Nations military observers to patrol certain limited areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this was to take place after the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, which did not occur. Until June 1992, the Force had no other mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15. The independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the EC (later renamed as the European Union (EU)) on 6 April 1992 and by the United States of America the following day. At the same time, the sporadic fighting which had taken place in a number of areas began to intensify. This was exacerbated by the JNA withdrawal from Croatia under the terms of the Vance Plan, which had involved the relocation of substantial amounts of materiel, particularly heavy weapons, into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Much of this materiel later passed into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs.

16. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) viewed the conflict which had erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina as having elements both of an international armed conflict (i.e. the invasion of that country by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and of an internal armed conflict. In its international aspect, the conflict represented a war between the JNA (later known as the Army of Yugoslavia, or VJ) on one side, against both the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) on the other. Later in the conflict, another foreign force, the Croatian Army (HV), was also involved in the fighting. In its internal aspect, the war represented a conflict between armed forces associated with the major nationalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17. Bosniacs (known until 1993 as >Muslims= or >Bosnian Muslims=), who represented 44 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina=s population of 4.4 million, were dominant in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ARBiH, officially established on 15 April 1992, was made up, ab initio, of a number of elements: territorial defence units, police forces, paramilitary forces and criminal elements. It enjoyed an advantage in manpower over the other forces in the conflict, but was poorly equipped and largely untrained. Prior to April 1993, when fighting later broke out between Bosniacs and Croats, the ARBiH was able to secure a limited amount of military materiel from foreign supporters via Croatia. The Croats, who constituted 17 percent of the population, were dominant in the HVO. This force also brought together territorial defence units, police forces, paramilitaries and certain prominent criminals. But unlike the ARBiH, the HVO enjoyed the backing of the Republic of Croatia which provided a broad range of support.

18. Ranged against these forces were the rump JNA (the regular army of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the >Army of Republika Srpska=, known to the international community as the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), and their paramilitary associates. All of these forces were dominated by Serbs, who constituted 31 percent of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNA officially withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under international pressure on 10 May 1992. In fact, however, the withdrawal was largely cosmetic since the JNA Aleft behind@ those units whose members were nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina. General Mladi°, Commander of JNA forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was re-styled Commander of the BSA. Throughout the war that was to follow, the BSA remained closely associated with the JNA/VJ and with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on which the BSA relied for materiel, intelligence, funds and other forms of support. The Serb paramilitary groups, which included a substantial criminal element, often operated in close cooperation with the regular armies of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs.

19. The conflict between these forces differed from conventional warfare in important ways. First, much of the fighting was local, involving regular and irregular fighters operating close to their homes. Second, a central objective of the conflict was the use of military means to terrorize civilian populations, often with the goal of forcing their flight in a process that came to be known as Aethnic cleansing@. Third, although several hundred thousand men were engaged for three-and-a-half years, and although several tens of thousands of combatants were killed, the conflict was more often one of attrition, terror, gangsterism and negotiation than it was of high-intensity warfare.

20. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was the lead agency for international humanitarian activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, establishing a significant presence in the country almost as soon as the conflict erupted. UNHCR convoys distributed food aid, shelter materials and 'winterization' supplies, seeds, clothing and other humanitarian goods to the authorities of all three communities. The local authorities then distributed these goods to the local populations (inevitably diverting a certain amount to the various military forces and to the black market).

21. From the outset, the Serbs restricted the flow of humanitarian aid to Srebrenica and to other isolated Bosniac communities. Humanitarian convoys were subjected to onerous clearance procedures and to other forms of harassment and obstruction. The Serbs did not, apparently, intend to starve the Bosniac enclaves altogether, but rather to reduce them to conditions of extreme privation. From this regime of privation the Serbs consolidated their control over the enclaves. They (and some counterparts in the other communities) also derived economic advantage from this system by initiating black market trade with the surrounded Bosniacs.

22. UNHCR delivered an average of approximately 750 tonnes of humanitarian aid per day to Bosnia and Herzegovina for the duration of the war, but much of this went to areas to which the Serbs did not control access. In the Bosniac enclaves, UNHCR was rarely able to meet the needs of the population. Even when basic food supplies could be delivered to these places, other items required to support the humanitarian needs of the population, including medical equipment and emergency shelter materials, were often blocked altogether. Although starvation was almost unknown in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosniac enclaves did endure sustained periods of material deprivation and psychological suffering.

23. In July 1992, UNHCR, building on the airport agreement brokered by UNPROFOR on 5 June (see para. 27), began a humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo. The Serbs, however, controlled the use of Sarajevo airport, and thus the restrictions which applied to road convoys also applied, in considerable measure, to the Sarajevo airlift. In February 1993 the relief supplies brought by UNHCR's road convoys and airlift began to be supplemented by a programme of air drops. French, German and United States transport aircraft flew 2,735 sorties, dropping humanitarian aid to Biha°, Gorañde, Srebrenica, ðepa and other isolated areas to which convoy access was restricted. Threats to the security of the aircraft ended the programme in August 1994, by which time almost 18,000 tonnes of aid had been delivered in this way, providing a degree of relief to the most vulnerable communities.

24. When fighting broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to explore the feasibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General accordingly dispatched to the region his then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Marrack Goulding. Mr. Goulding remained in the region from 4 to 10 May 1992. Referring to the situation in Sarajevo based on Mr. Goulding=s visit, the Secretary-General then reported to the Council, on 12 May 1992, as follows:

25. The Secretary-General noted that Mr. Goulding had consulted with representatives of the different communities and found that President Alija Izetbegovi°, Mr. Fikret Abdi° (both Bosnian Muslims) and Mr. Mariofil Ljubi° (a Bosnian Croat) had supported an immediate United Nations intervention. President Izetbegovi° had supported a peace-enforcement operation, to Arestore order.@ Mr. Goulding had also met with Dr. Karadñi° and other Serb leaders, who saw no role for a United Nations peacekeeping force at the time, though he and President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia had not excluded Aa possible role for United Nations peacekeepers in helping to implement the constitutional agreement which [was] expected to emerge@ from the peace process sponsored by the European Community. (Ibid., para. 17).

26. The Secretary-General concluded as follows:

27. The Security Council then asked the Secretary-General to take on some limited functions in the Sarajevo area. In resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, which also imposed sweeping economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council requested the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices in order to achieve the conditions for unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and elsewhere, including the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport. The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 6 June that UNPROFOR had negotiated an agreement, the previous day, on the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian purposes. Under the terms of the agreement, UNPROFOR was asked to take over full operational responsibility for the functioning and security of Sarajevo airport. The Secretary-General expressed the view that the agreement represented a Asignificant breakthrough@ in the tragic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it was only a first step, and added that:

28. The Secretary-General proposed the immediate deployment of United Nations military observers (UNMOs) to the airport, to be followed by an UNPROFOR infantry battalion. This was approved by the Security Council in its resolution 758 (1992) of 8 June, marking the formal beginning of UNPROFOR=s mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

29. For much of the war in the former Yugoslavia the effort to negotiate a political settlement to the conflict was conducted under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), established by the Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, held in London on 26-27 August 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the ALondon Conference@). The Secretary-General described ICFY as:

The Steering Committee of ICFY was initially co-chaired by Mr. Cyrus Vance, representing the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and David Lord Owen, representing the Presidency of the European Community.

30. Building on the Statement of Principles adopted by the London Conference, ICFY developed the basis for a political settlement to the conflict:

31. The Co-Chairmen unveiled their draft plan to end the conflict, which became known as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), on 2 January 1993. That plan consisted of three parts: a set of constitutional principles which would have established a decentralized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina; military provisions, which provided for a cease-fire and the eventual demilitarization of the whole country; and a map delineating ten provinces. The ten provinces were drawn largely to reflect the areas in which the three communities had lived before the war, thus substantially reversing the process of >ethnic cleansing=. Each community would have constituted a majority in three provinces, with Sarajevo, the tenth province, having no majority. None of the communities would have had a compact territory, and the Serbs would have been divided into five unconnected areas, effectively ending their hopes of seceding from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The objections of Serb leaders were reportedly focused on Province 5, which would have had a Bosniac majority. That province included not only Srebrenica and ðepa but also most of the areas of eastern Bosnia recently >ethnically cleansed= by the JNA, the BSA and their paramilitary associates. When the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was presented, the BSA was in control of roughly 70 percent of the country. The land area of the provinces with Serb majorities proposed under the Peace Plan would have represented 43 percent of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, requiring the Serbs to withdraw from over one third of the land they then held. This plan was strongly criticized by the United States and therefore never explicitly endorsed by the Council, which gave guarded encouragement to the AVance-Owen peace process@ instead.

32. Representatives of the Croat community accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan immediately. However, representatives of the other two communities were not satisfied, and some negotiated adjustments were made over the following months. Representatives of the three communities met at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 16 - 25 March 1993, just as the first crisis in Srebrenica was coming to a head. The Bosniac and Croat representatives signed the modified version of the plan on 25 March. The Serb representatives did not sign. Following concerted international pressure on President Miloûevi° of Serbia, Dr. Karadñi° was induced to sign on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs at a meeting held in Athens on 2 May. Dr. Karadñi°=s signature, however, was affixed subject to approval by the ANational Assembly of Republika Srpska@, a session of which, held in Pale on 5-6 May 1993, rejected the Plan.

33. Srebrenica lies in a mountain valley in eastern Bosnia, close to the border with Serbia. At the time of the 1991 census, the municipality had a population of 37,000, of which 73 percent were Bosniacs and 25 percent were Serbs. Despite the preponderance of Bosniacs in the pre-war population, Serb paramilitaries from Srebrenica, and from other parts of eastern Bosnia, held Srebrenica for several weeks at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During this period, Bosniacs from the general area of Srebrenica were not only expelled from their homes in many areas, but were also subjected to still more serious abuses. In Bratunac, a Bosniac-majority town some 10 km north of Srebrenica, for example, several hundred Bosniacs were detained in a local school, where a large number, including a local imam, were subjected to inhumane treatment and killed. Armed Bosniacs fled to the surrounding hills during this period.

34. By 6 May 1992 these Bosniacs had re-grouped and begun to contest Serb control of Srebrenica. Goran Zeki°, a leader of the Serb community in Srebrenica, was killed in an ambush on 8 May, and soon thereafter Serbs began to flee the town or were driven out. The town was secured by the Bosniacs on 9 May. The Bosniac forces which took control of Srebrenica comprised several groups of fighters without any definite military structure. The most powerful of these groups was that under the command of Naser Ori° of Poto·ari. Other groups continued to operate with a degree of independence, however, and violent rivalry between different factions within the Bosniac community became a feature of Srebrenica life until its fall in 1995.

35. The Bosniac enclave which centered around Srebrenica was then expanded under Ori°=s leadership over a period of several months into the surrounding areas. For the most part, the fighting that took place during this period was not regular warfare, but rather a series of raids and counter-raids by armed groups of one or the other community. As the Bosniacs advanced, they used techniques of ethnic cleansing similar to those used by the Serbs in other areas, burning houses and terrorizing the civilian population. Serb sources claim that over 1,300 people were killed by Bosniac fighters as they expanded out of Srebrenica, with much larger numbers being displaced from their homes. Serb sources and international human rights observers have reported incidents in which Serbs were apparently tortured and mutilated. At the same time, much larger numbers of Bosniacs were suffering similar fates in areas which remained under Serb control.

36. Bosniac forces from Srebrenica linked up with those of ðepa, a small Bosniac-held village in the densely wooded area to the south of Srebrenica, in September 1992. The Srebrenica enclave reached its greatest extent in January 1993, when it was joined to the nearby Bosniac enclave of Cerska, to the west of Srebrenica. At its greatest extent the Srebrenica enclave covered almost 900 square kilometers of territory in eastern Bosnia. Despite this expansion, the enclave was never joined to the main body of Government-held territory further west, leaving it vulnerable to isolation and attack by Serb forces.

37. Bosniac forces attacked out of the enclave against the Serb-inhabited village of Kravica on 7 January 1993. Serb sources claimed that over 40 Serb civilians were killed in the attack. Soon after the attack on Kravica, Serb forces began to prepare a counter-offensive. By March 1993, Serb forces were advancing rapidly, killing and burning as they did so. The villages of Konjevi° Polje and Cerska were soon over-run, and ultimately these villages= population, together with the remaining pre-war inhabitants of Srebrenica, numbering 50,000 - 60,000 in total, were compressed into a mountainous area of approximately 150 km² centered on the town of Srebrenica. During the same offensive ðepa was separated from Srebrenica, becoming an isolated enclave of its own, separated by a narrow corridor of Serb-held land. ðepa remained isolated until it was over-run by the Serbs after the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995.

38. A number of people, Bosniacs and foreign journalists alike, carried news of the desperate situation in Srebrenica to Sarajevo and the outside world, prompting the Commander of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina to travel there with a small UNPROFOR party on 11 March 1993. By the time he arrived in Srebrenica, the town was already enduring siege conditions. There was almost no running water, the Serbs having destroyed the town=s water supply as they advanced. Likewise, there was no electricity, other than that produced by a number of hand-crafted water wheels. Over-crowding was a major problem, with schools, office buildings and all other structures having been emptied to make way for successive waves of displaced persons fleeing before the Serb advance. There was no starvation, but food was in short supply and public hygiene was rapidly deteriorating. An atmosphere of panic was endemic. The UNPROFOR Commander was initially prevented by the local inhabitants from leaving, but was allowed to do so on 13 March. Prior to departing, he addressed a public gathering in Srebrenica, telling them that they were under United Nations protection and that he would not abandon them.

39. During the weeks that followed, UNHCR succeeded in bringing a number of humanitarian aid convoys into Srebrenica and in evacuating large numbers of vulnerable people to the relative safety of the Government-held city of Tuzla. These evacuations were, in general, opposed, sometimes forcibly, by the Bosnian Government authorities in Sarajevo who felt that they contributed to the >ethnic cleansing= of the territory. The evacuations were supported by the Bosnian Serbs, who were willing to allow UNHCR to send empty trucks to Srebrenica to collect evacuees, but who were reluctant to allow humanitarian aid into the enclave. UNHCR=s Special Envoy stated that he supported the evacuations as a measure of last resort to save lives.

40. The first UNHCR convoy entered the town on 19 March 1993, just as Bosniac, Croat and Serb leaders were meeting in New York to discuss the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and returned to Tuzla the next day with over 600 Bosniac civilians. A second convoy reached Srebrenica on 28 March. Six people died as an estimated 1,600 people scrambled onto the trucks as they prepared to return to Tuzla on 29 March; seven more died in the over-crowded vehicles as they made their way to Tuzla. A similar scene of mass panic and death occurred following the arrival in Srebrenica of a third UNHCR convoy on 31 March. Nearly 3,000 women and children, as well as old men, were evacuated in 14 trucks, with six deaths caused either by over-crowding or by exposure to the elements. On 2 April, the Bosniac authorities in Srebrenica announced that no more evacuations would be permitted. Despite objection and obstruction by the authorities, some further UNHCR evacuations did take place, albeit on a restricted scale. On 8 April, two days after the Serbs had cut the main fresh water supply to Srebrenica, approximately 2,100 people defied the local authorities, forcing their way onto 14 trucks. On 13 April, a further 800 people were evacuated. By the time the evacuations stopped altogether, at the end of April 1993, some 8,000 - 9,000 people had been transported to safety in Tuzla. Interviewed in connection with this report, President Izetbegovi° stated that, with the benefit of hindsight, the policy of his Government to restrict evacuations from the Srebrenica enclave had been mistaken.

III. THE ADOPTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 819 (1993),

824 (1993) AND 836 (1993)

41. As the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorated, the activity of the Security Council increased. During the 18-month period from the opening of full-scale hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992 to 5 October 1993, 47 Security Council resolutions were adopted and 42 Statements of the President of the Council were issued on matters relating to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The majority of these dealt directly with the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this date, no issue in the history of the Security Council has engendered more resolutions and statements over a comparable period.

42 Despite this unprecedented flow of resolutions and statements, however, consensus within the Council was limited. There was general agreement on the need for action, but less agreement as to what action was appropriate. The Secretary-General understood that the Council was able to reach consensus on three broad areas: the need to alleviate the consequences of the war; the need to contain the conflict; and the need to promote the prospects for a negotiated peace settlement. Up until that point, the following measures had been taken to address these three needs:

43 Relatively early in the conflict, a discernible pattern of decision-making emerged in the Security Council. Those countries which opposed lifting the arms embargo committed increasing numbers of troops to UNPROFOR, but resisted efforts to expand the UNPROFOR mandate in such a way as to bring the Force into direct military confrontation with the Serbs. Those countries which favoured more robust action, but which did not have troops on the ground, sought progressively to expand UNPROFOR=s mandate and to use the Force directly to confront the Serbs. The result was the deployment by France, the United Kingdom and others of forces which were largely configured and equipped for traditional peacekeeping duties rather than enforcement action. At the same time, in an effort to find some consensus in the Council, resolutions were adopted in which some of the more robust language favoured by non-troop-contributing nations was accommodated. Chapter VII of the Charter was invoked with increasing frequency, though often without specifying what that implied in terms of UNPROFOR operations. In this way, the efforts of Member States to find compromise between divergent positions led to UNPROFOR=s mandate becoming rhetorically more robust than the Force itself. During the 18-month period of maximum Security Council activity on this issue, Bosnian Serb forces operated almost unchecked; by the time the confrontation line stabilized, in mid-1993, approximately two million people, or one half of the total population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had fled their homes or been expelled.

44 Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in January 1994, later wrote as follows:

45 One of the proposals which emerged during this search for compromise within the Council was to establish Asecurity zones@, Asafe havens@ and Aprotected areas@ for the Bosniac population. In his remarks to the London Conference of 26-27 August 1992, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga, stated that the international community had a vital role to play. AForced transfers, harassment, arrests and killings must cease at once,@ he stated. He added that a haven would have to be found for some 10,000 detainees already visited by the ICRC in northern and eastern Bosnia. He then asked delegates whether or not they would consider establishing Aprotected zones@ as one of several options for addressing the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In October 1992 the ICRC issued a paper in which it stated that, AThe present situation calls for the creation of zones ... which need international protection.@ The ICRC spoke of the need to protect threatened communities in their places of residence. AFor this protection to be effective, the parties to the conflict must facilitate the deployment of UNPROFOR contingents, and the UN forces= mandate must be expanded.@

46 Some representatives of the United Nations were also supportive at this early stage. In his Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1992/2-1/10), dated 27 October 1992, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, concluded that Aa large number of displaced persons would not have to seek refuge abroad if their security could be guaranteed and if they could be provided with both sufficient food supplies and adequate medical care. In this context the concept of security zones within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be actively pursued.@ (Ibid., para. 25(b))

47 Austria, which was then serving as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, was the first Member State to pursue actively the possibility of establishing safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, the permanent members of the Security Council were not supportive, and the first set of discussions on this issue led only to a carefully worded operative paragraph in resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, inviting Athe Secretary-General, in consultation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant international humanitarian agencies, to study the possibility of and the requirement for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes.@

48 Almost immediately, a number of problems became apparent. First, if they were to function effectively, the safe areas would have to be established with the consent of the parties; that consent, however, might not be forthcoming. Second, the concept advanced by the humanitarian agencies was of zones occupied entirely by civilians, open to all ethnic groups and free of any military activity. Such zones would by definition have to be demilitarized, but no demilitarized zones of this nature existed in the country. Third, whether or not the safe areas were demilitarized, UNPROFOR would likely have to protect them, requiring substantial new troop contributions, which might also not be forthcoming. Fourth, the establishment of safe areas implied that other areas would not be safe, and not be protected, inviting Serb attacks on them. The Co-Chairmen of ICFY, Lord Owen and Mr. Vance, began to air these problems publicly. Lord Owen stated, towards the end of November 1992, that he felt the proposals for the establishment of safe areas were Aflawed in concept@. Repeating a similar message the following month, Mr. Vance told the Security Council that, in his view, the establishment of safe areas would encourage further >ethnic cleansing=.

49 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, expressed caution on the subject in her letter to the Secretary-General, dated 17 December 1992. She supported the general principle that security should be provided in situ, and that peacekeepers should be deployed to provide military protection for persecuted groups. She believed, however, that the safe area concept Ashould only be a last option.@ She voiced particular concern about the possible reaction of the parties to the conflict, which were either opposed to the concept, or wanted to use it to further their own military objectives. She also noted that some capacity for enforcement action by the international community would be required, and even then Athe complete preservation of security would be doubtful.@ She concluded in her letter to the Secretary-General that Ain the absence of a political settlement, protracted camp-like situations would risk being perpetuated.@

50 The Secretariat agreed that, for the safe areas to be viable, the United Nations would have to exercise some political control over the local authorities, to ensure that they took no action (such as using the zones as bases from which to launch military operations) which would increase the risk of attacks against them. The Secretariat anticipated, however, that it would be very difficult to exercise such control. It also questioned whether traditional peacekeeping rules of engagement would be sufficient to discourage any violations of the safe areas.

51 The Force Commander of UNPROFOR opposed the concept of establishing safe areas other than by agreement between the belligerents. He was concerned that the nature of the safe area mandate which was being proposed would be inherently incompatible with peacekeeping. He did not oppose the principle of protecting the Bosnian Government and its armed forces against Serb attack, but opined that there could be no role for peacekeepers in such an operation. Protecting the safe areas, in his view, was a job for a combat-capable, peace-enforcement operation. He summarized his position in a communication to the Secretariat, stating that Aone cannot make war and peace at the same time.@

52 Before the Security Council had time to finalise its position about the concept of safe areas, events on the ground demanded further action. The High Commissioner for Refugees wrote to the Secretary-General on 2 April 1993 (S/25519), that the people of Srebrenica were convinced Athat the Bosnian Serbs [would] pursue their military objective to gain control of Srebrenica.@ She noted that evacuation of non-combatants from Srebrenica was one option, and that these people were Adesperate to escape to safety because they see no other prospect than death if they remain where they are.@ She stressed, however, that the Bosnian Government authorities were Aopposed to continued evacuation of people, which they see as designed to empty the town of its women and children in order to facilitate a subsequent Serbian offensive.@ Under the circumstances, Mrs. Ogata concluded:

53 The Secretary-General presented the High Commissioner=s letter to the Security Council, after which extended consultations took place among the members of the Council. Broadly, the members of the Non-Aligned Caucus, represented principally by Pakistan and Venezuela, proposed strong action Ato reverse Serb aggression.@ The Caucus initially favoured two lines of approach: tightening sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and lifting the arms embargo established under Security Council resolution 713 (1991) as it applied to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Explaining the latter proposal, the Non-Aligned Caucus argued that the embargo was hampering the right to self-defense of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

54 The Non-Aligned Caucus tabled a draft resolution to this effect, which the President of the Council decided would be put to the vote on 26 April. Events on the ground, however, were overtaking the Security Council=s consultations. On 13 April 1993, Serb commanders informed the representative of UNHCR that they would enter Srebrenica within two days unless the town surrendered and its Bosniac population was evacuated. On 16 April, the Secretary-General=s Special Political Advisor, Mr. Chinmaya Gharekhan (who represented the Secretary-General in the Security Council), informed the Council that he had been in contact with the Force Commander of UNPROFOR and that United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) stationed in Srebrenica had reported that the town had not yet fallen, but that the authorities there had offered to surrender on three conditions:

55 There was considerable confusion in the Council, with the representative of one Member State indicating that he had heard from national sources that Srebrenica had already fallen. After extended debate, the Council adopted a draft resolution tabled by the Non-Aligned Caucus, as resolution 819 (1993). The resolution demanded that Aall parties and others treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act.@ It also demanded Athe immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the areas surrounding Srebrenica.@ It further demanded that Athe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.@ However, no specific restrictions were put on the activities of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). Upon learning of the resolution, UNPROFOR expressed concern to the Secretariat that the regime could not be implemented without the consent of both parties which, given Serb dominance, would certainly require Bosnian Government forces to lay down their weapons.

56 The Security Council, although acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, had provided no resources nor mandate for UNPROFOR to impose its demands on the parties. Rather, it requested the Secretary-General, Awith a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take immediate steps to increase the presence of UNPROFOR in Srebrenica and its surroundings.@

57 Thus, the Council appeared to rule out Mrs. Ogata=s evacuation option, and instead condemned and rejected Athe deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as from other parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of >ethnic cleansing=.@

58 Following the adoption of resolution 819 (1993), and on the basis of consultations with members of the Council, the Secretariat informed the UNPROFOR Force Commander that, in its view, the resolution, calling as it did for the parties to take certain actions, created no military obligations for UNPROFOR to establish or protect such a safe area.

59 While the Security Council was speaking out strongly against the actions of the Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR was confronted with the reality that the Serbs were in a position of complete military dominance around Srebrenica, and that the town and its population were at risk. UNPROFOR commanders, therefore, took a different approach from the Council, convincing the Bosniac commanders that they should sign an agreement in which Bosniac forces would give up their arms to UNPROFOR in return for the promise of a cease-fire, the insertion of an UNPROFOR company into Srebrenica, the evacuation of the seriously wounded and seriously ill, unimpeded access for UNHCR and ICRC, and certain other provisions (see S/25700). Representatives of the Bosnian Government were apparently divided as to how to proceed. According to General Halilovi°, then Commander of the ARBiH, President Izetbegovi° was in favour of the UNPROFOR proposal, which, as he understood it, meant that the Bosniacs would hand their weapons over to UNPROFOR in return for UNPROFOR protection.

60 The text of the agreement was negotiated in Sarajevo on 17 April 1993, and was signed by General Halilovi° and General Mladi° early in the morning of 18 April. The Force Commander witnessed the agreement on behalf of UNPROFOR. The agreement laid down the terms under which Srebrenica would be demilitarized, though it did not define the area to be demilitarized. Halilovi° has since stated that he understood the agreement to cover only the urban area of Srebrenica, and not the rural parts of the enclave. UNPROFOR seems also to have understood the agreement in this way. The Serbs, however, did not. The agreement also called for the deployment of UNPROFOR troops into the area by 1100 hours on 18 April in order to secure a landing site for helicopters which would evacuate wounded personnel from Srebrenica; for the monitoring of the cease-fire in Srebrenica and those areas outside the town from which direct fire weapons could be brought to bear; and for the establishment of liaison with authorized military leaders of both sides.

61 Approximately 170 UNPROFOR troops, principally from the Canadian contingent, deployed into the Srebrenica area on 18 April, establishing a substantial UNPROFOR presence there for the first time. The Canadian force then proceeded to oversee the demilitarization of the town of Srebrenica, though not of the surrounding area. Halilovi° has stated that he ordered the Bosniacs in Srebrenica not to hand over any serviceable weapons or ammunition. The Bosniacs accordingly handed over approximately 300 weapons, a large number of which were non-serviceable; they also handed over a small number of heavy weapons, for which there was no significant amount of ammunition. A large number of light weapons were removed to areas outside the town.

62 The Secretariat informed the Force Commander that, in light of the views of several Council members, he should not pursue the demilitarization process in Srebrenica with undue zeal, ruling out, for example, house-to-house searches for weapons. On 21 April UNPROFOR released a press statement entitled ADemilitarization of Srebrenica a success@. That document stated that AUNPROFOR troops, civilian police and military observers had been deployed in Srebrenica since 18 April to collect weapons, ammunitions, mines, explosives and combat supplies and that by noon today they had completed the task of demilitarizing the town.@ The statement noted further that Aalmost 500 sick and wounded had also been evacuated from Srebrenica by helicopters and humanitarian aid convoys have been entering the town since Sunday.@ The Force Commander of UNPROFOR was quoted as saying, AI can confirm that from noon today the town has been demilitarized ... The [UNPROFOR] team prepared a final inventory of all the collected weapons and munitions, which were then destroyed by UNPROFOR.@

63 Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 819 (1993), members of the Security Council had a rare opportunity to assess the situation on the ground first hand, when a Security Council mission let by H.E. Mr. Diego Arria, Permanent Representative of Venezuela, arrived in Srebrenica on 25 April. On arrival in Srebrenica, the mission members noted that whereas the Council resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993 had demanded that certain steps be taken by the Serbs, the UNPROFOR-brokered agreement of 18 April 1993 had required the Bosniacs to disarm. Confronted with the reality of the situation on the ground, the Council Members appeared to support the UNPROFOR course of action. In their report submitted shortly upon return to New York (S/25700), the members of the Security Council Mission wrote that Athe alternative could have been a massacre of 25,000 people. It definitely was an extraordinary emergency situation that had prompted UNPROFOR to act .... There is no doubt that had this agreement not been reached, most probably a massacre would have taken place, which justifies the efforts of the UNPROFOR Commander.@ The Council Members then condemned the Serbs for perpetrating Aa slow-motion process of genocide.@ Comparing the approach of the Council with that of UNPROFOR, a Canadian UNPROFOR officer told the Council Members that Aeven though the Security Council is obviously an important organ of the United Nations, it is of no importance to the Serbs in the area.@ (Ibid.)

64 The report of the Security Council mission noted the discrepancy between the Security Council resolutions and the situation on the ground. It stated that AEven though Security Council resolution 819 (1993) declared the city [of Srebrenica] a safe area, the actual situation obviously does not correspond to either the spirit or the intent of the resolution.@ The mission report then stated that ASerb forces must withdraw to points from which they cannot attack, harass or terrorize the town. UNPROFOR should be in a position to determine the related parameters. The mission believes, as does UNPROFOR, that the actual 4.5 kilometers by 0.5 kilometers decided as a safe area should be greatly expanded.@ How this was to be done was not indicated. The mission report recommended that Gorañde, ðepa, Tuzla and Sarajevo also be declared safe areas, Aas an act of Security Council preventive diplomacy.@ The report concluded by recognizing that Asuch a decision would require a larger UNPROFOR presence, a revised mandate to encompass cease-fire/safe area monitoring and different rules of engagement.@ It proposed the stepwise introduction of measures that could, if the Serbs ignored the integrity of the safe areas, lead to Aeventual consideration@ of Amilitary strike enforcement measures.@

65 On the ground, events were developing in a different direction. The agreement witnessed by the Force Commander on 18 April was followed by a more comprehensive agreement on 8 May, in which General Halilovi° and General Mladi° agreed on measures covering the whole of the Srebrenica enclave and the adjacent enclave of ðepa. Under the terms of the new agreement, Bosniac forces within the enclave would hand over their weapons, ammunition and mines to UNPROFOR, after which Serb Aheavy weapons and units that constitute a menace to the demilitarized zones which will have been established in ðepa and Srebrenica will be withdrawn.@ Unlike the earlier agreement, the agreement of 8 May stated specifically that Srebrenica was to be considered a Ademilitarized zone@, as referred to in Article 60 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).

66 As had been the case on 16-18 April, the cease-fire negotiations of 6-8 May took place simultaneously with consultations of the Security Council. A draft resolution presented by the Non-Aligned Caucus welcomed the recommendations of the Security Council Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and proposed expanding the safe area regime to include the city of Sarajevo, Aand other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, ðepa, Gorañde and Biha°.@ During the Security Council consultations of 5 May, the Secretary-General=s Special Political Advisor remarked that the Secretary-General would normally be requested to make recommendations on the resources he would need to ensure that the status of these towns as safe areas was respected. He added that UNPROFOR could not be expected to take on this additional responsibility within its existing resources and that it would need at least one brigade in each town declared a safe area. Quite simply, he concluded, the Secretary-General did not have the means to implement this draft resolution.

67 On 6 May, Members of the Security Council learned that the ABosnian Serb Assembly@ had rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The Council then adopted the draft under discussion, as resolution 824 (1993), which declared that Sarajevo, and other towns, such as Tuzla, ðepa, Gorañde and Biha°, should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act. It also declared that in the safe areas the following should be observed:

(A map depicting the general location of the designated safe areas is attached at the end of this chapter).

68 As with resolution 819 (1993), all of the Council=s demands in resolution 824 (1993) were directed at the Serbs. UNPROFOR, as before, stated that it could not implement the resolution unless there were an agreement between the parties or unless it were given the resources to enforce it in the face of Serb opposition. References to enforcement measures, which had been proposed in a draft submitted by members of the Non-Aligned Caucus, however, had not been included in the text of resolution 824 (1993). Instead, the Council authorized the Secretary-General to strengthen UNPROFOR with 50 additional unarmed United Nations military observers.

69 Noting the discrepancy between the agreement of 8 May 1993 that had been negotiated on the ground by UNPROFOR, and the resolution concurrently passed by the Council, the Secretariat explained to UNPROFOR that the Security Council had laid great emphasis in resolution 824 on the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs from their positions threatening the Asafe areas@. The Secretariat believed that it was essential that UNPROFOR reiterate its determination to ensure the implementation of those parts of the agreement concerning the Serb withdrawal from around the safe area. The Secretariat added that the implied sequence in the agreement -- with Government forces disarming first, followed by a Serb withdrawal later -- would be unacceptable to the Security Council.

70 Following the rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan by the ABosnian Serb Assembly@, a >referendum= was held in Serb-controlled territory on 15 and 16 May. The Pale authorities claimed that the result of the referendum overwhelmingly confirmed the decision of the assembly to reject the peace plan, which had only been signed by Dr. Karadñi° on the condition of the former=s concurrence. This led to a new round of activity in the international community, the focus of which was on how to stabilize the military situation on the ground.

71 On 14 May, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan transmitted a memorandum containing the views and concerns of the members of the Security Council that were members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25782) to the President of the Security Council. The memorandum presented the argument that the safe area concept would fail unless the security of those areas was Aguaranteed and protected@ by UNPROFOR. Without these guarantees and protection, the memorandum stated, Asuch safe areas will provide no help to their inhabitants but rather force them into helpless submission.@ The failure of the international community to use enforcement measures, or to use the threat of such enforcement measures, would Ainevitably lead to a much more substantial use of force in the future ... We have all learned the most important lesson in this conflict: that the international community will not be respected until it decides to take effective actions.@ Referring to UNPROFOR, the memorandum stated that Ain spite of the fact that the force was established under Chapter VII, its functions have been narrowly interpreted and its focus limited to the provision of humanitarian assistance and that, too, based on the consent of the perpetrators of the aggression. This restrictive interpretation, coupled with the denial of the inherent right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to invoke Article 51 of the Charter [to self-defence], has encouraged the Serbs to continue with their aggression.@ (Ibid., para. 10)

72 The next response was from the Permanent Representative of France who forwarded a memorandum (S/25800) to the President of the Security Council on 19 May. The French memorandum outlined changes that would have to be made to the UNPROFOR mandate Ato give it, more clearly than in resolution 824 (1993), the task of ensuring the security of the safe areas. To this end a new resolution should provide explicitly for the possibility of recourse to the [use of] force, by all necessary means.@ It explained that Athe general aim of the scheme should be to stop territorial gains by the Serbian forces.@ (Ibid., para. 3)

73 In their memorandum the French outlined three options which could be considered:

The task of UNPROFOR in the first two options would be Ato deter aggression.@ The following criteria might trigger the use of force, Adetermined in a limited way@:

74 The French memorandum specified that Aa symbolic United Nations presence@ would be required in each safe area for the Alight option without formed units@. For the Alight option with formed units@ a brigade (5,000 soldiers) would be required in Sarajevo, plus a battalion (900 soldiers) each in Biha° and Tuzla, a battalion divided between Srebrenica and ðepa, and a battalion divided between Gorañde and Fo·a. For the Aheavy option@ a division would be required in Sarajevo, and a brigade in each of the other areas. The memorandum concluded that Athe effective participation on the ground of the United States and the Russian Federation with the countries already involved would confer added credibility to such a concept of safe areas and might make the light options sufficient.@ (Ibid., paras. 5-8)

75 A third response came on 22 May, when representatives of the Governments of France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States met in Washington, D.C., agreeing on a >Joint Action Programme=. The meeting followed an unsuccessful mission to Europe by the United States Secretary of State seeking support for a Alift and strike policy@ - (i.e., lifting of the arms embargo and striking the BSA from the air). The Joint Action Programme attempted to bridge the positions of the various governments concerned. Instead of insisting that the Serbs accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as a complete package, as earlier statements had done, the Programme spoke of Abuilding on the Vance-Owen process,@ and encouraged the parties to the conflict to Aimplement promptly mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan.@ The Programme referred to the continuation of humanitarian assistance, to the rigorous enforcement of sanctions against the Serbs, to the possible sealing of the Yugoslav border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, to continued enforcement of the no-fly zone, to the rapid establishment of a War Crimes Tribunal and to the Avaluable contribution@ that could be made by the concept of safe areas. (S/25829)

76 The Joint Action Programme was strongly criticized by members of the Non-Aligned Caucus who objected to the lack of Aclear commitment to reversing the consequences of Serbian aggression.@ The Caucus also expressed concern about what its members saw as the abandonment of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and was particularly sceptical about the advancement of a weak safe area policy as a substitute for more resolute action such as the lifting of the arms embargo.

77 The Security Council then asked the Secretariat to prepare within 24 hours a Aworking paper@ on safe areas, which was presented to the Council, the next day, on 28 May. That unofficial working paper stated that Aany concept of safe areas must assume the cooperation of the warring parties. Without a cease-fire in the region of the safe areas, the concept of safe areas is virtually impossible to implement.@ The paper laid out the argument that peacekeeping operations could only succeed with the consent of the parties, and that the Serbs would certainly not consent to any arrangement which put UNPROFOR in the way of their military objectives. Having said that, the paper then stated that Aif UNPROFOR is given the task to enforce the establishment of a safe area (i.e. Chapter VII) it is likely to require combat support arms such as artillery and perhaps even close air support.@ The Secretariat paper laid out a number of options for the size and composition of United Nations units in each safe area:

The distinction being made between Aa military capability to protect the safe area@ and an UNPROFOR presence Acapable of defending the safe area against possible aggression@ was not explained, though estimates of the numbers of troops required to implement each option were given as follows:

78 France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States then co-sponsored a resolution based substantially on the French memorandum of 19 May. The Security Council began deliberations on it on 1 June, and voted on the draft resolution on 4 June 1993. It was adopted by 13 votes in favour, with two abstentions (Pakistan and Venezuela), becoming Security Council resolution 836 (1993). Three paragraphs of the resolution, which was adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, were seen as particularly important:

79 It is essential to note that the resolution explicitly eschewed the use of the words Aprotect@ or Adefend@, and asked UNPROFOR only Ato occupy some key points on the ground and linked the use of force to the phrase Aacting in self-defence@. As the following section indicates, some members of the Council nonetheless took a broader view of the resolution.

80 At the meeting during which the vote was taken (S/PV.3228 of 4 June 1993), representatives of the 15 Security Council members made statements commenting on the resolution, as did the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey.

81 The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a non-member of the Security Council, noted that the informal working paper presented by the Secretariat had characterized the implementation of the safe area policy as Anot realistically possible.@ He stated that the resolution appeared to be Adiplomatic cover for some of its co-sponsors to mitigate the need and responsibility for more resolute and comprehensive measures.@ He spoke of Aa continuing lack of will to confront@ Serb attacks on the Bosniac enclaves. The representative of Turkey was also sceptical about the effectiveness of the resolution, asserting that, in passing the resolution, Athe international community continues to pursue its course of indecision and fails to take coercive action that would once and for all stop the aggression.@ He said that his Government continued Astrongly to advocate the use of force to stop Serbian aggression.@ He added that the resolution failed to acknowledge the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to self-defence -- Aa right which has been denied for far too long.@ He repeated Turkey=s preparedness to contribute troops to UNPROFOR.

82 The representative of France, noting that his Government had issued the memorandum of 19 May in which the concept of the safe areas had been elaborated, stated that it was France and its partners which, following the adoption of the Joint Action Programme in Washington, had proposed that the Council adopt a draft resolution Aensuring full respect for the safe areas named in resolution 824 (1993) ...@ He stated that the draft resolution addressed two objectives: the humanitarian one of ensuring the survival of the civilian populations of the safe areas, and the political one of maintaining the territorial basis needed for the Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. He said that Athe designation and protection of the safe areas [was] not an end in itself, but only a temporary measure: a step towards a just and lasting political solution.@ He characterized the draft resolution as Arealistic and operational@, and believed that it would be a first step towards implementing the Vance-Owen Plan. He concluded by stating that, in adopting the text, Athe Council [would] demonstrate that the international community is not standing idly by.@

83 The representative of Venezuela, who abstained rather than voting in favour of the draft resolution, spoke at length, criticizing it on two grounds: first, that it could not be implemented without substantial resources which might not be forthcoming, and, second, that it provided cover for an unwillingness to support Athe broader and more meaningful goals of the fair and equitable distribution of territory between the various communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.@ On the first point, the representative stated that Athe draft resolution could not be implemented without the resolve to do so and until the Secretary-General had the necessary means and resources...@ He noted that the Non-Aligned Caucus had wanted the Secretary-General to report formally on the safe area concept before the vote was taken on the draft resolution. AUnfortunately, it [had been] decided not to await the opinion of the Secretary-General.@ The representative referred to the Aobjective and highly critical evaluation@ of the concept made by the Secretary-General in the unofficial working paper of 28 May. He noted that the Secretary-General had already asked Council members Aparticularly valid questions@ about the precise role of the United Nations, and whether or not the United Nations would be expected to use force if the Serbs did not comply with the resolution. He noted also that these questions had not been satisfactorily answered, and predicted that the safe areas would not be Asafe@ at all. On the second point, he criticized the Joint Action Programme and the view that Aall that are needed are containment and prevention measures: safe areas, border monitors, strengthening sanctions, the prohibition of overflights, a tribunal for crimes against humanitarian law.@ He asked whether Council members could believe that this attitude would Aconvince the aggressors that it is best graciously to renounce what they have conquered by terror and force.@ He called on the Council to Arespect and apply collective security, which ensures the right to self-defence, as guaranteed by the Charter.@

84 The representative of Pakistan, who also abstained rather than voting in favour of the draft resolution, supported Aexpeditious and comprehensive action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to enforce its decisions and to authorize the use of all necessary measures, including the use of air strikes against key strategic targets, to halt the Serbian aggression, [and] reverse it through withdrawals from all territories occupied by the use of force and >ethnic cleansing=...@ He drew the attention of Council members to Athe fundamental shortcomings of this concept@ of the safe areas, but reiterated his Government=s offer to provide troops to UNPROFOR in connection with the implementation of the draft resolution. He urged the Council to Atake further appropriate steps, including the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, in conformity with its inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter ...@

85 The representative of New Zealand stated that his Government supported the resolution on the understanding that force, in the form of air strikes, could be used if UNPROFOR was prevented from carrying out its tasks or if humanitarian assistance continued to be interdicted. He urged the Council to send a message to the Serbs that they should cease their activities in and around the safe areas, or face swift consequences. AAny message less than this -- as a first step -- would be, in our view, gravely damaging to the Council=s reputation and, indeed, to the United Nations as a whole.@ The representative of Djibouti said that he would vote in favour of the resolution, accepting Ain good faith the strong affirmations of the sponsoring Members that this time they do indeed mean business.@

86 Speaking after the vote, the representative of Brazil stated that: AThere should be no doubt in anyone=s mind that this resolution can be considered neither the ideal nor the final response of the Security Council to the conflict.@ He had voted in favour of the resolution because, Ain spite of its shortcomings ... it constitutes a concrete step and embodies a significant qualitative change in the way the Council has been dealing with the matter so far.@

87 The representative of the Russian Federation noted that his delegation was among the sponsors of the resolution, and that the resolution set out Aa serious package of very effective and genuinely practicable measures.@ His delegation was convinced that the implementation of the resolution Awould be an important practical step for the international community genuinely to curb the violence and to stop the shooting on the long-suffering land of the Bosnians. Henceforth, any attempted military attacks, shooting and shelling of safe areas, any armed incursions into those areas, and any hindrance to the delivery of humanitarian assistance [would] be stopped by the United Nations forces by using all necessary means, including the use of armed force.@ He spoke in favour of the Joint Action Programme and concluded that Athe Washington programme does not exclude the adoption of new, firmer measures: nothing has been ruled in or ruled out.@

88 The representative of the United States of America said that her Government had co-sponsored the resolution because it Asaw it as a means to save lives ...@ She added: Athe United States voted for this resolution with no illusions. It is an intermediate step -- no more, no less. Indeed, both the Security Council and the Governments that developed the Joint Action Programme have agreed that they will keep open options for new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration. My Government=s view of what those tougher measures should be has not changed.@ The United States Government expected Athe full cooperation of the Bosnian Serb party in implementing this resolution. If that cooperation [was] not forthcoming, [it would] move to seek further action in the Security Council.@

89 The representative of China noted that the humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had dramatically deteriorated. AUnder the present circumstances, the establishment of a number of safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina may as well be tried as a temporary measure in order to reduce conflicts and ease the people=s afflictions.@ He stressed, however, that the safe area policy could not provide a fundamental political solution to the conflict, and predicted that the policy might encounter Aa series of difficulties in the course of implementation.@ He said that Athe invoking of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to authorize the use of force, as well as the implication in the resolution that further military action would be taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina [might], instead of helping the effort to seek an enduring peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, further complicate the issue there, and adversely affect the peace process.@

90 The representative of Hungary stated that Athe solutions set out in that resolution are far from ideal ... This resolution treats only the symptoms, because it does not give a fully convincing response to the key issue, at present, in the Bosnian conflict: reversing the results of the aggression which has been carried out with impunity in that country.@ Hungary had voted in favour of the resolution because it understood it as Aauthorizing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to resort to force in response to bombardments of safe areas or armed incursions or if there [were] deliberate impediments in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or protected humanitarian convoys.@ He said that Athe action in which the international community [was] now engaged [fell] under the heading of >too little, too late=.@

91 The representative of the United Kingdom spoke positively about the Joint Action Programme, describing the safe area policy as Aan essential step in the immediate agenda@ of the Programme. AThe aim is to provide further help to large concentrations of the civilian population, most of whom are Muslims.@ A new element was that the United Kingdom, Awith France and the United States, probably acting in a NATO framework, were prepared to make available air power in response to calls for assistance from United Nations forces in and around the >safe areas=. To implement this concept of >safe areas= effectively, the United Nations [would] need some further troops, and [the United Kingdom would] support the Secretary-General in his efforts to attract new contributions, including from some Islamic States.@ The safe areas would not stop the war and were a temporary measure. Noting that there were some suggestions that a policy of >safe areas= might be combined with a lifting of the arms embargo, he said that his Government did not see the combination of these elements as an option and that the two policies were distinct and alternative. AIt would be hard to reconcile the supply of arms with United Nations peacekeeping on the ground.@ He then spoke in favour of the negotiating efforts of Mr. Vance and Lord Owen, and noted that neither the Joint Action Programme nor the view of the Government of the United Kingdom ruled out Aother, stronger measures as the situation develops.@

92 The representative of Spain stated that Awith the expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate to ensure full respect of the >safe areas=, [the Security Council had] taken an important step aimed at saving lives, protecting threatened territories, permitting free access to humanitarian assistance and also facilitating the future application of the Vance-Owen peace plan.@ He added that AUNPROFOR=s reinforced protection of the six areas mentioned in the resolution [was] aimed at increasing their security and providing higher levels of safety and well-being for the threatened civilian population.@

93 Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 836 (1993), the Serbs continued to bombard the safe areas at about the same rate as before. In Sarajevo, for example, Serb shells continued to land in the safe area at an average rate of approximately 1,000 per day, usually into civilian-inhabited areas, often in ways calculated to maximize civilian casualties, sometimes at random, and only occasionally for identifiably military purposes. This pattern, which had begun on 6 April 1992, continued, with lulls of varying lengths, until Operation Deliberate Force in August 1995. The Serbs also continued to obstruct freedom of movement to all of the safe areas, both for UNPROFOR and for humanitarian convoys, imposing a system of clearances, the principal effect of which was to limit the effectiveness of UNPROFOR and to slow down the delivery of humanitarian aid.

94 Shortly after the adoption of resolution 836 (1993), the Secretariat convened a meeting of the resolution=s sponsors (France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States) and Canada. The Secretariat made an oral presentation in which it stated that approximately 32,000 additional ground troops would be required to implement the safe area concept. This drew strong opposition, particularly from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who insisted that the preferred approach would be closer to the Alight option@ presented in the French memorandum, which would entail some 5,000 additional troops.

95 The Secretariat then informed UNPROFOR that none of the co-sponsors was willing to contribute any additional troops for UNPROFOR, and that none of them seemed to envisage a force capable of effectively defending these areas. The Secretariat believed that there was unanimity among the co-sponsors that the extension of UNPROFOR=s mandate to include a capacity to deter attack against the safe areas should not be construed as signifying deployment in sufficient strength to repel attacks by military force. UNPROFOR=s major deterrent capacity, rather than being a function of military strength, would essentially flow from its presence in the safe areas. The Secretariat referred to the positive example of Srebrenica, where, it was felt the success of the approach had been demonstrated. The Secretariat added that UNPROFOR=s role Ato promote the withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces@ was said to call for persuasion rather than coercion. The Secretariat informed UNPROFOR that the resolution=s co-sponsors shared the Secretariat=s own concern that any air strikes would pose grave dangers to UNPROFOR=s personnel and the humanitarian convoys and should, therefore, be initiated with the greatest restraint and, essentially, in self-defence.

96 The Secretary-General presented the first of several reports in which he outlined his views on the implementation of the safe area concept on 14 June. (S/25939). He noted that, Ain order to ensure full respect for the safe areas, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR estimated that an additional troop requirement at an indicative level of 34,000 would be required to obtain deterrence through strength.@ He went on to note, however, that Ait would be possible to start implementing the resolution under a >light option= envisaging a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600. While this option cannot, in itself, completely guarantee the defence of the safe areas, it relies on the threat of air action against any of the belligerents.@ (S/25939, paragraph 5)

97 Concerning Srebrenica, the Secretary-General stated that the existing force levels would not have to be enhanced under the light option. He did state, however, that, Asince it is assumed that UNPROFOR ground troops will not be sufficient to resist a concentrated assault on any of the safe areas, particular emphasis must be placed on the availability of the air-strike capability provided by Member States. This would require the deployment of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in order that the force-multiplying characteristics of air power may be fully exploited if necessary.@ (S/25939, para. 4). Forward Air Controllers were later deployed in all the safe areas.

98 Through its resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, inter alia: approved the report of the Secretary-General; decided to authorize the deployment of the additional 7,600 troops proposed under the >light option=; and reaffirmed its decision in para. 10 of resolution 836 (1993) on the use of air power.

99. Shortly thereafter, representatives of the Non-Aligned Caucus tabled a draft resolution which would have exempted the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo imposed on the former Yugoslavia under resolution 713 (1991). The Council voted on the draft resolution on 29 June, and rejected it by six votes in favour (Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan, the United States and Venezuela), to none against, and nine abstentions (Brazil, China, France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Spain and the United Kingdom).

100. Several Council members, and a number of other Permanent Representatives, who had asked to participate in the discussion of the draft resolution, made a connection between the safe area policy and the effort to lift the arms embargo. Representatives of several members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) said that they viewed the concept underlying Security Council resolution 836 (1993) as Aflawed from the beginning.@ They suggested that, if the Council was unable to take action to halt the conflict or to protect the Bosniac population, then the Council should at least allow the Bosniacs to defend themselves. The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina saw the safe area regime as an expression of the lack of will of some countries to provide an effective deterrent to Serb aggression. That being the case, the safe area regime could, at best, benefit some people temporarily, but none permanently. Given the lack of will in the international community, Bosnia and Herzegovina now sought to reassert its right to obtain the means of self-defense.

101. The representative of Pakistan noted that his country, together with other non-aligned members of the Council, had originally supported the establishment of safe areas, but felt that the experience in Srebrenica, ðepa and Gorañde had revealed the fundamental shortcomings of the concept in the absence of any real resolve. In his view, the safe area policy had become an instrument for freezing the situation on the ground to the full advantage of the Serbs. He felt that the lack of resolve within the Council had emboldened the Serbs. Thirteen representatives of Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference also spoke in favour of the draft, as did the representatives of Costa Rica, Slovenia, Venezuela and the United States.

102. The representative of the United Kingdom, leading those who opposed the draft resolution, also referred to the safe area policy. On the ground in Bosnia, he said, top priority had to be given to making the safe areas safe. He described the response to the decisions of the Council to reinforce UNPROFOR with 7,500 troops and to back up those troops with the deterrent threat of air strikes as Aencouraging.@ The representative of France, who also opposed the draft, said that reasons of