Several posters have questioned my introductory remark about the ideology of Christoslavism that is behind much of the religiously motivated violence in Bosnia. It is now time to explain exactly what I mean by the topic, and in doing so, to bring in the specificities of the religious elements in the Bosnian genocide.
Before I do, I should clarify two issues. In an earlier posting I mentioned that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic harnessed Serb religious nationalists and mobilized them at the Kosovo celebration of June 28, 1989. I will demonstrate exactly how Milosevic carried this operation out. Momcilo Miljkovic complains that Milosevic is not religious and thus objects to my discussion of him in terms of religious nationalists. But religious persecutions are often organized or supported by political leaders who are not themselves religious. These leaders understand symbols and the power of symbols, especially in times of crisis and in combination with mob pyschology. While not themselves religious, they appropriate religious symbolism, secure the support of religious militants, and help arm and organize those religious militants in turn.
So, of course Milosevic is not religious. In addition to his own indifference to religion, his powerful wife, Mira Markovic, despises religion and considers herself a classical Marxist. Yet from 1987 to 1992 Milosevic mobilized Serb religious nationalists, armed them, gave them massive media exposure, and sent them into Bosnia across all the borders of Bosnia with Serb Krajina, with Serbia, and with Montenegro. He in turn was fervently supported by the same religious nationalists.
Father Rastko Trbuhovic points out that many Serbs are not religiously observant. The same of course was true for Bosnian Muslims, many of whom were not only not observant, but were skeptics, atheists, or simply not interested in religious issues. Father Trbuhovic therefore questions the notion that the tragedy in Bosnia is a religious conflict rather than an ethnic conflict.
The fact that many Serb militia members might not attend church regularly does not mean that their activities were devoid of powerful religious elements. The non-observant Serbs who fought in the militias of Arkan, Bokan, Vojkan, Jovic, and Seselj, and in the army of General Ratko Mladic, may not have been regularly observant, but they wore religious symbols on their uniforms, used semi-religious rituals, saw themselves specifically as soldiers of Christ, and in many cases were supported by Serb bishops such as Vasilje of Tuzla-Zvornik, and supported Serb Bishops in turn. Arkan, a key figure in the most unspeakable atrocities, had a hugely popular wedding, steeped in religious symbolism, in which he wore a huge cross and his bride was figured as the "maiden of Kosovo," a Mary Magdalene figure in Serbian religious inconography. Serb bishops from Bosnia journey to Arkan's wedding in Belgrade to honor him. Serb priests even blessed a boxing and go-go girl casino owned and run by Arkan, waving an incense burner and reciting prayers and blessings.
So while Arkan and his "Tigers" (the name of his militia members) may not go to Church, they are dress their uniforms and their consciousness in religious mythology and see themselves explicitly as fighting on behalf of their religion, and have close connection to important religious leaders within the Serbian Orthodox Church. The notion that Bosnian Muslims are Christ-Killers, a notion developed through the iconography of the battle of Kosovo and the death of the Christ-Prince Lazar at Kosovo in 1389, is a key element in their consciousness.
The crucial distinction here is between modes of religion. There is a common confusion between religious observance and religious fundamentalism. In fact, it is often those who are n-o-t necessarily observant who are the most militant or fundamentalist, the most determined to destroy those in other religions-- and to destroy those in their own religion whose practices or beliefs differ from their own. Arkan, Dragoslav Bokan, Dragos Kalajic, each of whom I will discuss in terms of religious nationalism, would be a classic examples.
Father Trbuhovic raises a very important challenge to my initial language of religious conflict. How do those who may be only superficially religious act out a religious mythology and carry out religious persecution, and both motivate and justify their actions by placing themselves within specifically religious scenarios? That is the topic I will explore in the following postings on Christoslavism, and I will offer a clear and detailed answer to the questions implied in Father Trbuhovic's post.
Michael Sells