On the Latent Function of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia

By Keith Doubt

Keith Doubt
Associate Professor of Sociology
Truman State University

Ethnic cleansing is a widely used euphemism for the murders, arrests, rapes, and expulsions of Bosnian citizens. The phrase is euphemistic because cleansing implies an activity that is harmless, ordinary, and even good. The analogy, which the phrase establishes, however, is perverse. Were the murders, arrests, rapes, and expulsions of Bosnian citizens a matter of cleansing? Were the murders, arrests, rapes, and expulsions of Bosnian citizens a matter of cleaning dirt out of an area? In what sense was this activity beneficial? Necessary? Was there anything ordinary about the murders, arrests, rapes and expulsions of Bosnian citizens? The use of this phrase by victimizers and victims alike obstructs an adequate understanding of the activity which the term describes.

The use of this phrase also promotes the prejudice which motivates the conduct. The term, ethnic cleansing, patronizes and indulges the rationalization of the actors victimizing people under the guise of cleansing, a term loaded with positive images. Whenever the phrase is used, it leaves unchallenged the assumptions and opinions of those engaged in and committed to ethnic cleansing. Perhaps because the conduct being identified is so painful, it is necessary in media presentations to employ a normalizing language. Nevertheless, ethnic cleansing is a phrase which refers to a planned and methodical act of genocide in southern Europe in the 1990s. Despite his reservations, the author will employ this widely used phrase. The task now is to understand the significance of the conduct which the phrase identifies.

In "Bosnia: A Short History," Noel Malcolm concludes his account of Bosnia's history from the middle ages to the present time with an astute observation of contemporary events. First, Malcolm describes the conscious motivation for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. One implication is that the conscious motivation is rational. It represents the actors' decisions on the most efficient means for attaining a selected end. Malcolm writes, "The pattern was set by young urban gangsters in expensive sunglasses from Serbia, members of the paramilitary forces raised by Arkan and others . . . what they were doing was to carry out a rational strategy dictated by their political leaders -- a method carefully calculated to drive out two ethnic populations and radicalize a third." This conscious motivation has been documented carefully; Norman Cigar, Roy Gutman, Peter Maass, and many others have provided abundant evidence to support this description of the manifest function of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

Malcolm is implictly drawing upon a well known but infrequently used concept in the sociology of Robert K. Merton. In his essay "Manifest and Latent Functions," Merton says that functional analysis is an interpretive scheme, a certain style of hermeneutics. Drawing upon the model of the biological sciences, functional analysis examines social conduct in terms of how it contributes to the maintenance of an organic whole. It addresses what role social conduct plays in the vitality of this whole. From a functionalist point of view, how did ethnic cleansing operate so as to maintain the vitality of a whole to which it was subject? What social organization did ethnic cleansing serve? The manifest function was to drive apart two ethnic populations and radicalize a third. Does this conscious motivation, however, adequately explain why the conduct occurred?

After describing the conscious motivation for ethnic cleansing, Malcolm identifies a more compelling understanding of why ethnic cleansing occurred in Bosnia. Malcolm cites another historian to conclude "Bosnia: A Short History." The strength of these concluding words is the way in which they identify what Merton would call the latent function of ethnic cleansing. Malcolm writes, "But perhaps the best comment on the tactics of Milosevic and Karadzic and on what they have achieved in Bosnia . . . is a judgment by another historian on another country's descent into blood." Then Malcolm cites the following passage from Richard Pipes, "The Bolsheviks had to spill blood in order to bind their waving adherents with a band of "collective guilt." The more innocent victims the Bolshevik Party had on its conscience, the more the Bolshevik rank and file had to realize there was no retreating, no faltering, no compromising, that they were inextricably bound to their leaders, and could only march with them to 'total victory' regardless of the cost."

Merton argues that, as long as functional analysis restricts its focus to the manifest function of social conduct, it remains deficient and undeveloped. The business of functional analysis, Merton asserts, is to explain the real or causal function of social conduct. In sociology, function, Merton says, is determined, not by the subjective dispositions of social conduct, for instance, its aims, motives, and purposes, but by the objective consequences of the conduct. Aims, motives, and purposes, Merton says, more often than not have little to do with the objective consequences of conduct. According to Merton, in social life subjective dispositions and objective consequences operate independently of each other. Thus to understand what governs conduct, it is necessary to address the objective consequences of the conduct. Often, the objective consequences are unintended and unrecognized, which is why Merton introduces the concept of latent function.

What was the objective consequence of ethnic cleansing? What function did ethnic cleansing perform? Why did it occur with the sadism that it did? While the manifest function describes, from the viewpoint of the actors involved, a rationalization for ethnic cleansing, the latent function explains the unrecognized or unintended logic which governs the activity. As Malcolm points out, the latent function of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was to bind together with a band of collective guilt the wavering adherents within the Serbian population. The more ambivalent Bosnian Serbs were about the aim of ethnic cleansing, the more gruesome the practice had to be. The more uncertain Bosnian Serbs were about the purpose of ethnic cleansing, the more perverse the conduct became. The more skeptical Bosnian Serbs were about the purpose of ethnic cleansing, the more sadistic the activity was.

The reason why ethnic cleansing took its most abusive form in Bosnia rather than other parts of former Yugoslavia is not because there was a long standing history of tribal hatreds in Bosnia. On the contrary, the reason why ethnic cleansing took its most abusive form in Bosnia is because there is a long standing history of openness and tolerance in Bosnia. There has been among Bosians a long standing history of good will toward each other and different traditions. From the viewpoint of Bosnian Serbs who saw themselves not only as Serbian but also as Bosnian, there was no need for ethnic cleansing. From the viewpoint of Bosnian Serbs who saw themselves as Yugoslavs rather than Serbs, there was no purpose for ethnic cleansing. >From the perspective of Bosnian Serbs whose spouses were non-Serbs, there was no desire for ethnic cleansing.

Given the normative orientations which had historically held together the Bosnian community, ethnic cleansing had to be done in ways which were absolute. Given the shared values which integrated the Bosnian society, ethnic cleansing had to be done in a ways which were absolute and ruthless. Otherwise, the uncertainty and ambivalence of Bosnian Serbs could not be overcome. Thus the objective consequence of ethnic cleansing was to force Bosnian Serbs "to realize there was no retreating, no faltering, no compromising, that they were inextricably bound to their leaders, and could only march with them to 'total victory' regardless of the cost."

Examples of this objective consequence are easy to find. Consider the following telling passages from Michael A. Sells's "The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia," Peter Maass's "Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War," and David Rohde's "Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica: Europe's Worst Massacre Since World War II." First, Sells writes: "Serbs who refused to participate in the persecution of Muslims were killed. In a Serb-army occupied area of Sarajevo, Serb militants killed a Serb officer who objected to atrocities against civilians; they left his body on the street for over a week as an object lesson. During one of the 'selections' carried out by Serb militants in Sarajevo, an old Serb named Ljubo objected to being separated out from his Muslim friends and neighbors; they beat him to death on the spot. In Zvornik, Serb militiamen slit the throat of a seventeen-year-old Serb girl who protested the shooting of Muslim civilians. In the Prijedor region, Serb militants put Serbs accused of helping non-Serb neighbors into the camps with those they tried to help." Later, Sells writes: "Commanders of the killing camps made a practice of opening them to local Serb radicals, gangsters, and grudge-holders, who would come each night to beat, torture, and kill the detainees. This practice had the effect of spreading complicity throughout the neighboring area. Distribution of stolen and abandoned goods also spread complicity. Every town "cleansed" meant the availability of automobiles, appliances, stereo and television equipment. Once a family had in their home something that had belonged to a neighbor, they were less likely to object to the "ethnic cleansing."

In "Love Thy Neighbor," Maass also identifies the objective consequence of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. "Gaining the support of ordinary people . . . is a crucial element of any successful reign of terror. The wavering masses, the silent majority, the good men, they must feel stained by the same blood as the Visigoths who fired the first shots. They must be made into accomplices to the crime. Once this is done, once their moral backs are broken, they will do virtually anything. Like Zelja [a Serb sniper in the hills of Sarajevo] they will even fire shots that might kill their own parents [Selja's parents lived, by choice, in Sarajevo during its siege]." Rohde's "Endgame" chronicles the fall of Srebrenica from the viewpoint of those who either experienced or participated in the atrocity. Reporting an anecdote from Drazen Erdemovic, an executioner during the Srebrenica massacre found guilty in June of 1996 of crimes against humanity before the International War Crimes Tribunal, Rodhe writes from Erdemovic's recollections: "Before the last group were executed, Gojkovic [the squad's commander] entered the bus and handed a Kalahnikov to the driver. "You must each kill one, " he said to the horrified driver. He didn't want anyone talking. Everyone would be guilty. Not only were individuals coopted into the conduct of ethnic cleansing, but entire villages and towns were implicated by the process.

Consider the particular manner in which the Muslim men, who were retained in Bratunac, a Serb-held town northeast of Srebrenica, were executed. Rodhe reports: "600 Muslim prisoners . . . were packed shoulder to shoulder in two sixty-foot-long, sixteen-wheel trucks. . . . For three hours, the men stood in the stifling trucks. At 11 p.m., guards finally lifted the top off the back entrance of the truck. Local Serb men and women from Bratunac were waiting. They asked if any Muslims from Bratunac or any old friends they knew were on board. "We brought you dinner," they said, or "We brought you cigarettes." About twenty Muslims got off the truck. They were asked questions briefly and then the Serbs began to beat them. The men in the truck listened to their cries, and then heard pistol fire. None of the twenty returned. At 12:30 a.m., more people appeared at the back of Hodzic's truck, wanting to know if there were any Muslims from the villages of Kravica and Lolici on the truck. About twenty Muslim men, either deciding that they wanted to die or believing somehow that their friends would spare them, got off. They were immediately beaten. "Fuck your Gypsy mother!" one Serb shouted. Again, shots were heard. Again, none of the twenty returned."

What was the latent function of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia? The function was to disfigure the normative orientation to which Bosnian Serbs were dependent and subject as members of the Bosnian community. The objective consequence of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was to maim the collective sentiments which integrated Bosnian Serbs in their society and guided them in their interactions with others. The objective consequence of ethnic cleansing was to detach Bosnian Serbs from the value elements which they use to make judgments not only about others but also about themselves.

What has occurred in Bosnia since 1992 is that the moral sentiments of Bosnian Serbs have been transformed into the mind-set of a crowd. Gustave Le Bon says that, while a crowd is a social phenomenon with a distinct structure, a crowd, nevertheless, lacks the form of a society. While a social entity, a crowd is still a deficient society. Le Bon notes, however, that sometimes, "An entire nation may become a crowd under the action of certain influences."

Given the influence of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the normative orientation upon which the Bosnian community depended became the delusional mind-set of a crowd. Maass provides a caricature of this crowd mentality which overtook not only many Bosnian Serbs, but also Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. "Everyone knew that sin was evil and that no good could come from evil. But . . . it was almost no trick at all . . . to turn vice into virtue, and slander into truth, impotence into abstinence, arrogance into humility, plunder into philanthropy, thievery into honor, blasphemy into wisdom, brutality into patriotism, and sadism into justice. Anybody could do it; it required no brains at all. It merely required no character."

The reason why Western leaders and United Nations officials appeased nationalist Serb leaders meeting after meeting and year after year is because Western leaders and United Nations officials lacked an adequate understanding of why ethnic cleansing was occuring. Although Western leaders and United Nations officials had detailed reports from the CIA and the State Department on the manner and degree to which ethnic cleansing was occurring, they lacked an objective understanding of why ethnic cleansing was occurring. With the media they accepted the accounts provided by the actors engaged in ethnic cleansing. They accepted that the aim, purpose, and goal of ethnic cleansing was to drive apart two ethnic populations and radicalize a third. Western leaders and UN officials granted the rationality of the ethnic cleansers too much significance in part because the rationality of the ethnic cleansers also informs and dominates the conduct and activities of Western leaders and UN officials. The conscious motivation for ethnic cleansing fails to explain why this social conduct was necessary from the viewpoint of the actors engaged in ethnic cleansing. The manifest function, that is, the need to drive apart two ethnic populations and to radicalize a third, is insufficient to explain what compelled the gruesome conduct and sustained it over the course of five years. To constuct an adequate account of the activity, it is necessary to understand why, from the viewpoint of the actors involved, ethnic cleansing was necessary.

Upon reflection, the manifest function for ethnic cleansing is not as rational as it purports to be. Bosnia is now partitioned. The end of ethnic cleansing can be said to have been achieved. Why, then, does ethnic cleansing persist? In northwest Bosnia, ethnic cleansing took place even during the signing of the Dayton Accord, a document which accepted and practically endorsed the political result of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. If the end of ethnic cleansing was achieved and even sanctioned by world leaders with the signing of the Dayton Accord, why would the activity persist? What other need does the activity serve? Is this other need perhaps greater than the manifest goal of the activity? In accepting at face-value the political purpose of ethnic cleansing and in pandering to the nationalist Serb leaders who brazenly promoted this purpose, Western leaders and UN officials became implicated in the way that Bosnian Serbs were implicated.

Since 1992, the latent function of ethnic cleansing has grown in significance in part because the latent function has not been recognized and examined. Thus the latent function of ethnic cleansing enlarged as the activity increased, and as the latent function increased in significance, the activity intensified. The need on the part of those engaged in ethnic cleansing to gain the complicity of not only Bosnian Serbs but also leaders of Western nations as well as UN officials became overwhelming.

To give an example, the manifest function of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, two UN designated safe havens, was to make negotiations possible and to complete the inevitable process of partition. "Impartial" UN officials like General Bernard Janvier openly advocated this position with world leaders. The latent function of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, however, was to humiliate Western leaders and United Nation officials, and this latent function determined the activity to a far greater degree than the manifest function. The latent function of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, from the viewpoint of those engaged in the atrocity, was to show that the moral integrity of Western leaders and UN officials was no different from the moral integrity of the nationalist Serb leaders. Even nationalist Serb leaders were surprised by how easily they could establish this point.

Western leaders and UN officials did not understand why, after being exposed in the world media by the reporting of journalists like Roy Gutman, ethnic cleansing not only persisted but intensified. They did not understand why exposure in the world media increased rather than diminished the excesses of ethnic cleansing. They did not understand because they did not understand the barely hidden logic which fueled ethnic cleansing. They did not grasp the strong need on the part of national Serb leaders to win the tacit endorsement of Western leaders and UN officials for the hideous process misleadingly called ethnic cleansing.