NEWS FRONT PAGE

Promoting Democracy in
Latin America Today:
Questioning the Assumptions

The promotion of democracy has served historically, either to define or to justify US policy in the hemisphere. If, during the 19th century, US efforts to foster democracy were largely limited to providing an example for Latin American countries to emulate, by the twentieth century the US government regularly turned to more direct forms of intervention.

This is not the place to indulge in an account of US adventurism, pursued in the name of democracy. Instead, let me emphasize why those efforts were inherently problematic and usually limited in impact.

1. To begin with the United States never believed that Latin Americans were up to the task. Scholars writing on the topic have stressed the paternalism and racism that informed official views of Latin America. Time and time again policy makers describe Latin Americans as lacking the cultural attributes required to sustain democratic governance.

Thus for instance, an Ambassador to Somoza's Nicaragua writes: "I knew that Tacho was manoso; that he was on the clever, even cunning side. But let us be frank: in Nicaragua's society, a degree of mana might be a requisite to survival. Nicaraguans were not Groton graduates."

A foreign service officer posted in postwar Havana complains of: "organized indiscipline... a condition which is not curable save through the development of a sound and general social character, as the result of a prolonged period of internal peace, fairly well sustained prosperity, and absence of irritation. All these things seem too much to hope for."

And, after a 1950 trip to the region, George Kennan concludes: "it seems unlikely that there could be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behavior could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life than in Latin America."

2. The US also defined its democratic objectives narrowly. It limited itself to the promotion of electoral democracy. Woodrow Wilson's ambassador to England outlined US policy towards Latin America as designed to "make 'em vote and live by their decisions. "If they refused to adhere to the results, a determined ambassador added: "We'll go in again and make 'em vote again... The United States will be here for two hundred years and it can continue to shoot men for that little space till they learn to vote and rule themselves."

The approach poses two principal problems. The first has to do with objectives. US policy makers confused form with substance. Elections are critical to the democratic process. Yet for elections to yield sustainable democratic rule in Latin America further reaching changes were required. Some of these were political, entailing respect for political and civil liberties, the emergence of civil society, the establishment of democratic political parties and the subordination of the military to civilian authority. Others involved socio economic reforms, designed to lessen poverty and attenuate inequalities.

The second has to do with means. "Jamming democracy down Latin American throats at the point of bayonets borne by United States marines" was bound to be counterproductive, as Warren Harding correctly noted in critiquing Wilsonian policy. The use of undemocratic means to foster democratic ends generated opposition both at home and within Latin America even among those who favored democracy but deplored the use of coercion, and the violation of sovereignty resorted to in its pursuit.

Furthermore, the need to "jam democracy down Latin American throats," or to intervene repeatedly, to "make 'em vote again," underscores just how difficult it was to export democracy to Latin America. Not only were local institutions and structures adverse, but local partners with whom the US could cooperate in such a venture were conspicuous by their absence: Economic elites were threatened by democracy, while popular sectors embraced mass notions of democracy resisted by the United States.

3. Finally, democracy has rarely either stood alone, or stood out, as the central US policy objective in the hemisphere. When democracy was advocated, it was because it was viewed as facilitating the achievement of more pressing US concerns - safeguarding US security or advancing US economic interests.

As those familiar with the region know well, the problem was that democratic goals were regularly shoved aside when they clashed with - rather than complemented - economic or security objectives. Examples of such instances include the 1954 ouster of President Arbenz in Guatemala, or US support for the 1973 coup that toppled Chilean President Allende.

Kennedy's well-known musing about the political future of the Dominican Republic following the death of long-time dictator, Trujillo, captures the essence of policy thinking on this topic: "There are three possibilities in order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third."

In summary then, because of the perceived undemocratic Latin American character, the narrow and ethnocentric definition of democracy, the impatience, and heavy handedness in approach and the half-hearted commitment to an endeavor in which policy objectives often clashed, the US rarely succeeded in promoting democracy in the hemisphere. In fact, US policy was more adept at installing authoritarian regimes than in launching Latin American countries along a democratic path.

By the mid 1980s US shortcomings were readily apparent. To observers of the democratic transitions then underway throughout the continent, the role of international actors were secondary at best. I wrote at the time: "to the extent that the international community has made a difference, it has done so at the margins, encouraging and nurturing a domestically rooted process of regime change."

My views coincided with those of academic colleagues. They also found a timid echo in policy making circles. One former policy maker turned scholar described US policy towards South America during the 80s as "democracy by applause."

Scholars did more than note this reality. They contended that democracy could not be exported, or willed into being. The long term viability of any democracy rested on the indigenous founding, quality and character of that regime, developed over time.

Yet, just as these sobering lessons were being absorbed, the Cold War ended. Almost overnight, debates over democratic definition, content and course, and the ramifications for international assistance - became irrelevant. Instead, operating on the basis of a set of revised assumptions, international democracy activism gained a renewed sense of purpose.

1. First, democratization in recent decades has been compared to a wave that sweeps through entire regions and even spreads from one part of the globe to another. It is also viewed as an epidemic. This speaks to its proportions. But, when juxtaposed with the term contagion, also used to describe the process, it suggests something more. It highlights the fact that domestic actors crafting transitions may emulate strategies that facilitated successful democratization elsewhere.

This vision gives pause. International influences may shape the course of democratization after all. And they may do so in indirect and critical ways. Their contribution may be positive - particularly when the decision to emulate strategies is one taken by domestic players. Not imposed by an international actor.

2. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union has simultaneously also opened and narrowed political and economic spaces. However grossly exaggerated, the notion that the "end of history" has arrived portends a convergence around liberal representative democratic forms and a neo-liberal capitalist course.

The implications for democracy in Latin America are significant. In the debris of a collapsed wall, thousands of miles away, the United States found the regional allies needed to undertake a democratic crusade. Elites and popular sectors alike converted to the democratic cause, endorsing a liberal representative brand of democracy, accompanied by neo-liberal economics.

Elites accept that sustained prosperity in the current global order depends on their playing by the democratic rules of the game. The current Arzu government of Guatemala, for instance, an administration representative of business interests, had trade and investment concerns in mind when it embraced peace in the mid 1990s. Given the repression of authoritarian regimes and the vacuum of ideological alternatives, Latin America's popular sectors also endorse procedural democracy. Using the Guatemala example again, that country's guerrilla movement and its civil society gambled on peace and democracy as avenues for change when they joined Arzu in negotiating the 1996 peace accords.

By extension, the US role was cast in a different light. Because Latin Americans had, of their own volition, embraced liberal representative democracy, the United States no longer needed to jam its version of democracy down Latin American throats. It could lead by example, cajole or teach - thereby realizing the idealist aspirations that had informed US democracy promotion efforts in their earliest incarnations. The Clinton foreign policy campaign platform, boldly labeled "US Global leadership for Democracy," thus stated: "the pro-democracy doctrine aims at building a new concert of free nations in which America would be first among equals."

Up to this point, I have stressed real and perceived transformations in the political, economic and ideational dynamics and their consequences for democracy assistance. As I want to point out now, assumptions about the rationales and the methodology that inform democracy assistance have also changed in substantial and significant ways.

First, over the past decade, the so-called legal right to democratic governance has gained increasing currency. Illustrative of this trend, a report by the Global Governance Commission, a group comprised of former UN officials, as well as former state leaders from developed and developing worlds, and endorsed by the United Nations Secretariat, suggests: "The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention must be adapted in ways that recognize the need to balance the rights of states with the rights of peoples."

When originally proposed, the notion of a right to democratic governance was dismissed and even mocked. This was because of lingering insecurity about the meaning of democracy and also because of the radical reconceptualization of sovereignty that it implied.

Its growing acceptance reflects in part the ideological changes noted above. With consensus apparently achieved on a liberal, procedural destiny for emerging democracies, the international community was put in the position of upholding a carefully circumscribed democratic vision. But it also gained credence because of the persuasiveness with which its proponents argued that a legal right to democracy already existed. They insisted that democratic rights are extensions of the accepted right to self-determination. And, moreover, that these rights are enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights which is grounded in the fundamental democratic credo. After all, the declaration stipulates that a government's authority is derived from its embrace of the popular will.

Acceptance of a legal right to democratic governance has ramifications for democracy promotion. At its simplest, would-be international democratizers can now make a legal case for pressuring regimes to adhere to democratic principles. Meanwhile, political leaders who violate democratic procedures find themselves on shaky ground today, no longer able to denounce international pressures merely by invoking national sovereignty.

4. The cachet of democracy promotion has also been boosted by the fact that democracy now clearly complements other foreign policy priorities in the region. As in its original elucidation during the Wilsonian era, democracy seems to best guarantee security and economic growth.

In terms of security, the Kantian paradigm of perpetual peace has been revived - at least at the level of political discourse. Democratic nations, it is argued, are more likely to engage in dialogue and compromise. They are thus prone to seek to resolve conflicts peacefully.

Discourse aside, the post Cold War redefinition of strategic interests has had a noticeable effect on the reconceptualization of democracy assistance. The absence of a geo-political adversary has dispelled traditional US fears of foreign intrusion into this hemisphere. This watershed development, has permitted a lengthier and more diverse set of international actors to enlist as democracy promoters. It has also diminished the threat - perhaps even enhanced the appeal - of less elitist notions of democracy. The original emphasis on elections as the democratic marker has thus been broadened. Increasingly, the viability of democracy hinges on the strength of civil society and the degree of popular participation.

On the economic front, the turnaround is equally remarkable. Only a few decades ago, Latin American scholars formulated dependency analysis to account for a natural affinity between authoritarian rule and capitalist development in the region. Yet, in a striking historical turn, scholars and policy makers alike now celebrate the harmonious and self-sustaining relationships between democratic governance and neo-liberal capitalism.

These shifts inform the thinking and actions of the Latin American political leadership and the international community. Brazilian President Cardoso, for instance, an adherent of the current economic orthodoxy, was in an earlier life one of the scholars most closely associated with the formulation of dependency analysis.

Within international circles the linkages have practical implications for democracy assistance. They explain why aid agencies, such as USAID, or the multilateral banks, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, have assumed an active role in democracy promotion. To justify so extending their mandate, they underscore the myriad ways in which democratic governance, popular participation and economic development are self-reinforcing mechanisms.

5. The final set of assumptions speak to approach and method. As we have seen, in today's context the international community intervenes to nurture a liberal democracy to which Latin American leaders and society are both entitled (the right to democratic governance) and now appear increasingly committed. The commitment is as significant as the entitlement in shaping the contours of international action. As I stressed earlier, the international community no longer intervenes to impose democracy - an act which would have meant transforming values - but which, in the current pro-democracy climate, is superfluous.

International actors thus have an easier task these days. It is also one which demands a qualitatively different approach. They are now called upon to provide know-how - to lend their expertise by exporting techniques that they have mastered. Technical assistance becomes key to unlocking the contagion dynamic, enabling Latin Americans to replicate democratic models and processes that have stood the test of time elsewhere. Again, to quote the Clinton campaign manifesto: "As the world's oldest and strongest democracy, we have the experience, resources and moral authority to help others nurture the seeds of economic and political freedom that they have planted in their own soil."

To summarize, just as debates about democracy promotion promised to inject a cautionary note into international action, sea changes in the international and domestic environments cast that assistance in a new light. Concerns about sovereignty, about democratic definition, consistency and commitment, and, ultimately, also about impact have been set aside.

A heightened appreciation of democracy in the region, revised understandings of its form, and a reconfiguration of the contours of international assistance, combine to encourage the United States to engage with renewed zeal in a century-old mission of exporting democracy to its southern neighbors.

What has this meant? At this stage I want to turn to that section of my talk that follows the semi-colon in its title: Questioning the assumptions. I'll highlight positive developments first, then balance these against lingering dilemmas.

First the positive.

The democratic gains registered in Latin America over the past decade are truly remarkable. Apparently, military regimes are a relic of the past, as is single party rule in Mexico and civil war in Central America. Headway has been made in consolidating liberal-procedural democracies, defined by fair, inclusive and competitive elections and respect for individual freedoms. A vibrant civil society and committed political leadership propel these transformations in an era marked by an unprecedented normative commitment to democratic rule. Survey after survey underscores a strong preference for democracy among Latin Americans of all economic backgrounds.

These encouraging signs suggest that Latin America may have emerged definitively from the shadows of dictatorship in which it lurked for the better part of the twentieth century. Finally, Latin Americans seem up to the task.

It is impossible to ascertain precisely how much credit to award the international community. Nevertheless, changes in the complexion of international assistance has facilitated democratic progress.

Importantly, the field of international assistance has become considerably more crowded. The US is no longer the lead actor. Other foreign governments, non governmental organizations, private foundations, intergovernmental organizations and multilateral financial institutions all boast a presence.

As noted earlier, the focus on technical assistance, combined with the shift away from electioneering towards greater support for a broader array of activities have enhanced the appeal of democracy assistance for many of these international actors.

The diversity of the cast of participating players ensures a plurality of approaches and emphases. This is true even in those fields which have attracted greatest interest, such as judicial reform. Here, for example, NGOs tend to maintain a long-standing rights and legal access focus. By contrast, multilateral banks, concerned with ensuring a climate conducive to economic growth, usually stress the need to modernize and professionalize the legal system.

Let me stress the advantages. Because each international actor operates with a set of biases, were any single player to monopolize a given field of assistance the prevailing biases would limit the scope - and reach - of democracy assistance. Nevertheless, given the presence of multiple actors in most arenas, international assistance yields a collage of initiatives. Together they produce a richly textured field of democracy assistance.

Without downplaying lingering misgivings, international actors also now march increasingly in step. Formal, donor consultative groups, guide international involvement in Central American peace efforts. These formal processes coexist alongside ad hoc mechanisms. International actors regularly share ideas and seek advice over the phone, at lunch, or by posting information on their web pages. Increasingly, they also jointly fund initiatives. On occasion they surprise themselves by the ease with which they collaborate. A representative of a UN agency, was still digesting a recent success story when we spoke: "We actually loaned money to USAID so that it could get in on the ground and participate with us. Who would have thought this was possible a few years ago?"

Finally, the more multilateral and technical character of assistance conveys an important message. It confirms a shift away from coercion towards a more consensual relationship between democracy donors and their Latin American grantees.

The political transformation of Latin America, the expanded cast of players, the variety of programs and the consensual character of assistance all offer promising signs that democracy promotion is achieving its potential.

It is easy to get carried away by the promise of democracy assistance. Nevertheless, there remains a need for critical reflection - a reflection that entails challenging some of the more dearly held assumptions that underpin democracy promotion today. I want to flag three areas of particular concern before tackling each in turn:

1. First that technical assistance promises to fulfill democratic dreams by setting the contagion dynamic in motion and by serving as the harbinger of an era of consensual and collaborative assistance;

2. Second, that the pursuit of democratic governance and neo-liberal capitalism are complementary objectives, collectively critical to achieving sustained economic and political development;

3. Third, that civil society strengthening efforts, as presently conceived, are also the wave of the future - the key to sustained and deepened democracy.

1. First, the rose-colored view of technical assistance is symptomatic of the enthusiasm that pervades democracy assistance today. It is premised on the conviction that the unprecedented democratic commitment has laid the foundation required to erect and sustain a democratic edifice. The mandated task thus becomes purely technical. International actors teach, share, export techniques which they believe fundamental and which they have mastered - to willing partners in the region. Under these circumstances, democracy assistance becomes a collaborative enterprise with untold rewards.

For all its advantages, enthusiasm about technical assistance is also symptomatic of an underestimation of the challenges that democracy still faces in the region today. Democratic gains notwithstanding, historically embedded practices, such as clientelism, hinder the construction of both representative and accountable political and civic organizations. More importantly, the extreme poverty and inequality impedes the emergence of a participatory, democratic order. These features explain a growing disillusionment with the democratic political process - also expressed consistently in Latin American surveys.

A pause and a cautionary note &endash; or two &endash; regarding interpretations of opinion polls. First: yes, they indicate a strong preference for democracy. But the preference is for democracy in theory, not necessarily as practiced by the political leadership. And disillusionment with the practice, as is often the case in fragile democracies, can trigger disillusionment with the system.

Second, Latin American agreement on democracy has not spelled agreement on form. There is less convergence than assumed. To illustrate let me turn to the case I know best these days. I have asked the Guatemalans whom I have interviewed about the meanings and hopes they attach to democracy. The responses are consistent, striking and divergent. Elites regularly answer: democracy works if it guarantees individual freedoms and private property. By contrast, popular sectors support for democracy is also conditional - on whether it enables their enhanced participation in a process of social and economic transformation. Both are democratic notions &endash; one more liberal, and consistent with the current orthodoxy &endash; the other more social, hence more divergent from the global vision currently expounded.

This raises a host of questions. But the resulting limitations for technical assistance need to be stressed here. Will the establishment of a congressional research service modeled along US lines; the adoption of a legislative committee structure replicating the Spanish; or the advocacy training provided to Latin American NGO leaders by their US counterparts address the underlying challenges for democracy as variously understood by Latin Americans? Will these programs root out clientelistic structures? Will technical assistance enhance participation, access and influence in the current socio-economic context and in ways that permit structural change ?

Advocates of technical assistance are also misguided in assuming that such assistance can today escape charges of ethnocentrism. To be sure, the range of targeted activities has expanded in recent years. Nevertheless, the liberal political, and neo-liberal economic models which both inform and enhance the appeal of technified aid are predicated on the notion that a universal - and Western - democratic recipe exists. In this respect, despite changes in methodology, democracy assistance shows remarkable continuity with an ethnocentric past.

Finally, and along similar lines, the technical emphasis disguises the degree to which democracy promotion remains coercive - with coercion sanctioned by invoking the right to democratic governance. Consensus is the name of the game - that is, as long as the Latin American leadership plays by the current rules. Should the leadership stray from democratic principles, as it has on occasion - to wit the self-staged coups of Peruvian President Fujimori, or Guatemalan President Serrano, the international community has displayed a resolve to act forcefully, indeed coercively, in democracy's defense.

More subtle reminders of the heavy handedness of a presumably bygone era exist. Referred to now as political conditionality, the disbursement of needed economic aid is often tied to the political leadership's willingness to undertake reforms deemed by the international community to advance democracy. International pressures thus aggravated the Chamorro government's headaches as it wrestled with destabilizing policy dilemmas (such as property reform) in the fragile post-Sandinista era.

2. Second, the presumed harmonious relationship between democracy and capitalism is equally problematic. To argue against the grain here, I suggest that these policy objectives still clash today. Why?

The economic reforms mandated by the international community have exposed and exacerbated democratic weaknesses. Privatization has neither been clean nor fair. The corruption involved has revealed the limitations of Latin America's judicial systems. Cuts in public expenditures have also contributed to producing levels of inequality increasingly incompatible with democracy. And the challenge of enhancing popular participation in contexts where citizens are struggling to survive each and every day is a particularly daunting one.

Strict adherence to a neo-liberal model also undermines the legitimacy of Latin America's elected regimes. Governmental accountability is skewed. Political leaders become finely tuned to the requirements of the global market and to the demands of international financial institutions, upon whom they depend for trade, investment and aid. In the process, decision making ignores societal demands. Social services are often either absent from the neo-liberal menu, or cannot be provided by weakened, hollowed-out states. As one Guatemalan political activist explained to me: The major problem is not the model. It's the process. If the international community tells our government what it can and what it can't do, what's the point? Who does that government represent and why should we bother participating?"

The international community can easily find itself working at cross purposes. Key democratic elements: representation, accountability and political equality are weakened. In its imposition of the current capitalist model then, the international community deprives Latin Americans of the tools and incentives needed to deepen democracy &endash; whether of a more liberal or social variant.

3. Finally, the new mantra of international assistance -support for the strengthening of civil society &endash; deserves a critical look.

In allocating support to civil society, groups sharing certain characteristics are favored. They are often umbrella organizations, usually headquartered in the capital where they can directly access the political system and where they, in turn, are easily accessible to foreign donors.

They also tend to work on a well defined set of issues - that coincide with those the international community deems key to democratic success. As one representative of a Latin American NGO awash in international support, observed: "If you work on human rights, women or indigenous peoples - all the trendy Western issues - then you have no problem getting funds."

They are also the more professional organizations. Skilled at proposal writing and accounting and already well positioned to influence the political system, or to make an impact on development, the capacities of these groups gives them an enormous leg up in securing international funding. Indicative of this, an Inter American Development Bank representative in Guatemala explained how it selects its partners:

We have a competition, we solicit proposals from NGOs and we choose the best proposal. We are now designing a proposal for technical cooperation with rural women. And the executor will be an NGO. Five or six NGOs will compete, submit proposals and we will choose the one that we think is the best. ... This is how we are opening spaces and strengthening civil society."

There is a further question of comfort. The more professional organizations boast a better educated leadership, well plugged in to local and international networks. They possess a particular savvy, reflected in their ability to formulate polished proposals, easily justifying an expenditure of international funds. Personal rapport may be another part of the equation, facilitating as it does a good working relationship between donor and grantee. One representative of an international NGO that supports a rural indigenous group confessed that cross cultural communication at times causes confusion and misunderstandings that could negatively impact funding decisions. During one meeting, for example, operating on the basis of different social norms and obviously bored by my colleague's presentation, the entire group fell into a deep sleep. Not only did their eyes shut but their bodies went completely limp.

Donor biases are at work here. The groups funded are specifically concerned with central challenges to democracy. Moreover they seek, and promise to access, influence and monitor the political process. Hence their contribution to democratization is obvious and relatively immediate.

But there are also important tradeoffs. Grant making along these lines risks doing as much harm as good. Support for key umbrella organizations carries with it the enormous advantage of economy of scale. Yet by their very nature, these organizations also carry with them the potential for aggravating a prevailing penchant for hierarchical and clientelistic relationships. Civil society is no more immune to these undemocratic tendencies than are political institutions.

Moreover, by supporting the usual suspects the international community contributes to further marginalizing and retarding the development of other groups, who may not enjoy the same skills, access or polish, and who appear to be working on more peripheral themes. However well intentioned, IDB work with NGOs - along the lines conveyed in the quote above, may contribute relatively little to opening up spaces or to strengthening civil society.

Finally, the impact transcends that which it has on any individual civic organization. Patterns of international assistance create a dependent civil society. Like the political leadership in the current global economic era, civic organizations are prone to valuing their relationships with international donors to the detriment of those they need cultivate with local constituents. International agenda-setting renders this problem particularly acute. Financial survival dictates that civic organizations tackle problems in ways that reflect donor priorities. At best these are an incomplete reflection of how local communities understand the dynamic of democratization in the region.

Let me now conclude, summarizing and tying the various strands together.

Undeniably, international democracy assistance has taken great strides during the past decade. This is as true of the goals pursued as it is of the impacts attained. In terms of goals, the reach and range of actors, programs and activities are broader. The international approach has also been come to value collaboration and consent. The impacts are also significant. They lie in the steadfastness with which democracy has endured and even strengthened - beating considerable odds.

All the same, the limitations of international contributions are impressive. In part this is because the international community has operated on the basis of several mistaken assumptions. These reflect an underestimation of the depth of democratic change in the region, as well as an overestimation of the degree to which the theory and practice of international assistance has evolved.

Let me be clear. Mistaken assumptions about the strength of democracy in Latin America exact a potentially steep price. Because of this, the impact of technical aid is inherently limited. Technological know-how can reshape institutions. But behind the institutional facade lurk embedded illiberal practices, an underlying cause of democratic fragility which technical aid is helpless to address. Damage is also incurred in areas where the international community acts with greatest conviction. In the rush to underwrite civil society, for instance, international actors reinforce undemocratic tendencies. They also skew the focus of these organizations, hampering the potential impact of a sector deemed a cornerstone of democracy. Finally, the belief in the appropriateness of liberalism for Latin America, has blinded international actors to alternatives and to tradeoffs. As a result, poverty persists, inequality is exacerbated, and governmental legitimacy undermined.

Internationally, the degree of change is also exaggerated. The coercive, imposition of democracy has waned but has yet to cede fully to a collaborative pursuit. Coercion remains the instrument of choice when democracy is threatened. And political conditionality constrains decision making. Furthermore, rooted in the rhetoric of liberalism lies a particular, familiar model of democracy. International actors again engage in the export of a Western-centric democratic model.

Many of these shortcomings and the impediments they pose for democracy assistance efforts are captured in an anecdote recently told by a visiting Guatemalan Maya leader, which I want to share in closing:

Several years ago an international development technocrat was asked to formulate a development plan for rural Guatemala. Within that context she visited a Maya community. During her brief stay there she canvassed members of the community about their perceived needs and aspirations. Upon return to the capital she drew up a plan, prioritizing the need for infrastructure: a road, a school, a health clinic. She traveled back to the community where she asked its members to react to her proposal - to let her know whether they agreed with her recommendations. They refused to consider her plan. They told her that the only thing the community wanted was a "cantina" (a pub).

Shocked, she tried to bring them to their senses, but they insisted. "All we want is a cantina." She left furious and told her Washington-based organization to forget about these misguided indios.

Curious as to their fate, she paid a return visit a few years later. In approaching the community she took note of the spanking new road that led right into the village. Not only that, but the community now had a health clinic and a school, just as she had envisaged. She confronted the community elders, whom she accused of stealing her plan. "No," they reminded her ; she hadn't left a plan with them - they weren't interested in it. She persisted "But you stole my ideas." "No," they insisted. They hadn't. "Well then why is there a road, a school and a health clinic here now, just as I recommended?"

"A while after you left," they answered, "someone else visited and asked what we wanted. We told her what we told you. We wanted a cantina. " She got us one. You see, once we had a cantina, we had a place to meet and discuss our needs. We decided that we needed a road, a school and a health clinic."

In making democracy in its own image, international actors are prone to forget lessons learned a decade ago that remain equally relevant today. Democracy cannot be exported, democracies do not spring up overnight and cannot all look alike. To stress again in closing, the long-term viability of a democratic regime rests on the indigenous founding, quality and character of that regime. The simple &endash; and elusive - key to international success may thus lie in providing more support for cantinas.

 

News Front Page | Top of this Page