By Tanvi Jha; Image by India TV News
Within the coming years, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is expected to become prominent within international relations. Thus, many countries are focused on ensuring their bid in the IOR. One of these countries is India. Despite having neglected the IOR in the past, the rise of China and the growing interest in the IOR from the West has led India to begin channeling its efforts into maintaining its presence in the region. One of the ways India is attempting to do so is by maintaining its relationship with nations with a stake in the region. Out of the island nations located in the Southwest part of the Indian Ocean, the French island, Reunion is significant in Franco-India relations and their partnership within the IOR. Thus, examining the relationship of India and France is necessary to evaluate how it will play a significant role in IOR politics in the near future. This can be done, firstly by seeing how India’s relationship with France through Reunion Island has altered over the years, then how has the nation-to-nation relationship evolved in the past few years, and finally what is the significance of this relationship on politics in the IOR.
India has improved its relationship with France through the Reunion Island, which is located 200 km off the coast of Mauritius, in the past decade. France was skeptical of creating ties with India as 25% of the Reunion Island is of Indian heritage which meant risking Indian influence over the island’s population. France’s hesitance to create closer ties with India in the IOR was also because of its undercurrent of competition with India when it came to French cultural influence on Mauritius, which has a small population of French descendants compared to its larger Indian-descendent population. However, as France has realized the potential advantage of having India as an ally in the IOR, has become more comfortable with India’s increased presence in the region. France has encouraged India’s growing role in anti-piracy in the Southwest of the IOR where Reunion Island is located. At the same time, India has acknowledged France as a large security provider in the region, as exemplified in France’s inclusion in its annual bilateral naval exercises since 1993. France and India established a strategic partnership in 1998 and both countries have shared a common philosophy of maintaining strategic autonomy and sovereignty, which is defined by not being overly dependent on any other nation. India also signed a strategic pact in which both nations would open their naval bases to one another in the IOR. As the dynamic between the two nations changed, Reunion Island has become a point of interaction between the two nations for their common goals in the IOR. The relationship has evolved to the point where in 2020 India and France conducted joint P-8I operations from Reunion Island.
In the era of Macron and Modi, India has slowly been increasing its presence within international politics, with its membership in BRICS, the G20, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, to name a few. Meanwhile, France has used its diplomatic activism to justify its prominent position in many international alliances and organizations. Some of the initiatives that France has created include the European Political Community and the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. One objective that is shared between President Macron and Prime Minister Modi is a multipolar international order, which would allow both nations to have a major role in global affairs, without being swayed by a dominant power. Thus, France sees an emerging power like India as a possible strategic ally to help it achieve its objectives on the international stage.
Besides a shared philosophy on how to handle international affairs, both countries and their leaders have a mutual interest in responding to the growing influence of China. China’s rise, particularly in the IOR, have caught the attention of both countries. Chinese presence in IOR countries around India, which include Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Nepal, has brought up discussions on the concurrent interests between India and France in the IOR, especially regarding future strategic plans for the Indo-Pacific region. In 2018, President Macron stated that China’s presence in the IOR had become a ‘gamechanger’ in his speech in Sydney, Australia. In the same year, the cooperation between the two countries in the IOR was recognized in the Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. Prime Minister Modi has also commented that both countries believe in the potential benefits that are to be reaped from the IOR and that both countries are committed to strengthening their cooperation in relation to the IOR. The two nations are also expanding their joint venture with other major powers in the IOR with interests in the region, including Australia and the United Arab Emirates.
The defense trade agreements between India and France have showcased their mutual aim to preserve their strategic autonomies whilst also to create an oppositional power to China. According to Chinomoyee Das, France has also participated in India’s lucrative arms market which has included the transfer of submarines, upgrading India’s aircraft fleet, the co-development and co-production of short-range missiles, a contract for 126 Rafale fighter jets, and in 2016 India signed a deal to buy 36 Rafale for Rs. 58,000 crores. Recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to France in July 2023 led to a deal for submarines and jet engines. During the same visit, France unveiled a plan to offer Indian alumni from Master’s programs in France a 5 year Schengen visa. During the same meeting, a deal between Modi and Macron was cemented for the 26 Rafale Jets and the co-development of fighter jet engines and the construction of three additional submarines. The growing closeness between India and France is an indicator of shifting interests from the West towards the IOR, and specifically, China’s growing presence there.
Upon evaluation, it is clear that Franco-India relations will play a critical role in politics in the IOR within the coming years. In the near future, as China continues to become more present in the IOR, France and India should focus on reinforcing this bilateral cooperation and expanding it. It is clear that both countries have similar interests in the IOR and view one another as potential allies for achieving them. Their cooperation on how to build an oppositional force to China’s power in the IOR and their defense trade agreements illustrate how this alliance is growing. Moving forward, perhaps Paris and New Delhi will begin to highlight a vision for the IOR and how both countries will utilize this strategic partnership to defend their interests and accomplish their individual goals in the region.
