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EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE: KANTIAN THEMES AND
SELLARSIAN VARIATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Empirical knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons, an exercise of freedom. It is, furthermore, an exercise of freedom whose correctness depends on how things are. The very idea of empirical knowledge, of something that is at once *empirical*, of things without the mind, and *knowledge*, properly a standing in the space of reasons, requires that objective facts impose rational constraints on knowing. It can seem, however, that objective facts cannot provide a rational constraint on knowing. The source of the difficulty, McDowell has argued,¹ is a certain conception of mind and world according to which the realm of the conceptual has an "outside" wherein is located the reality on which thought aims to bear. For, as he argues, the picture generates a dilemma. On the one hand, what is outside the conceptual sphere cannot have any rational bearing on thought: "the idea that the space of reasons, the space of justifications or warrants, extends more widely than the conceptual sphere" (MW I §3, p. 7) is just the Myth of the Given.² But if, on the other hand, the reality that is outside the conceptual sphere does not rationally constrain empirical thought, then that thought is empty, not properly thought at all: "if spontaneity is not subject to rational constraint from outside . . . then we cannot make it intelligible to ourselves how exercises of spontaneity can represent the world at all" (MW I §6, p. 17). What is outside the conceptual sphere both must and cannot have rational bearing on thought, which is to say, both options are unintelligible. Not only is it a myth – the Myth of the Given – to think that something outside the conceptual *can* have rational bearing on thought, it is equally a myth – as I will call it,



the Myth of the Taken – to think that reality *need not* have rational bearing on thought, that it is enough that it have (say) causal bearing on thought. The obstacle to an adequate account of empirical knowledge is that empirical reality both *must* and *cannot* have rational bearing on empirical thought.

Both Sellars and Kant, I will argue, are caught in exactly this bind and aim in their respective theories of knowledge to overcome it. For both, the starting point is that empirical reality both must and cannot rationally constrain empirical thought. They do not, however, take that starting point to call into question the very idea that the reality on which thought has representational bearing is outside the conceptual sphere. Sellars and Kant are agreed that reality must be outside the realm of the conceptual, that one cannot avoid idealism otherwise. They are agreed, in other words, that the negative thesis – that things as they are in themselves (in reality) cannot rationally constrain empirical thought – is true just as it stands. Since it is nonetheless clear that something has to give if any account is to be given of empirical knowledge, their attention is turned to the positive thesis, that empirical knowledge essentially involves rational constraint by what is, the reality known. Both argue, in effect, that a distinction needs to be drawn if this thesis, and thereby empirical knowledge itself, is to be understood. Kant, focusing on what is, the reality known, argues that reality is one thing and the known another. We have empirical knowledge, and it is in a sense of reality, but the two do not come together to yield knowledge of reality. Empirical knowledge is rather of appearances of reality to creatures like us. Sellars focuses instead on the notion of rational constraint, arguing that rational constraint on knowledge is one thing and constraint by what is another. Empirical knowledge on his view is rationally constrained and it is constrained by the reality known, but the two do not come together to yield rational constraint by the reality known. In neither case can one say without extensive commentary that empirical knowledge involves rational constraint by what is, that an empirical judgment is true in virtue of the fact that things are just as they are judged to be. Seeing that their views have this dialectical relationship should help us to see how unsatisfactory both accounts are.

I

Sellars's *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* reproduces (with the addition of one chapter) the text of his Locke Lectures for 1965–1966 and is, according to him, “in a sense ... a sequel” to his seminal essay “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.³ In these lectures, Sellars self-consciously pursues the Kantian roots of his own thought, making explicit both what he takes to be Kant's fundamental insights and what he takes to be Kant's blindspots. The main themes of Sellars's understanding of Kant can be highlighted through consideration of some basic structural features of the Kantian conception of empirical knowledge.⁴

“Our knowledge”, Kant writes in the familiar opening sentences of the *Transcendental Logic*,⁵ sentences with which Sellars's discussion in *Science and Metaphysics* also begins,

springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through those representations (spontaneity of concepts). Through the first an object is *given* to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] intuition (which is a mere determination of the mind) (A50/B74).

The two faculties are sensibility and understanding; and they are, Kant tells us in the *Jäsche Logic*,⁶ both logically distinguished as involving fundamentally different sorts of representations, and also metaphysically distinguished, distinguished with respect to the origins of their representations. Logically, sensibility is a faculty of intuitions, of singular representations immediately of objects, and understanding a faculty of concepts, of general representations that are of objects only mediately, by way of marks common to many. Metaphysically, sensibility is a receptive faculty, “the capacity of receiving representations”, and understanding a faculty of spontaneity, of freedom.

The two characterizations are not, for Kant, merely different ways of putting a single thought. It is for him a substantive thesis that the two distinctions are aligned as they are in the two faculties. For, he thinks, while no content can be given to the idea of an understanding, a faculty of spontaneity, that is itself intuitive, nevertheless the idea is not simply incoherent. Such an understanding would be

an understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition – an understanding that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist ... (B138–139; cf. B145).

It is only our spontaneity (more generally, that of any finite being) that is and must be discursive, through concepts, only our intuitions (more generally, those of a finite being) that are and must be given in a receptive faculty. We have objects only insofar as we are sensibly affected by them; we can think (of) them only through concepts.⁷

According to the logical characterization, the distinction between sensibility and understanding is a distinction between a faculty of intuitions, singular representations immediately of objects, and a faculty of concepts, general representations mediately of objects by way of marks. It is natural to think of this logical distinction between intuitions and concepts as a kind of Mentalese counterpart to the distinction between referring expressions, whose role in language is to locate or pick out individuals as that about which a judgment can be made, and predicative expressions, which function to characterize objects so picked out. To draw such a distinction is to reject classical term logic in which subject and predicate are logically distinguished – the one as involving a sign of quantity ('all' or 'some') and the other a sign of quality ('is' or 'is not') – but which draws no logical distinction among the terms that occur in subject and predicate expressions. In a term logic, the difference between a singular term such as 'Socrates' and a general term such as 'man' is nothing more than (as Sommers has put it) "the difference between a term expressly designed to apply to no more than one thing, and one that is not restricted to unique application".⁸ Realizing that the terms themselves are logically different as playing (logically) different roles is a fundamental advance – "the first serious advance in real logic since the time of the Greeks" according to Russell.⁹ Russell himself further held that this discovery was due to Frege and (independently) Peano, but it is clear that already in Kant something like the logical distinction among terms that modern logic recognizes is already in play. For Kant, concepts, by contrast with intuitions, have the form of rules; they are essentially predicative: "concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, relate to some representation of a not yet determined object" (A69/B94). "The only use which

the understanding can make of ... concepts is to judge by means of them" (A68/B93). The role of concept words, Kant thinks, is to characterize objects otherwise given. So also, we find already in Kant a logical distinction between singular and general sentences. Although that distinction is not (he thinks) required in logic itself, which concerns only inferential relations among the contents of judgments, it is essential to an adequate conception of the act of judging.¹⁰

As metaphysically characterized, sensibility and understanding are, respectively, a receptive faculty and a faculty of spontaneity. Though not knowing as such, Kant thinks, nevertheless our knowledge, the knowledge of finite beings, essentially involves both spontaneity and receptivity. By contrast with a divine understanding "through whose representations the objects should themselves be given or produced" (B145), our understanding, our freedom, is limited: *our* saying does not make it so. Our saying – by contrast with the *dictum* of an infinite being – is constitutively constrained by how things are, by the truth of the matter. Empirical knowledge, then, essentially involves both spontaneity, the freedom to take a proposition to be true, and also receptivity, a passive capacity to be impressed upon by the truth of the matter. Otherwise put, knowing requires that we have both an active relation to truth, the freedom to judge, and a passive relation to truth, since the correctness of our judgments is a matter of how things are and not of how we take them to be.

It might seem that so characterized the two distinctions – that between concepts and intuitions, on the one hand, and that between spontaneity and receptivity, on the other – cannot be what Kant has in mind in his account of sensibility and understanding. For those two distinctions seem obviously not to line up. The distinction between concept and intuition is a distinction of two kinds of representations, of two components of the content of a possible judgment. The distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, by contrast, is a distinction of two aspects of the act of judging that is required to account for the fact that while judging strives after truth it can fail to achieve it. The fact that we can be mistaken not only as regards how things are, what properties and relations are instantiated by objects, but also as regards what there is, what objects exist,

seems to show that the two distinctions cannot be aligned, and so that it is not those distinctions that Kant intends in his logical and metaphysical characterizations of sensibility and understanding. In fact, as I will indicate, various themes that are fundamental to Kant's view are well accounted for on the assumption that these are exactly the distinctions he has in mind.

Suppose that Kant did understand the two distinctions as characterized but nevertheless thought that they are coextensive, that receptivity, the faculty responsible for our passive relation to truth, is as a faculty of intuitions (only), a faculty of representations of objects but not of them *as* thus and so (since that would essentially involve concepts), and that spontaneity, in virtue of which we have an active relation to truth, the freedom to judge, is, as a faculty of concepts (only), a faculty of representations that are for thought but not as such of any object (since objects can be given only in intuitions).¹¹ This directly sets in place the picture with which we began according to which the reality on which empirical thought bears is outside the sphere of the conceptual. For on this view what we are receptive to is objects but not objects as thus and so, as in conceptual shape.

Given this characterization we can also understand Kant's motivation for his familiar slogan that "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51/B75). Because we have no spontaneity with respect to objects as such, because objects can be thought at all only through concepts, it follows that intuitions are not as such cognitively significant, even though they are representations of objects. Intuitions so conceived are blind without concepts, as in a different sense we are to them. To think otherwise, to think that representations with respect to which we are altogether passive, which are not as such cognitively significant, can nonetheless rationally constrain empirical judgment is just the Myth of the Given. Conversely, because concepts are involved only in spontaneity as it contrasts with receptivity, there can be no knowledge through concepts alone. Knowing requires both an active relation to truth and a passive relation to truth. Thoughts without content, then, without the involvement of intuitions given in receptivity, are empty; they have no representational bearing on reality at all. They are cognitively significant – we can think the

unschematized concepts, the thing in itself, and so on¹² – but such thoughts are altogether lacking in objective significance. Absent a relation to truth with respect to which we are passive, our freedom to judge such thoughts true or false is empty. To think otherwise is just the Myth of the Taken, the myth that the spontaneity operative in empirical knowledge is intelligible independent of a correlative receptivity in terms of which we are to understand how empirical reality sets rational constraints on knowing. Since, Kant thinks, the faculty of receptivity is at the same time the faculty of intuition through which objects are given, objective significance can be for him nothing other than relation to an object. That is why the transcendental analytic is, he thinks, a logic of truth: "For no knowledge can contradict it without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and therefore all truth" (A62–63/B87).

Given this conception of the distinction of sensibility and understanding, we can understand, finally, why Kant thinks that the logical distinction of singular and general judgments can be ignored for the purposes of logic (which is the science of inference, of logical relations among the contents of possible judgments), but is critical to a proper account of judging, and so of knowledge. Kant writes in §19 of the B Deduction:

a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective . . .

To say 'The body is heavy' is not merely to state that two representations have always been conjoined in my perception, however often that perception be repeated; what we are asserting is that they are combined *in the object*, no matter what the state of the subject may be (B142).

Obviously the content of a judgment, what is taken true in an act of judging, must be cognitively significant, a thinkable. Since, on Kant's view, it is only through concepts that anything is (for us) thinkable, it follows that the content of a judgment must involve concepts in both subject and predicate positions. That is, it must have the form of a general sentence, that all (or some or the unique) S is P, where 'S' and 'P' are predicative expressions rather than the terms of classical logic.¹³ To judge is to state that the two concepts, that of being (all/some/the unique) S and that of being

P, are “combined in the object” (B142), that it is one and the same objects that are (all, some, or the unique one) S and P. Of course, to say that does require reference of some sort to the object(s) involved; as Kant puts it, “granted then that we must advance beyond a given concept in order to compare it with another, a third something is necessary, as that wherein alone the synthesis of the two concepts can be achieved” (A155/B194).¹⁴ But on Kant’s view of judgment, the object – that wherein the synthesis of the two concepts is achieved – is not thought in any sense that would require reference to it in the judged content itself.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the object is in a sense thought; for only by reference to it can we understand the act of judging. It is in judging, on Kant’s view, that we move outside the conceptual sphere to reality itself: what is judged in judging that S is P is that the concept of the subject and the predicate concept are combined in the object itself.

On the other hand, an object considered simply as such, merely as something that is, cannot provide any rational constraint on judging; it is only as it has various properties and relations to other objects that an object is the locus of the truth of a judgment about it. But because all concepts (which are the medium of our awareness) contrast with receptivity in having their home in the understanding, receptivity is only to objects as such, never to them as they are thus and so. It follows that what we know of objects, if it is properly knowledge, cannot be properties of them as they are.¹⁶ Because knowing essentially involves receptivity as well as spontaneity, our knowledge of objects can only be of them as appearances which essentially involve both a given, essentially spatio-temporal, matter and an imposed conceptual form. Empirical experience of objects as thus and so which provides the requisite constraint on judging is, Kant thinks, the result “of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul” (A78/B103; cf. B151–152) acting on “the manifold of *a priori* sensible intuition – that being the condition under which all objects of our human intuition must necessarily stand” (B150). Experience is and must be of what really is; but nothing in experience insofar as it is cognitively significant, accompanied by the ‘I think’, is of it as it is. Instead it is a function of the productive imagination acting on what is given prior to all thought. Empirical knowledge is not and cannot be

of things as they are in themselves. Given Kant’s starting point – his thought that the distinction between intuitions and concepts and the distinction between receptivity and spontaneity are aligned in the faculties of sensibility and understanding – the very idea of empirical knowledge as knowledge of things as they are is incoherent.

II

According to the account just outlined, Kant’s conception of sensibility and understanding is based on two quite different distinctions, that between intuitions and concepts and that between receptivity and spontaneity, which are nevertheless taken by Kant to be coextensive. According to Sellars, the distinction between sensibility and understanding is itself conceptually basic; it just is the distinction between a faculty of nonconceptual representations with respect to which we are altogether passive and a faculty of conceptual representations which as such are epistemically significant. From Sellars’s perspective, Kant’s fundamental insight was that sensibility, though not itself a cognitive faculty, is nonetheless essential to an adequate account of empirical knowledge. Sellars explains in his “Autobiographical Reflections”:¹⁷

by denying that sense impressions, however indispensable to cognition, were themselves cognitive, Kant made a radical break with all his predecessors, empiricists and rationalists alike. The ‘of-ness’ of sensation simply isn’t the ‘of-ness’ of even the most rudimentary thought. Sense grasps no facts, not even such simple ones as something’s being red and triangular.

Having seen this, Sellars goes on, Kant’s task was to show that “[granting] knowledge of even the simplest fact about an event occurring in time is, in effect, granting knowledge of the existence of nature as a whole”. But, Sellars asks, “How is it *possible* that knowledge has this structure?”. Sellars takes his own task to be that of answering this question without appeal either to the Scylla of “dogmatic realism, and its appeal to self-evident truth” or to the Charybdis of “transcendental idealism, in which conceptual structures hover over a non-cognitive manifold of sense”. “The solution of the puzzle”, Sellars would come to think, “lay in correctly

ment of concepts and the forms of intuition is something that for us can only be an object = x, but which is in principle knowable as it is by an infinite intellect. For Sellars, the distinction belongs to the order of being insofar as the representations of sheer receptivity are unknowable as such precisely because they are nonconceptual representations of sense. As the point might also be put, Kant assumes the transcendental perspective with its constitutive notion of knowledge of things as they are in themselves, and discovers that there must also be another perspective, that of (merely) empirical realism, which we as knowers enjoy. Sellars, by contrast, starts from the empirical perspective as it contrasts with the transcendental perspective (a starting point first made available by Kant); he starts with the insight that all our knowledge is inherently mediated by the conceptual (in the broader sense).²⁵ His discovery is rather to be that the transcendental perspective is one we can in principle occupy. According to Sellars, Kant's thought that we cannot know things as they are is due primarily to his radically underestimating the value of analogical concepts. Kant did not see that

the use of analogy in theoretical science, unlike that in theology, generates new determinate concepts. ... One might put this by saying that the conceptual structures of theoretical science give us new ways of schematizing categories (SM II §49, p. 49).

Whether or not Sellars is right in his general point, he is wrong in his formulation of it in terms of new ways of schematizing categories. It is illuminating to see why.

Kant holds that concepts themselves must be schematized, brought in relation to objects, if they are to have any objective significance; for, as we have seen, objective significance just is relation to an object on his view. But as Sellars argues, this appeal to relation to an object to account for the objective significance of concepts is useless for the purpose. It is a version of the Myth of the Given. Concepts do not need any relation to objects to have objective significance; their whole meaning is already given by the rules governing their use. As Sellars puts it in an early essay, his is the "rationalist" view that "the meaning of a term lies in the materially and formally valid inferences it makes possible".²⁶

The familiar notion (Kantian in its origins ...) that the form of a concept is determined by 'logical rules', while the content is 'derived from experience'

embodies a radical misinterpretation of the manner in which the 'manifold of sense' contributes to the shaping of the conceptual apparatus applied to the manifold in the process of cognition ... There is nothing to a conceptual apparatus that isn't determined by its rules, and there is no such thing as choosing those rules to conform to antecedently apprehended universals and connexions, for the "apprehension of universals and connexions" is already the use of a conceptual frame, and as such presupposes the rules in question.²⁷

On Sellars's view, "the 'content' of concepts as well as their logical 'form' is determined by the rules of the understanding".²⁸

One important consequence of this insight is a distinction between the methodological dependence of the theoretical concepts on observational ones and a (spurious) ontological dependence of the former on the latter. Since, as Sellars argues, no concepts – including observational ones, no matter how basic – have any 'ostensive tie' to items in the world, there is in principle no reason to understand scientific theories instrumentally. It is perfectly coherent that "the scientific account of 'what there is' supersedes the descriptive ontology of everyday life"²⁹ – provided, that is, that the theoretical language comes to be itself an observation language, that is, usable in direct perceptual reports rather than only in fact-stating judgments that are the conclusions of inferences.³⁰ Since there is no "given" content to even perceptually basic concepts, since the meaning of a concept is entirely constituted by the material and formal rules of inference that govern it, it also follows that concepts can be refashioned through the reformulation of the rules they involve to whatever extent is required to make sense of experience.³¹

To say that the relevant concepts are *analogical* is to introduce yet another dimension to the notion of a theoretical concept, one that provides the key, Sellars thinks, to an understanding of how it can be "the same thing that one thinks and that is". To say that a sense impression is of (say) a red triangle can be, he argues, to give an intrinsic characterization of it (as contrasted with a characterization in terms of its standard cause, a red triangle); for as used in the phrase "impression of a red triangle" the expressions "red" and "triangle" can function analogically. As so used, *red* and *triangle* are theoretical concepts, that is, correctly applied to sense impressions (which are postulated entities) rather than to ordinary observable objects in the world; but they are also concepts that share certain second-order attributes with the ordinary concepts *red*

and *triangle*.³² Not only do analogical concepts share higher-order features with ordinary concepts – much as properties of moments in a temporal series (e.g., being one before another) share higher-order features such as transitivity with properties of points on a line (e.g., that one is to the left of another)³³ – the ordinary concepts on which the relevant analogical concepts are modelled are precisely those that the theoretical concepts are to explain. Sellars's thought is that because the theory of sense impressions is developed analogically on the model of sensible objects, it is intelligible to say that the same sensible form (as we might put it) can characterize both red objects and sensings of red objects. As we will see, it is such analogical thinking – which not only preserves second-order attributes across commonsense (first-order) attributes of things and postulated (first-order) attributes of sense impressions but also gives content to the idea that it is the same thing that is thought and that is true – that is to enable us to make good Wittgenstein's Tractarian notion of picturing, and thereby to provide an adequate account of objective truth, empirical knowledge of things as they are in themselves.

On Sellars's view, both sensibility and understanding are faculties of representations, though only the latter is a cognitive faculty. It follows that not all representational aboutness is intentional aboutness, “where the intentional is that which belongs to the conceptual order” (SM I §59, p. 23). Sellars further holds that both sorts of representations, both those that are cognitively significant and those that are not, can be representations of things as thus and so. That is, not only are there intuitions, cognitively significant representations of individuals that are not by way of concepts, there are also representations of individuals as thus and so that are not in any way concept involving or cognitively significant. As Sellars bluntly puts it in a late essay, “the concept of innate abilities to be aware of something as something, and hence of pre-linguistic awareness is perfectly intelligible”.³⁴ Such awareness is not cognitive; it cannot properly be described as knowing (which is ineliminably intentional, a standing in the space of reasons); but, we will see, it is nonetheless a crucial moment in knowing on Sellars's account.

Sellars argues in “Mental Events” that merely natural animals have responses to things that are plausibly described as cases of awareness, as contrasted with the sort of classificatory “responses”

that iron filings (say) make to magnets, on the grounds that to be an act of awareness it is sufficient that one's classificatory acts be moves in a complex, organized web of representational analogues of inferences, language entries and language exits. To be a representational system – a cognitive map-maker – is “to be a primitive or sophisticated form of perceiving-inferring-remembering-wanting-acting organism”.³⁵ Animal behavior, but not iron filing behavior, exhibits “real patterns” in Dennett's sense.³⁶ And the patterns such behavior exhibits are correctly described as having propositional, though not logical, form, where “to have propositional form, a basic representational state must represent an *object* and represent it *as* of a certain character”.³⁷ It is Sellars's Tractarian view of predication, according to which the only way to represent an object as being a certain way is to represent that object itself a certain way, that stands behind this view of the propositional. Whereas, in English, one represents an object *a* as red (say) by concatenating the sign ‘is red’ to a name for the object, in a more perspicuous language, Sellars thinks, in a properly Tractarian language, “we could say that *a* is red without the use of an auxiliary sign design – for example by writing ‘*a*’ in bold face”.³⁸ A relation of two objects would be perspicuously represented by relating representations of those objects (e.g., one above the other), and so on. On this view, “the fundamental job of singular first-level matter-of-factual statements is to picture, and hence the fundamental job of referring expressions is to be correlated as *simple linguistic objects* [i.e., as items in the real order] by matter-of-factual [non-intentional] relations with simple non-linguistic objects” (SM V §26, p. 124). The job of referring expressions “is to be linguistic representatives of objects” (SM V §27, p. 124), and this is a job that can in principle be played by features of language-using and non-language-using animals alike. Picturing something as something, on Sellars's view, is a non-intentional correlation of items in the real order.

But in our case this correlation also involves “the complex machinery of language entry transitions (noticings), intralinguistic moves (inference, identification by means of criteria) and language departure transitions (volitions pertaining to epistemic activity)” (SM V §58, p. 136). It involves, in other words, semantical uniformities in Sellars's sense, uniformities in behavior that mirror semantic

rules. For Sellars, the pair of notions, semantical uniformity and semantical rule, are to replace the (according to him, fundamentally mistaken) notion of a semantic statement as expressing an intentional relation of meaning or aboutness between a linguistic item and a nonlinguistic one. The idea, in brief, is this. According to Sellars's analysis, sentences such as "‘*rot*’ in German means red' – sentences which one might have taken to express relations between words and properties of objects – in fact ascribe to words certain linguistic roles, in this case, to the German word "‘*rot*’ the role that the word "red" plays in English.³⁹ Such sentences do not formulate (ideal) semantical uniformities, rules of use on the order of "‘*rot*’ is correctly applied to all and only red things', but instead classify words according to their function relative to a language already in use. In the case of words that have extensions as well as intensions – e.g., "red" but not "not" – such classifications also convey "that these expressions are involved in semantic uniformities (actual or potential) with appropriate extra-linguistic items" (SM III §59, p. 82, cf. IV §57, p. 112). On this account, then, there are word-word relations expressible as semantic rules which belong to the conceptual order, and world-world relations or semantic uniformities in the real order; but there are no relations of meaning or aboutness between items in the conceptual order and items in the real order. For that, Sellars thinks, would require the Myth of the Given.⁴⁰

Sellars offers an analogous two-part account of truth: on the one hand, an intra-linguistic notion of truth as semantic (or S-) assertibility,⁴¹ and on the other, a matter-of-factual notion of truth in terms of picturing.⁴² The "bringing about of linguistic pictures could be 'mechanical' " (SM V §56, p. 135); but because the uniformities "which link natural linguistic objects with one another and with the objects of which they are linguistic projections"⁴³ reflect semantic rules, they are (in our case) subject to what Sellars calls rules of criticism. We can and do refine our habits of response in light of what we take to be the correct semantic rules of the language. Since, as Sellars argues, the notion of truth as correct picturing (by contrast with the notion of S-assertibility) admits of degrees – since pictures can be more or less adequate maps of reality – we can make intelligible the idea that there are more adequate pictures of reality than

those we now are in a position to produce. We can, that is, make good the Peircean concept of "ideal truth" (SM IV §75, p. 142).

Sellars gives us a two-language or two-perspective view according to which our judgments can be treated either as episodes in the space of reasons, the conceptual order, which as justified or not according to the semantic rules of the game are S-assertible or not, or as episodes in the realm of nature, in the real order, which either do or do not correctly picture other states of affairs in the real order according to the method of projection grounded in the relevant semantic uniformities. The two perspectives are correlated by way of rules of criticism. What remains to be seen is why we should take the pictures we produce to be true or about – in the relevant, intentional, sense – reality at all. In virtue of what is the language game not merely a game we play, but properly described as the striving after truth? Sellars's answer, I take it, is this.

According to Sellars, "to take a realistic stance towards scientific theories is to take seriously this role of theoretical languages as providing a method of picturing the world" (SM VI §57, p. 171). A theoretical language, if it is to picture how things are, must acquire a reporting role. Furthermore, if we assume (as Sellars thinks we must for reasons that will soon become clear) that there is in the real order some analogical counterpart of color predicates – a counterpart that we, as the sentient beings we naturally are, picture in sensing – then to acquire, through the development of analogical concepts which subsequently acquire a reporting role, conceptual resources adequate to these counterparts just is to picture them correctly, that is truly, and to do so *because* the world is that way. That is, on Sellars's view, noncognitive impressions of sense do not "guide minds" in the sense of merely causing us to have certain thoughts. That would be to fall into the Myth of the Taken according to which the reality on which thought bears need set no rational constraint on thinking. Nor do they "guide minds" by providing us reasons, justifications, for our thinking as we do. This would just be the Myth of the Given since in that case something outside the conceptual would nevertheless provide a rational constraint on knowing. Instead the noncognitive impressions of sense are to guide minds by being, retrospectively, the (ineffable) causes of our finding things to be thus and so within whatever conceptual scheme we actually

employ, and prospectively, through the development of ever more adequate theories of what there is, the (effable) causes of linguistic pictures that in the limit correctly depict those causes. At the level of sense impressions we just do – mechanically, as it were – correctly picture how things really are. But such pictures are not true because sensing is not knowing, not an episode in the space of reasons. What is required for knowing is that we have concepts of such impressions (or concepts of whatever is the counterpart of such impressions in the final theory), and we can come to have such concepts, Sellars thinks, in virtue of our capacity to develop theories involving analogical concepts that will not only explain why ordinary perceptible objects obey the lawful generalities they do as far as they do, but also (because they are analogical) ground the idea that it is those very sense impressions that our talk is about.

III

Sellars and Kant are agreed that there must be a rational constraint on thinking in the sense of an imposition on a thinker, something independent of one's thinking that somehow guides it. In Kant, the something is empirical experience itself. In Sellars, it is noncognitive sensing. In both cases, to say that this something is independent of one's thinking is to say that one is altogether passive with respect to it. This is obviously so in the case of the Sellarsian notion of sensing since sensing is conceived by him as a merely causal process. But (as Sellars himself reminds us) it is also true of the Kantian notion of empirical experience as constituted by the synthetic activity of the productive imagination; for "this spontaneity is still only a *relative* spontaneity, a spontaneity 'set in motion' by 'foreign causes' ".⁴⁴

[It] is, though not a *sheer* passivity, nevertheless a passivity in that the inner development is set in motion by a foreign cause and follows a routine. . . . If this were all that the spontaneity of the noumenal self amounted to, then although it would not be a part of the phenomenal nature of outer and inner sense, it would be *like* an object in nature and might be called a noumenal mechanism.⁴⁵

Empirical experience on Kant's view is simply a given as far as empirical knowledge is concerned. Not only is the object (as

existing) independent of our thinking – though not of the thinking of an infinite being – what the object is experienced as is equally independent of our thinking. The productive imagination "follows a routine" with respect to which we as knowers are altogether passive.

But if, as McDowell puts it,

we could not recognize capacities operative in experience as conceptual at all were it not for the way they are integrated into a rationally organized network of capacities for active adjustment of one's thinking to the deliverances of experience (MW II §4, p. 29),

then experience as Kant conceives it cannot after all be something that is conceptual shape. That is, it is not properly perceptual experience at all. As both Sellars and McDowell see,⁴⁶ a capacity is properly conceptual just if it involves not only the freedom to judge but also the freedom to refashion the concepts in terms of which one judges, or indeed experiences anything at all. Again I quote McDowell:

part of the point of the idea that the understanding is a faculty of spontaneity – that conceptual capacities are capacities whose exercise is the domain of responsible freedom – is that the network [of capacities for active thought], as an individual thinker finds it governing her thinking, is not sacrosanct. Active empirical thinking takes place under a standing obligation to reflect about the credentials of the putatively rational linkages that govern it (MW I §5, p. 12).

The problem is that in Kant's thinking that network *is* sacrosanct insofar as it is transcendently grounded in the synthetic a priori principles of mathematics and pure natural science. Our freedom extends only to judging (i.e., to the application of concepts), not to the putatively rational linkages (and hence to the concepts themselves) that govern it. As far as we are concerned, the latter are simply given. The problem with Kant's abstractionist account of empirical concept formation, then, can be put like this: one cannot abstract empirical concepts from experience, on the grounds that they were put there in the first place (at least as regards their form) through the pure synthesis of the manifold of intuition by the productive imagination in accordance with the pure concepts of the understanding, because nothing put into experience that way *could* be conceptual.

Sellars has a different problem. He agrees with Kant that there must be a constraint on thinking in the sense of something imposed

on it that will guide it, and agrees that a rational constraint on thinking can only come from within the conceptual realm. But, as he sees, no constraint on thinking that comes from within the conceptual realm can do the job that is wanted. For the constraint that comes from within thinking is only a relative constraint, relative, that is, to other things one thinks. If empirical thought is to have representational bearing on reality, there must be an absolute constraint on thinking, a constraint by what is. The only way out (that Sellars can see) is to posit two different constraints, one that is rational and internal, a constraint on thinking set by truth as S-assertibility, and one that is merely causal and properly external, a constraint on the content thought set by truth as correct picturing. Sellars claims, as he must, that it is the latter that is basic, that “the *correctness* of the picture is not defined in terms of the correctness of a performance but vice versa” (SM V §57, p. 136); but this constraint, that a judging is ultimately correct just if it pictures things as they are, is necessarily external to judging. On his view, there can be no constitutive relationship between the correctness of the content of a judgment and the correctness of the act of judging. As Kant sees, if that is so then what one is doing is not properly judging at all. The things themselves (as knowable) must, Kant argues, rationally constrain one’s judging; it must be exactly the same thing that one thinks and that is (A600/B628). McDowell puts the point this way:

there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks *is* what is the case (MW II §3, p. 27).

Sellars thinks that there must be an ontological gap between what one can think (something cognitively significant) and what is (something outside the conceptual). As a result, judging as he understands it lacks objective significance, that is, a passive relation to truth. But that means it is not properly judging at all. In the end, judging in Sellars’s account is nothing more than a move in a self-contained game. The fact that in the course of this game we might produce linguistic representations that in fact are isomorphic in some way to aspects of reality does nothing to change that.

Sellars and Kant each has a cogent objection against the other, an objection grounded in a fundamental insight into the nature of

empirical knowledge. What Kant sees is that the two conditions on empirical knowledge – that it be an exercise of freedom, a standing in the space of reasons, and that it be answerable to, rationally constrained by, how things actually are – are sides of a coin. Empirical knowledge requires that judging be a standing in the space of reasons *and by the same token* answerable to how things are. It is this that Sellars fails to grasp. On the other hand, Sellars sees, though Kant does not, that the understanding must operate with absolute freedom within its own sphere. Empirical knowledge requires that our spontaneity (and hence our answerability) extends not merely to the judgments we make but also to the concepts (and intuitions) we employ in judging. In Kant’s account, judging is at once (i.e., by the same token) a standing in the space of reasons and rationally constrained by what is; but it can be only by virtue of the fact that what is known (so what one is answerable to) is only an appearance. Our freedom, on his view, is essentially conditioned. In Sellars’s account, while our freedom is unconditioned, it can be only because the truth of the matter to which judging is answerable is external to one’s adequate standing in the space of reasons. What we now need to see is that if the picture with which we began, a picture according to which the reality known is outside the conceptual sphere, is left in place then each insight can be kept in view only at the expense of the other.

Sellars and Kant agree that if there is (or were) rational constraint by what is, the reality known, then concepts are (or would be) derivable from, and so also applicable to, experience of objects. Both accept this conditional. Kant argues *modus ponens*: the antecedent must be true, he thinks, since empirical knowledge requires rational constraint by the reality known, hence the consequent must be true as well, that is, concepts must be derivable from and so also properly applied to objects as experienced. To avoid the Myth of the Given, Kant further argues that concepts are so derivable because they have been put there in experience by the transcendental activity of pure spontaneity. Sellars, by contrast, argues *modus tollens*: the consequent (that concepts are derivable from objects) must be false since the distinction of concept and object is a logical one. Hence, the antecedent must be false too, that is, the reality known can set no rational constraint on knowing. To avoid the Myth of the

Taken according to which spontaneity is intelligible independent of receptivity, Sellars further argues that being rational, that is, justified or S-assertible, is one thing, and being constrained by truth in the sense of correct picturing is another. Neither strategy, we have seen, is successful. But if that is right, then it would seem that the conditional on which Sellars and Kant are agreed is false. We begin to see why it is false when we notice that, while the antecedent concerns the distinction of spontaneity and receptivity, the consequent concerns the distinction of concept and object. What Kant argues, in effect, is that since (as he quite correctly sees) neither spontaneity nor receptivity can be understood except in terms of the other, it follows that neither objects nor concepts can be understood except in terms of the other. But that conclusion (Sellars sees) is false. Concepts and objects are not internally related as spontaneity and receptivity are. Sellars's mistake is to conclude from the fact that concepts are *sui generis* relative to objects that spontaneity must also be *sui generis* relative to receptivity, that these two faculties must be logically different, the one inherently cognitive and the other radically noncognitive. Each starts from a true premise; what neither sees is that those premises in no way imply the conclusions they draw.

According to this diagnosis, the obstacle that bars the way to an adequate account of empirical knowledge in the thinking of Sellars and Kant is a certain conception of the relationship of two distinctions, that between spontaneity and receptivity, and that between concept and object. Both Kant and Sellars, though for interestingly different reasons, take these distinctions to be aligned, and it is this that inevitably leads to a fundamental distortion of one or the other. The problem is not merely that initially raised, that one is a distinction among elements that make up a judgeable content and the other a distinction among aspects of judging; rather it is the related but deeper point that while spontaneity and receptivity are unintelligible except in relation to each other, concepts and objects cannot be understood by reference to each other. It is because they align these distinctions nonetheless that Kant and Sellars find themselves with the original picture. Given that picture, there are only two options: locate the causal realm (as constituted by receptivity and the notion of an object) within the conceptual realm (conceived in terms of

spontaneity combined with the notion of a concept), as Kant does; or locate the conceptual realm so conceived within the constituted causal realm, as Sellars does.

The fact that the concept/object distinction is a logical one, that, in particular, concepts cannot be understood by reference to objects (since a concept essentially involves a principle of inclusion that no list of objects can provide), does not imply that a correlative distinction can be drawn for the case of spontaneity and receptivity. Nevertheless, Sellars does make the inference and so thinks that the very idea of an intentional relation of meaning or aboutness between thought contents and items in the world is incoherent. There is, he thinks, a logical gap between items in the space of reasons, the conceptual order, and items in the world without the mind, the real order, a logical gap that precludes there being any intentional relation of aboutness or meaning between thought and the reality on which thought aims to bear. Sellars thinks that his critique of the Myth of the Given shows that there must be such a gap. But the Myth of the Given applies only to the distinction between concept and object. It has no application to the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity.

On the other hand, the fact that the concept/object distinction is a logical one does seem to have implications for our conception of ourselves. Though I can only gesture at the point here, it implies that our capacity to use concepts, to judge, cannot be a natural capacity, that is, a capacity we have or could come to have solely in virtue of the fact that we are sentient beings. If that is right, then being a knower is, as McDowell argues, essentially *second nature*.⁴⁷ Much as sentient animals able competently to cope with the environment can come into being only through the process of biological evolution by natural selection, so sapient animals at home in the space of reasons can come into being only through a distinctively social process of evolution by natural selection.⁴⁸

A correlative pair of points can be made for the distinction of spontaneity and receptivity. We have seen that the fact that there is a constitutive relation between spontaneity and receptivity – that having the capacity to have a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons is by the same token to have the capacity to be impressed upon by what is the case – does not imply that concepts and objects

are constitutively related. Concepts are *sui generis*; and objects do not need concepts to have the properties and relations they actually have. Only if (following Kant) one draws such an inference nonetheless will one think that the argument to show that the Taken is a myth amounts to an argument showing that our knowledge cannot be of things as they are in themselves. The Myth of the Taken is the myth that spontaneity might be coherent independent of receptivity, of a passive rational relation to the reality known. But that the Taken is a myth provides no grounds for thinking that the objective validity of our concepts must be understood in terms of a relation to an object. Spontaneity is indeed empty independent of receptivity; but concepts are not empty independent of objects.

On the other hand, the fact that spontaneity and receptivity are internally related does have implications for an adequate understanding of justification and truth, and thereby for an adequate conception of reality. For if it is by the same token that one has a standing in the space of reason and is answerable to (constrained by) how things are, then it follows that one can have a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons only if things are as one takes them to be. That is to say, the truth (or falsity) of one's judgment is internal to its status as justified (or not). Truth is not, as Sellars holds, an extra extrinsic condition added on to a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons. Again the insight is McDowell's. As he argues in "Knowledge and the Internal", "the particular facts that the world does us the favor of vouchsafing to us, in the various relevant modes of cognition, actually shape the space of reasons as we find it".⁴⁹ "The effect", as he immediately goes on, "is a sort of coalescence between the idea of the space of reasons as we find it and the idea of the world as we encounter it". In the imagery of *Mind and World*, the reality on which thought bears is not located outside the realm of the conceptual.

IV

Sellars and Kant, I have argued, occupy the two poles of a dilemma that, following McDowell, has been understood in term of a picture according to which reality is located outside the conceptual sphere. The dilemma, given that picture, is that reality both must and cannot

have rational bearing on thought. Both Sellars and Kant respond to the problem with what McDowell stigmatizes as constructive philosophy. They aim to show how it is possible that we have empirical knowledge given that reality both must and cannot rationally constrain empirical thought; and to that end each constructs an elaborate, and often surprising, theory of how things, in the broadest possible sense, are. Each of these theories, I have suggested, helps us to see why the other is wrong. Nor, it seems clear, should we hope for other theories that might do better. What is needed instead is "to dislodge the assumptions that make it look difficult to find a place for meaning in the world" (MW Afterword III §1, p. 176). According to the account sketched here, the assumption that is responsible for the difficulty is the thesis that rational constraint by what is requires that concepts be derivable from (experience of) objects. It is this assumption, I have argued, that effects the collapse of the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity, on the one hand, and the distinction between concept and object, on the other; and it is the collapse of these distinctions that generates the picture according to which reality is outside the conceptual sphere and thereby the dilemma that reality both must and cannot rationally constrain empirical thought.

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NOTES

¹ In *Mind and World* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), which is the text of his Locke lectures given in the Spring of 1991. All references to *Mind and World* will be given by 'MW' followed by the lecture number, section number, and page number.

² It is of course Sellars who is responsible both for the label and for bringing home to us that the Given is indeed a myth. As Sellars himself recognizes, the insight really belongs to Kant – though Kant did not, on Sellars's view, fully come to grips with it.

³ *Science and Metaphysics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), p. viii. All subsequent references to this work will be given in the body as 'SM' followed by the lecture number, section number, and page number. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956) is now reprinted as a monograph (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) with an introduction by Richard Rorty and study guide by Robert Brandom.

⁴ The Kantian themes of interest here are almost exclusively those that help us to understand and assess Sellars's account of empirical knowledge as it compares with Kant's. Inevitably, much that is of more general interest and importance in Kant's thought cannot be taken up. More specifically, the focus here is on Kant's metaphysical and transcendental characterizations of the faculties of sensibility and understanding, characterizations that I take to be explanatorily prior to his account of those faculties as involving, respectively, pure intuitions of Space and Time and the pure concepts.

⁵ *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933).

⁶ In *Lectures on Logic*, ed. and trans. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 546.

⁷ See A19/B33. It should be noted that this notion of an intellectual intuition is not Kant's only or even his primary motivation for his conceptions of sensibility and understanding. It is much more likely, as Michael Friedman argues in *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), that his most immediate motivation is his understanding of the mathematics of his day, and in particular Euclidean geometry. Nevertheless, the idea of an intellectual intuition is not negligible for him; it is a powerful image both of our potential for knowledge and of the inevitable limitations on that knowledge.

⁸ Fred Sommers, *The Logic of Natural Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 15.

⁹ Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1914), p. 50.

¹⁰ He writes in "The Clue": "logicians are justified in saying that, in the employment of judgment in syllogisms, singular judgments can be treated like those that are universal ... If, on the other hand, we compare a singular with a universal judgment, merely as knowledge, in respect of quantity, the singular stands to the universal as unity to infinity, and is therefore itself essentially different from the universal" (A71/B96). In §19 of the B Deduction, Kant explicitly takes issue with the classical conception of judgment as a relation between two concepts on the grounds that "the definition does not determine in what the asserted relation consists" (B141). To judge, on Kant's view, is to assert that the concept of the subject and that in the predicative position "are combined in the object" (B142; Kant's emphasis). That is, it is to assert their relation in an object.

¹¹ By the end of the story, of course, we are to see that receptivity is not merely a faculty of representations of objects, and that spontaneity is correspondingly not merely a faculty of concepts. For, as Kant will argue, our receptivity as a form of representation of object as essentially spatio-temporal, and the pure concepts must be schematized if they are to have any objective validity. Both these concepts must be thought of as Kantian theses ought, according to the conception pursued here, to be understood in terms of the logical distinction between intuition and concept and the physical distinction between receptivity and spontaneity.

¹² "There certainly does remain in the pure concepts of understanding, even after the elimination of every sensible condition, a meaning; but it is purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of the representations. The pure concept of some object, and so can acquire no meaning which might yield a concept of some object. Substance, for instance, when the sensible determination of persons a subject, omitted, would mean simply a something which can be thought only never as a predicate of something else" (A147/B186).

¹³ According to Kant, even in their singular use in definite descriptions as concepts do not amount logically to intuitions, representations immediately of individuals. Concepts are essentially predicative, true of objects rather than referring expressions for objects (see the *Jäsche Logic* §15, Note).

¹⁴ Cf. Kant's remark in the discussion of the ontological argument: "Whatever, we must go outside of it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object" (A601/B629).

¹⁵ As Manley Thomson has argued in "Singular Terms and Intuition" in Kant's *Epistemology* *Review of Metaphysics* 26 (1972–1973): 314–343, Kantian intuition has no linguistic representation: "for Kant an intuitive representation in language we no place in language, where all representations are discursive. In 1st presuppose intuitive and create discursive representations" (p. 333).

¹⁶ For all that has been said here, they could be isomorphic to properties of things as they are. Kant has other reasons for thinking that reality cannot be taken as it is taken by us to be. I consider those that concern space in "The Logic of Relations and the Ideality of Space", *Journal of Philosophical Research* 20 (1995): 367–379.

¹⁷ In *Action, Knowledge and Reality: Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars*, ed. H.-N. Castañeda (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), p. 285.

¹⁸ *Action, Knowledge and Reality*, pp. 285–286.

¹⁹ *Jäsche Logic* §6, p. 592.

²⁰ The question of the legitimacy of the application of concepts does arise for the case of the pure concepts involved in the synthesis of the representations of basic perceptual experience, however. A transcendental deduction of the pure concepts is needed to answer it.

²¹ "Kant was right to postulate the existence of a manifold of objects in our sense on epistemological ('transcendental') grounds – even if the details of his argument are open to serious objection" (SM I §28, p. 11).

²² "The characteristics of the representations of receptivity as such, which is what should properly be meant by the forms of sensibility, are never adequately

discussed [by Kant], and the so-called forms of sensibility become ever more clearly, as the argument of the *Critique* proceeds, forms of conceptual representation" (SM I §77, p. 30).

²³ The role of sheer receptivity in Sellars's account of intentionality is the topic of McDowell's Woodbridge Lectures, "Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality", given at Columbia University, April 1997, and published in the *Journal of Philosophy* 95 (1998): 431–491. My debt to these lectures, though not as direct or extensive as my debt to McDowell's Locke Lectures, is nonetheless significant.

²⁴ So, for instance, whereas for Kant empirical intuition (i.e., perceptual experience of things as thus and so) belongs on the side of sensibility even though it involves a productive synthesis, for Sellars it is more correct to say that empirical intuition belongs to the understanding (SM I §21, p. 9).

²⁵ As Sellars points out in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, another name for the notion of givenness that he argues is a myth is 'immediacy' in its Hegelian sense (p. 13).

²⁶ "Inference and Meaning", *Mind* 62 (1953): 313–338, p. 317.

²⁷ "Inference and Meaning", p. 336–337.

²⁸ "Inference and Meaning", p. 336.

²⁹ *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, §41, p. 82.

³⁰ As Sellars says, "that at least some of the descriptive predicates of a language must be learned responses to extra-linguistic objects in order for the language to be applied, is obvious" ("Inference and Meaning", p. 334). This demand, as it matters to us here, is that at least some of the descriptive predicates of a theoretical language acquire a reporting role, and enough of them that the theory as a whole comes to function independently of the observation language on which it was originally based. See SM V §90, p. 146.

³¹ It is, as Sellars argues in "Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal Modalities", in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol II, eds. Feigl, Scriven and Maxwell (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1958), "the presence in the object language of the causal modalities (and of the logical modalities and of the deontic modalities) [that] serves not only to express existing commitments [to various rules of material inference], but also to provide the framework for the thinking by which we reason our way (in a manner appropriate to the specific subject matter) into the making of new commitments and the abandoning of the old" (pp. 302–303). Only speakers of such a language, he argues, are properly characterized as describing, as judging rather than merely as labelling. McDowell makes essentially the same point in the Locke Lectures, arguing that our (essentially limitless) capacity to refashion concepts is constitutive of the understanding as a spontaneous faculty. See, e.g., MW I §5, and II §8.

³² This is not to say that our understanding of the meanings of these concepts essentially depends on the fact that they have such a high-order isomorphism with observational concepts. In principle it must be possible directly to formulate the rules governing the use of such concepts. For, as Sellars argues in "Scientific

Realism or Irenic Instrumentalism", *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol II, eds. R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), "to suppose otherwise is to return to some form of abstractionism or givenness" (p. 179).

³³ The example is Sellars's in "Scientific Realism and Irenic Instrumentalism", p. 180.

³⁴ "Mental Events", *Philosophical Studies* 39 (1981): 325–345, p. 336.

³⁵ "Mental Events", p. 338.

³⁶ Daniel Dennett, "Real Patterns", *Journal of Philosophy* 88 (1991): 27–51.

³⁷ "Mental Events", p. 336.

³⁸ "Mental Events", p. 334.

³⁹ In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* Sellars puts the point this way: "the rubric '...' means ---' is a linguistic device for conveying the information that a mentioned word, in this case 'rot', plays the same role in a certain linguistic economy, in this case the linguistic economy of German-speaking people, as does the word 'red', which is not mentioned but used – used in a unique way; exhibited, so to speak – and which occurs 'on the right-hand side' of the semantic statement" (§31, p. 67).

⁴⁰ In the Introduction to *Science and Metaphysics*, Sellars goes so far as to say that the nonrelational character of 'meaning' and 'aboutness' is "the key to a correct understanding of the place of mind in nature" (SM, p. x).

⁴¹ To say that a sentence is true in this sense is to say that it (or any other sentence with the same role) is "correctly assertible; assertible, that is, in accordance with the relevant semantical rules, and on the basis of such additional, though unspecified, information as these rules may require" (SM IV §26, p. 101).

⁴² "A statement to the effect that a linguistic item pictures a nonlinguistic item by virtue of the semantic uniformities characteristic of a certain conceptual structure is, in an important sense, an object language statement, for though it mentions linguistic objects, it treats them as items in the order of causes and effects, i.e., in *rerum natura*, and speaks directly of their functioning in this order in a way which is to be sharply contrasted with the metalinguistic statements of logical semantics, in which the key role is played by abstract singular terms" (SM V §59, p. 137).

⁴³ "Truth and 'Correspondence'", reprinted in *Science, Perception and Reality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 222.

⁴⁴ "This I or he or it (the thing) which thinks ...", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* 44 (1972): 5–31, p. 23.

⁴⁵ "This I or he ...", pp. 23–24.

⁴⁶ See note 31 above.

⁴⁷ McDowell writes, "our nature is largely second nature, and our second nature is the way it is not just because of the potentialities we were born with, but also because of our upbringing, our *Bildung*. Given the notion of second nature, we can say that the way our lives are shaped by reason is natural, even while we deny that the structure of the space of reasons can be integrated into the layout of the realm of law" (MW V §1, p. 88).

⁴⁸ I explore the nature of this process and the distinctive transformations it enables, transformations that culminate in creatures properly described as knowers, in "The Coin of the Intentional Realm", *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 24 (1994): 143–166.

⁴⁹ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55 (1995): 877–893, p. 887. In this essay, McDowell considers the argument from illusion as it motivates the interiorization of the space of reasons that would leave reality outside it. This argument is not in play for Sellars, as McDowell sees, but, I have suggested, other motivations lead Sellars to end up with exactly the interiorization of the space of reasons that McDowell argues is a mistake.

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