



described by the laws of fundamental physics.<sup>1</sup> Consider, for example, a smudge of ink that might appear on this page owing, let us say, to some minor malfunction in the printer that produced it; and consider as well the various other "smudges" that make up the letters and thereby the words and sentences that appear here. Conceived merely as ink marks all have the spatial locations and shapes they do by virtue of the physical laws governing the processes involved in printing this page of text. One could not, at this level of description, properly say that some of the marks ought to be there and some ought not; all are equally intelligible as the outcome of a certain physical process. But, of course, there are other sorts of patterns discernible here as well. We might, for example, describe the marks on the page not in terms of their spatial location and shape, but instead as a sequence of letters, spaces, and punctuation marks. At this level of description, it is appropriate to recognize the possibility of malfunctions, errors or noise, and so to distinguish between, say, letters and mere smudges, or between letters that are correctly oriented and those that are backwards or upside down. The idea of real patterns is just the idea of such orders of intelligibility that supervene on other orders, ultimately that describable in physical terms. Two features of such patterns that are critical to the project here are, first, that descriptions of higher order patterns invoke categories of entities (e.g., letters, words, or text) that do not appear at lower levels, and second, that higher level descriptions properly involve what can be broadly characterized as normative notions (e.g., that of correct or incorrect functioning, or of the proper orientation of letters).<sup>2</sup>

Living organisms as evolved functional unities are a particularly well-understood illustration of the idea of real patterns, and it is not surprising that many have tried to understand distinctively human phenomena, the patterns we exhibit in our actions and our speech, in terms of the sort of functionalist notions that are invoked to explain the behavior of living organisms generally. But functionalism as an explanatory framework for understanding distinctively human behavior is inadequate. We are *rational* animals, subject to the force of the better reason and responsible to the norm of truth — or so it will be supposed here. If we are, then to think that a functionalist account can adequately map the structure of our intentional states, attitudes and actions is to commit a kind of naturalistic fallacy.<sup>3</sup>

A second strategy appeals to a different sort of pattern, one that supervenes on patterns properly described in functionalist terms. Inspired primarily by Sellars' work and that of the later Wittgenstein, the pragmatist's idea is that our intentional involvements are to be thought of as moves in various socially constituted games. So, for example, we might think of assertion as a move in the game of giving and asking for reasons that is entitling of other moves and itself entitling just if adequate justification can be given of it — where adequate justification in turn is a matter of what is taken to be so by the players.<sup>4</sup> This pragmatist strategy is much more plausible than that of the functionalist insofar

as it explicitly recognizes the distinctively normative character of intentional phenomena. It is nevertheless vitiated by its inability to fund a properly objective notion of truth. The pragmatist can make nothing of the idea that knowledge is of things as they are. Of course, the pragmatist also argues that there is nothing to be made of this idea — but perhaps it is only a picture that holds him captive.

We need another picture. The one I want to explore is a triptych of images: of a commodity money market as it evolves out of pre-market barter exchanges, of a fiat money economy, and of a pure credit economy. The first image, that of a commodity money market, is to illustrate the evolution of social significances and thereby to clarify the evolution of practices. In both the economic case and the case of practices, the patterns that emerge are to be understood in functionalist terms. The second image, of a fiat money economy, depicts a kind of game, with well-defined sorts of moves, game tokens, and score-keeping. The notion of a fiat money economy is to illustrate the nature of distinctively linguistic practices as they constitute a social game. The third panel bears the image of a credit economy. Such an economy is not merely a game, nor can it be understood in functionalist terms. Indeed, in this case, there are no other images or pictures that might be appealed to in understanding it. The image of such an economy is itself the picture in terms of which we are to understand the nature of properly intentional phenomena. To accept this picture is to be inclined to think differently, not only about the autonomy of the subject and the objectivity of the world, but also about action, perception and judgment. For to accept this picture is to be inclined to think differently about concepts as the medium of all such involvements. It is concepts, on this view, that are the coin of the intentional realm.<sup>5</sup>

#### 1. THE EVOLUTION OF SIGNIFICANCE

With the rise of modern science we learned to see the world as a totality governed by discoverable physical laws. But commitment to the idea that all systems are physical systems, describable (at least in principle) in the vocabulary of fundamental physics and explicable in terms of processes governed by the inviolable laws of physics, is not incompatible with the idea that other patterns, other orders of intelligibility, are discernible in nature as well. The theory of evolution by natural selection, for example, shows how structures can evolve that are as if designed and so have a functional unity that supervenes on the physical.

According to the theory of evolution by natural selection as set out by Brandon (1984), evolution occurs whenever there is, first, variation or a constant source of different items that are in principle replicable, second, a

mechanism of their replication, and finally, differential fitness among the replicable items. Biological evolution occurs according to this principle through the differential survival of DNA molecules, and realizes systems properly described as having (biological) natures and habitats. Such creatures are as if designed to develop and behave in certain ways, and these norms of development and behavior are intelligible in turn relative to the demand for the continued survival of the species. Even the simplest organisms are normal or abnormal relative to the standards set by their biological natures; and even where normal an organism can be mistaken or fooled in various ways owing to limitations in its design relative to the purpose of that design.<sup>6</sup> Finally, as having a nature, a biological organism has a world which is a unified totality of opportunities for and hazards to its survival. Just as various physical components of the system acquire the significance of being functional parts of it that have roles to play relative to the way of life of the organism as a whole (and which can fail to play these roles), so various features of an animal's surroundings acquire significance for it — as food, for example, or shelter, as dangerous or benign. By virtue of its evolution, its as if design, an organism is the locus of the significance of its world.

Biological evolution realizes new, functional, unities new patterns that are properly intelligible only in terms that are quite alien to the physical sciences. But evolution by natural selection is not a specifically biological phenomenon. Economic markets too can evolve according to this principle, and their evolution realizes in the same way new significances for things.

In a pre-market or barter economy, the terms of exchanges are fixed only by the willingness of each participant to meet the demands of the other. Goods in such an economy have antecedent significances (i.e., they are more or less useful or otherwise desirable to the individuals involved), but they have no market value. Because trading in a barter economy is on an *ad hoc* basis, nothing has the market significance of being worth so much. If, however, some one good comes to be generally desired and available to be traded for any other good, if that is, something comes to function as a commodity money, then competition can occur. Now everyone with the same good to trade is in competition for buyers of that good, and everyone seeking a particular good competes for its purchase. Where there is commodity money, some one thing each participant is willing to accept or offer in trade, the terms of trades are easily replicable; and they are differentially fit since each participant in the market seeks the most advantageous terms. As a result, stable, commensurate prices for goods evolve.<sup>7</sup>

Commodity money enables the evolution of the market and the market significances that are prices. Goods are realized as market commodities with stable market values, and because each transaction involves the commodity money and so is assessable as more or less profitable relative to the terms others offer, trades are realized as market transactions proper. But much as the biological significance of a creature can be seen only relative to the larger

pattern that is the evolution of its kind and of other kinds (i.e., independent of the whole the instance is not intelligible as a living organism<sup>8</sup>), so a market transaction can show up as such only within the context of the market as a whole. Independent of the market its significance is only that of any barter exchange. On the other hand, once considered within the context of the market, as a part of a whole pattern of exchanges, a particular transaction not only has the significance of being a market exchange but also (much as any animal is normal or abnormal relative to the species) of being a fair or unfair trade. Because particular transactions depend only on the willingness of both participants to make the trade, prices (like species) are stable but not fixed. Particular trades are constitutive of what counts as a fair price much as particular matings of animals are constitutive of what counts as a normal or typical member of the species, but each can also be assessed relative to the fair or market price much as animals are assessed as normal or abnormal relative to the species. The transactions that actually take place are both constituted by and constitutive of what counts as fair or normal.

As species and markets evolve according to the theory of evolution by natural selection, so practices can evolve by way of the differential fitness of various dispositions to respond in particular ways to things in particular circumstances. In the case of practices (as in the case of relative market values), the differential fitness of a given disposition is not a matter of its practical usefulness to the individuals involved, however. A disposition's relative fitness is rather determined by how the behavior manifesting it is treated by others.<sup>9</sup> In a group of creatures with the capacity to mimic each other's behavior and with dispositions to "punish" deviant behavior — that is, in a group of creatures that are conformists in Haugeland's (1982) sense — practices evolve that are distinctive of the group. Such practices are the norm of behaviour for members of the group; they are peculiar to particular groups since the actual history and composition of the group affects the patterns of behavior that actually evolve; and though never fixed once and for all, the practices are stable across generations of the group.<sup>9</sup>

With the evolution of practices, certain items of behavior acquire the significance of being performances of practices. They are significant as normal (or abnormal) performances relative to the practices of the group, and like market values or biological organisms are at once constituted by and constitutive of what counts as normal. As before, these practices also confer significances on entities that do not evolve as practices do but which are caught up in those practices in some way or other: the food stuffs that must (according to the practices of the community) be prepared and eaten in certain ways, for example, the materials that are used for various purposes, the natural phenomena that are responded to in particular ways, and so on. As the surroundings of a particular species of animal come to have the shape of a habitat for that species, so the environment of practitioners of practices takes on

a particular shape relative to the practices that are constitutive of their way of life.

It is worth emphasizing, finally, that much as the relative market values of goods need not reflect their relative usefulness (though they will reflect their relative desirability to market participants), so practices need not be particularly rational or even practically useful. They can be merely decorative (as it were) or even positively harmful. So long as they are not so deleterious as to wipe out the tribe altogether, they can persist. For, as Dennett (1991b, p. 203) has put it, "replication is not necessarily for the good of anything, replicators flourish that are good at . . . replicating! — for whatever reason."

## 2. THE INSTITUTION OF SIGNIFICANCE

Evolution by natural selection realizes patterns that have an intelligibility distinct from that afforded by the notion of the lawfulness of the physical world. These patterns in turn can be the basis for the institution of yet another order of intelligibility. In particular, some significances that are socially evolved — e.g., market significances or those of certain practices — can be instituted as *purely* social significances. The picture here is of a fiat money economy as a kind of game, with well-defined sorts of moves, game tokens, and scores.

In a general way, games differ from practices by virtue of involving norms; they involve the notion of what one is entitled or permitted to do rather than merely that of what is normal. A player in a game, for example, is not only someone who is capable of making the relevant moves (who has the requisite dispositions, who behaves normally); it is someone who is *entitled* to make moves, and who is properly held responsible for playing according to the rules. Being a player is not, in other words, a matter of being in a particular (dispositional) state; it is a matter of having a certain (socially conferred) status. A move in a game, similarly, is not just a performance that is in accord with some practice or other; it is also legal or illegal according to the rules. It is a performance of a certain kind as it has a certain status. Thus, although the practices that underlie games are evolved entities, games themselves, because they involve norms, cannot be the result of an evolutionary process. They are rather socially instituted, directly or indirectly, through mutual recognition: individuals have the status of players by virtue of being treated as players by those they treat as players, and other game significant entities acquire their statuses by virtue of being so treated by players.<sup>9</sup>

Consider, first, a very simple case: a child's game of tag in which one person is 'it' and chases others until one of them is tagged and thereby becomes 'it'. Suppose that the practice of such a game has evolved, that is, a group of children have acquired the relevant behavioral dispositions (on being tagged one is disposed to chase others, on having tagged another to flee rather than to chase,

and so on), and in various circumstances are disposed to enter into this mode of behavior. This is just something the children have evolved to do, a practice they have come to have. Suppose now that the children begin to treat some as in the game and others as not so that, for example, when child B is tagged by child A these children continue to treat A as 'it' — in effect not recognizing the tag as legal. The *game* of tag is instituted just when an equilibrium is reached in which each child who acts as a player is recognized as a player (held to the standards of the game) by those she treats as a player (or holds to the standards of the game). At equilibrium, if it is reached, recognition is transitive: one treats as a player all those who are treated as players by those one so treats. In this way, through mutual recognition, the players and the game are instituted, and the one bound by the norms of the other.

We saw above that the market evolves out of pre-market barter exchanges through the presence of a commodity money. For where there is a commodity money there is competition and this in turn ensures that the market will reach an equilibrium in stable commensurate prices for all commodities. But while the evolution of a market economy requires that some commodity play the role of money, once the market is established anything at all can take over the role of the money — even something that is of no value to participants outside the market. While it would be absurd to attempt to nourish a baby by feeding it pieces of paper on which are written "one bottle of milk" or to try to drive a nail with a token marked "hammer", it is not at all absurd (once the market has been established) to exchange a good for a piece of paper on which is written "one unit of market value". For market values (i.e., prices) and market transactions in fact affect only the statuses of market participants. It follows that once the market has been established, the money of the market need only keep track of the purchasing potential (or market scores) of individual participants across exchanges. Such a market, a fiat money market, is a kind of game.

A fiat money economy is different from a commodity money economy in various respects. Most obviously, it differs in using something that is of no (or more exactly negligible) value independent of the market as the money of the market. The value of fiat money lies in what it can buy. Market participants, then, from having an array of goods (one of which is directly tradable for others, the rest of which are indirectly tradable), now have two distinct sorts of possessions: goods that can be used or traded, and a stuff that is very nearly a pure potency to acquire independently valuable goods. Exchanges too are transformed. From being an exchange of goods, a trade is now, from one perspective, the buying of a good, and from the other, the selling of a good.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, because the money of the market is not also a good, because it has no value outside the market, the market is now bounded; it forms a (metaphorical) space which one enters by selling goods and which one leaves by buying goods. Finally, the goods themselves, from having commensurate market values (one of these worth seven of those, and so on), which can but need not be expressed as

worth relative to the commodity money, now have the significance of being worth so much of the money. Fiat money, because itself without (non-negligible) value, is the standard of value.

But fiat money does not contrast with commodity money only in having no (or more exactly negligible) market-independent significance. It differs also in how it serves as the medium of exchange. A commodity money can serve as the universal equivalent of goods — as the medium of exchange — only if the ratio of value between two bits of the money is proportional to the ratio between the two items themselves. Five cowrie shells are worth five times as much as one, and half an ounce of gold half as much as one ounce. Fiat money is not like this. Two five dollar bills are worth the same as one ten dollar bill, and half a five dollar bill is worth nothing at all. In the case of fiat money, not only is the stuff (e.g., paper) valuable only as the medium of exchange, it has whatever value it has by way of marks indicating the particular role it is to play rather than by way of intrinsic properties like weight or count. Practical constraints aside, the matter of fiat money does not matter, either to its being the medium of exchange or to how it plays that role. For its monetary value is made, not found.

The making of money is not, however, only a matter of producing tokens that can serve as the money of the market. The tokens must be recognized as money by market participants, and it is recognition of certain types of tokens rather than others that creates the boundary around the market. The boundary is fixed by what counts as the money. If, for example, both coins and bills are issued but some traders accept and offer only coins while others only use bills, two distinct markets are generated. To enter the one, you must accept coins in trade and to leave it must offer coins. To enter or leave the other, bills must be accepted or offered. The one market recognizes the issuing body as authoritatively issuing only coins, and the other recognizes only its bills. The authority of the issuing body, then, is instituted through its being recognized as authorized to make the money of the market. And if no one at all will use its tokens then it has no authority whatever. The role of issuing authority whose task it is to produce the money in the amounts required by the market is socially instituted. With such an institution, finally, comes the possibility of counterfeit money, money made without the proper authorization. Such "money" may well be treated as money proper (indeed it may be absolutely indistinguishable from the money of the market), but it is not for all that money. Counterfeit money does not entitle one to any goods. It has, so ought to be treated as having, no purchasing power.

A fiat money economy has the ontological status of a game insofar as it is instituted through mutual recognition. To be a player in the market game is to be recognized as a trader by those one so recognizes, either directly or by virtue of recognition of the money. To make a move is to trade, and each trade affects one's market score or purchasing potential as it is represented by the game tokens (money) one possesses and one's wealth in marketable goods. One enters

the game by trading goods for tokens, makes moves in the game by exchanging tokens, and one exits the game by buying something for use. I want now to describe an economy of verbal practices employing categories that are fundamentally analogous to those invoked in the account of a fiat money economy. This verbal game stands to a system of socially evolved practices as a fiat money economy stands to a commodity money economy.

Practices are of two sorts: those that are the producing and usings of things (food and shelter, for instance, and the tools and materials that are involved in their production and use), and those that are themselves the items to be produced and used. Vocal performances, for example, can be produced by way of doing something else (as one might make a particular noise in scaring off crows or bringing in cows), but can also be produced simply as what is normal for the tribe. As performances of practices, all are responses to various circumstances and are events that can be responded to, but the latter sorts of practices, because they (like market transactions) have no significance but social significance, can be instituted as a special sort of game. As a commodity money can be replaced by fiat money once prices have stabilized, so these practices, the ones that in fact make a difference only to the behavior of others, can come explicitly to have a purely social significance instituted through mutual recognition. So instituted, these practices, like a fiat money market, acquire the status of a bounded game which one enters by (say) verbally responding to something with extra-game significance (e.g., some event or state of affairs in the environment), which is exited by a performance that, in the simplest case, effects a material change (e.g., one produces or uses something), and which has intra-game verbal moves that are responses to other verbal moves. The practices involved in such a game are explicable by appeal to evolution by natural selection, but they constitute a game rather than mere practices just if doing what is done counts as a move by being so treated. Much as one is a player in the market game just if one is treated as a trader by those one treats as traders, so one is a player in a verbal game just if one is so treated by those one treats as a player.

In a fiat money economy, traders have two fundamentally different sorts of possessions: usable goods and money. Their money is the medium of the exchange of goods for goods, and is very nearly a pure potency. It represents one's purchasing power in the market. In a community that has instituted verbal games, people similarly have two different sorts of capacities. They can say things (though, as will become clear below, it is only an *ur* form of saying since it is not yet subject to the norm of objective truth), and they can do things. Sayings, like sales of goods, are game entries. One enters the game by making an utterance in response to something that does not have the status of a move, some event or state of affairs in the environment say. Moreover, much as selling a good effects, from the perspective of the seller, the transformation of a good into money that entitles one to other trades, so sayings that are entries effect

transformations, or better here translations, of states of affairs into tokenings that entitle other performances. Such tokenings entitle players, both to other sayings and to doings or exits. Exits are to be thought of on analogy with purchases. An action or game exit effects the translation of a game token or utterance into a performance much as in a purchase or market exit one transforms one's money into a usable good. One hears the cry 'to the hunt' and straightaway one acts; one is entitled to the action by the cry one hears. As the possession of money entitles one to market goods, so utterings are entitling; and responses to utterances, like goods one has bought, are entitled.

I have suggested that much as entering the market is a matter of selling a good and thereby acquiring purchasing potential in the form of money which entitles one to goods, so to enter the verbal game is to acquire a potential or to become entitled in a particular way. One's performance is typical or normal relative to the relevant practice (e.g., one makes the sound "red" in response to red things and not in response to green things), but it is not entitled by that to which it is a response. The entitlement to make particular moves, like purchasing power in the form of money, is a purely social entity; it cannot be conferred by an event or state of affairs. Verbal responses to things, then, while they are entitling of other performances (of both intra-game moves and exits), are not themselves entitled. Contrariwise, a game exit or (nonlinguistic) action one performs is, like a commodity one buys, entitled without being entitling. Of course, what one buys can in turn be sold, and what one does by way of a game exit may occasion an entry move, but the distinction remains. In the verbal game, entries or sayings (like the money one receives for a good) are entitling of moves but not entitled by moves; exits or actions (like goods one purchases) are entitled by moves but are not entitling of moves; and intra-game moves (like purchases of money in one form with money in another) are at once entitled by and entitling of moves.

Finally much as the institution of an authorizing agent for the making of fiat money brings with it the possibility of counterfeit money, so the institution of a verbal game brings with it the possibility of a sort of counterfeit saying. In both cases, a counterfeit is a token (or in the case of saying, a tokening) that purports to entitle but which in fact does not because it was not properly authorized. In the economic case, the authorizing agent is the one instituted as the maker of the money of the market. In the linguistic case, it can be the world (in a sense to be explained) that is instituted as the authorizing agent. If it is, the distinction between properly entitling sayings and sayings that seem to entitle but are in fact counterfeit can amount to a distinction between sayings that express "veridical" perceptions, and those that are founded on perceptual "illusion". This distinction is not exactly that between sayings that describe things as they are and sayings that describe things only as they seem to be, however, and it is important to see why.

Suppose that among the rules of the verbal game there comes to be a rule to the effect that only in certain circumstances are correctly made utterances to

count as entitling. An utterance of 'this is green' when made in response to an object seen in the full light of day, for example, is treated as entitling of other moves, while the same response even to the same object but made at twilight is not. Players, in such a case, learn to discriminate not only objects and states of affairs, but also the circumstances in which they are discriminated; and this latter capacity is exhibited in their treating some discriminations of objects and states of affairs as entitling and others as not. Those that are treated as entitling are, as we will say, properly authorized by the world. They are those entries that are made in (what are treated as or taken to be) standard conditions. If, according to the game, the circumstances count as nonstandard, then an utterance made in them ought not be treated by the players as an entitling move. An utterance in such circumstances is, in effect, counterfeit.

This distinction between "standard" and "nonstandard" conditions is and must be instituted by the players themselves (just as the distinction between authorized and nonauthorized makers of money must be instituted by the traders themselves). We say that standard conditions are those in which things are just as they appear to be; in standard conditions things show up as they are, in their true colors — or so we say. But no more than the players of the language game envisaged here do we have access to things independent of how they show up for us. We have, and can have, no Olympian perspective, no view from nowhere, from which to survey things independent of their appearance to us. Therefore, we have no basis for the claim that things are, in one sort of circumstance, shown in their true light, while in another not. There can be no basis for the claim that the conditions deemed standard actually are those in which things are as they appear. To say, then, that standard conditions are those in which things are as they appear to be is only to say that they are the conditions in which sayings are (taken to be or treated as) properly authorized and so entitling of other sayings and of doings. Nonstandard conditions, similarly, are just those in which sayings, while behaviorally correct insofar as one says of the object that appears (say) red that it is red, are not properly authorized and so not entitling of other moves. In sum, the notion of objective truth as correct representation of things as they are, by contrast with the pragmatic notion of truth as what is assertible or correct according to the practices of the linguistic community, has and can have no role to play in an account of linguistic practices as here described.

A verbal game can come to look very much like a language proper: its game entries like assertions; its exits like properly intentional actions, the "conclusions" of chains of practical reasoning; and its game-game moves like inferences. For instance, it could become appropriate in the game to question another's entitlement to a move rather as one might question another's entitlement to a good, and to respond by producing the utterance on the basis of which it was made as one would produce a bill of sale. The distinction between moves one is obliged to make and moves one is permitted to make could also be instituted;

and we can imagine that failing to make obliged moves, like failing to pay one's taxes, could result in one's losing one's status as a player.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, even a notion of 'looks', as a kind of flag to indicate that one's "move" has not the entitling force of a move (say, because conditions are perceptibly nonstandard), can be introduced.<sup>12</sup> But for all such embellishments the game is only a game. Entitlement is thus far only a social status. One is entitled to a move or makes an entitling move just if one is taken to do so by those with whom one plays the game. We have in place a notion of assertibility, of the acceptability of an entitling move, but not yet the notion of objective truth, and hence no notion (yet) of assertion proper.

### 3. CREDITING MINDS

The idea that assertions or judgments are fundamentally like moves in a game is a familiar one, but it is not fully adequate since games and the legitimacy of moves in them are only socially instituted. If, as will be assumed here, judgment has the form of a commitment to the (objective) truth of a description of how things are, then it cannot be understood as a move in a socially constituted game. A different picture is needed.

We saw that the establishment of the market requires that a commodity play the role of medium of exchange and also that once the market is established the role of medium of exchange can be played by anything that serves to keep track of one's purchasing potential. In fact, once the market is established nothing at all need play the role of medium of exchange. The role of medium of exchange, while required for the creation of the market, is not necessary to sustain it. All that is required once the market has been established is that scores be kept of transactions. This fact, implicit in a fiat money economy, is made explicit in a credit economy. In a credit economy, each participant has an account recording credits and debits and a signature code governing access to the account; a database stores all information pertaining to accounts; and a telecommunications network provides access to the database from any market position. To purchase a good, one calls up the database, enters the amount to be debited from one's account, enters the number of the account to be credited and one's authorizing code, and with that the transaction is complete, the good properly one's own.

Nothing plays the role of medium of exchange in a credit economy. What is bought or sold changes hands, if only figuratively in the transfer of title of ownership, but there is not even a metaphorical sense in which money changes hands. This gives rise to two distinctive features of transactions in a credit economy. First, the fact that the debit to the buyer's account matches the credit to the seller's is not now a feature intrinsic to particular transactions; rather it is

an equilibrium property of the economic system as a whole. In a credit transaction, the credit to the seller and the debit to the buyer match (or indeed, systematically deviate) only because things are arranged so that they will. Moreover, because a credit system requires that one be entitled to debit only one's own account and to credit only the accounts of others, buying in a credit economy is active relative to selling. The seller makes the good available but only the buyer has the authority to make the trade. While both must agree to the terms of the trade only the buyer is free to enact it. Buying and selling in a credit economy, then, are contrasted both by the direction of flow of a good and as active and passive. It is these features of a credit economy that can help to clarify the structure of our intentional involvements in the world, and our capacity to judge of things as they are in themselves.<sup>13</sup>

Unlike money, credit has no bearer; it is not something with market-independent features. Nor can it even be token-token identified with particular functional states or processes in the computer that keeps the economy running. For nothing relevant to the transaction need happen in the system at the time of the transaction, any more than anything relevant to the accrual of interest need occur in a bank's computer at the moment one becomes entitled to a sum of money as the interest on one's deposits. Balance information requested after that time will reflect the change, but nothing relevant to the change need happen at the time of the change. The change is a change in one's market status that need not correspond to any particular change in the state of the world.

But while credit neither is nor can be identified at any level with an objective entity or process, it also cannot be a mere cipher. If it were, if it did not matter whether one had an overall credit balance of this amount or an overall debit balance of that amount, transactions would be wholly random and the market would dissolve. Credit is actually nothing and yet not merely nothing. It is a pure potency, and one's overall balance an expression of this potency (or of one's impotence) in the market. Indeed, it is because credit is a pure potency that one must have (by right) absolute authority over debits to one's account and none over credits. To say that one has an amount of credit, a certain purchasing potential, just is to say that one has a certain amount or degree of authority to buy. What I want to suggest now is that much as a credit economy is founded on the constitution of loci of authority over debits and credits which realize buyings and sellings as essentially active and passive transactions respectively, so a properly intentional "economy" can be understood in terms of the notion of loci of authority over commitments and entitlements which realize game entries and exits as essentially passive and active respectively — as perception and action proper.

In a credit economy one is passive with respect to a sale in the sense that, while one makes the good available to potential buyers, the transaction itself can be authorized only by the buyer. One does not so much enter the market as find oneself in it with credit or purchasing potential. Similarly, we can now think of

"language entries" not as moves that one makes, but rather as credits or entitlements with which one finds oneself, as processes with respect to which one is purely passive. One "makes oneself available" to the world — one opens one's eyes, runs one's hand across a surface, or whatever — but the entry that is made into one's cognitive credit column is an entry which (from one's own perspective) just happens. Things just do show up to one as thus and so.<sup>14</sup>

Game entries were described above on analogy with selling in a fiat money economy. A game entry effects the translation of something with extra-game significance into a saying with game significance. A red object, for example, is translated into the game significant saying "it is red" in something like the way the same object can be transformed into market significant money by selling it. In a credit economy, by contrast, the transformation that is a selling is of an actual good into a pure potency. One receives nothing at all in a sale; instead a credit is made to one's account. Only one's score is changed. So perceiving proper can be thought of as a translation of an actual state of affairs into a pure potency. From being an entitling move or a game entry (something one does), perceiving becomes a pure entitling — as it were, the idealization or bringing to mind of a mind-independent entity that entitles one to claims. Much as selling is and must be passive in a credit economy (since one must have authority only over debts to one's account), so perception is and must be passive. Because it is entitling, it is necessarily authorized from without. In perception, one's score is changed by a change in what one is entitled to assert, and this change is not one that the subject (or for that matter, anyone else in the linguistic community) has the power to bring about. It is states of affairs in the world that cause one to perceive as one does and thereby entitle one to claims.

Perception, I have suggested, can be thought of as effecting a translation of an actual state of affairs into a pure potency, a perceiving that is the bringing to mind of what is (ostensibly) the case. Action, conversely, can be thought of as effecting a translation of a potency into an actuality. It is the realization of an idea to which one has committed oneself. Above, game exits were understood as entitled but not entitling responses to sayings on analogy with purchases that effect the transformation of money into goods. In a credit economy, similarly, a purchase amounts to the realization of one's purchasing potential in an actual good. In this case, however, it is wholly determined by the exercise of one's authority to debit one's own account. Buying something in a credit economy is an act of freedom, the expression of one's absolute authority over debts to one's account. So we can think of actions as acts of freedom, authorized by the agent and performed as the realization of cognitive potencies. We cannot now think of one as merely entitled or even required to act (on the basis of a game move); rather one is properly committed to realizing some state of affairs. One has the status of an autonomous agent. Action, according to this picture, is the expression of the freedom of the subject, and a particular action the expression of a particular commitment of the subject.

The notion of entitlement is all that is required to express the differences between game entries, game exits and intra-game moves (they are respectively entitling, entitled, and both entitling and entitled). As just indicated, to understand the differences between properly intentional action and perception we seem to require a pair of notions, that of a commitment and that of an entitlement. The credit model suggests why this is so.

We saw that in a credit economy buying and selling are asymmetrical, the one active and the other passive, even though in another sense they are wholly symmetrical since no one can buy what a seller does not want to sell. Another way to think of this characteristic unique to a credit economy is as follows. In a fiat money economy, sellings and buyings are distinguished only by the direction of flow of the money (as it were, either entitling, by being the acquisition of money, or entitled by the money one spends) — which we can equally well think of as a difference in the direction of flow of a good. In a credit economy, on the other hand, there is no money and so no flow of money. In a credit economy, buyings and sellings are distinguished by the direction of flow of a good and also by whether one debits one's account or finds it credited, by whether one is active or passive with respect to the sale. In other words, while the flow of goods and of money come to the same thing in a fiat money market, the flow of goods and the "flow" of credit do not come to the same thing in a credit economy. The match of credit and debit in such an economy is, as already pointed out, an equilibrium property of the whole economic system. So, if one must think of credit as like money, then one should also think of debit as like money, as a kind of anti-money (something like an IOU) that in contact with money on the balance sheet annihilates it. In fact, credit and debit are just as they appear in one's ledger: credits as entitling entries authorized from without, and debts as the expression of transactions authorized by oneself. The notion of money that is in play in both a commodity and a fiat money market is replaced, in a credit economy, by a pair of notions: credit and debit.

In much the same way, the notion of (purely social) entitlement that is in play in a game context is replaced by a pair of notions, commitments and entitlements (proper), in an intentional context. To think of the commitments and entitlements of a subject as distinguished merely by a direction of fit, as entitled and entitling respectively, would, according to our picture, be a fundamental mistake. These are distinct, though like credit and debit fundamentally related, potencies. Commitments are the expression of one's freedom; they are intentions that have (as we might put the point) the form of rules that one freely undertakes to follow. Entitlements, by contrast, are impressed upon one by how things are. They are, as it were, the expression of one's receptivity, and have the form of facts. According to this picture, then, perceiving and acting (like buying and selling in a credit economy) differ along two distinct dimensions: with respect to the direction of fit, mind to world and world to mind, and with respect to the sort of authority that is involved, that of a

commitment that has the form of a rule or norm and that of an entitlement that has the form of a representation or fact.

A credit economy of the sort described here works through the institution of loci of authority over credits and debits. One enters the market passively, making something available for purchase and if all goes well finds a credit made to one's account. The transaction is characterized both by the transformation of a good into a pure potency, and by one's passivity with respect to the sale. One leaves the market by authorizing a debit to one's account, thereby acquiring possession of a good. In this transaction, one's purchasing potential is realized in an actual good, and one is active with respect to it. Perception, I have suggested, has a character analogous to that of a sale. It is an act with respect to which one is passive, and it is world to mind in the sense that perception effects a translation of a mind-independent state of affairs into a cognitively significant perceiving. Such perceivings, like credits, are entitling. Actions, by contrast, have the character of exits from the cognitive realm on this model. They are the expression of one's autonomy, and they realize intentions in actual states of affairs. Since, according to our picture, judging is the successor of intra-game moves which are like exits in being entitling and like entries in being entitling, one would expect that judgment too involves in some way aspects of both perception and action.

To judge is to make a commitment; it is to take a stand, on how things are in assertion and on how they ought to be in intention. In this respect it is like action. It is something one does and for which one is responsible. But whereas an action is, in the first instance, responsible to the intention it aims to realize and is successful just if it realizes the state of affairs intended, whereas it is in this respect mind to world, a judgment is responsible, in the first instance, not to an intention but to things as they are. An act of judgment aims to represent things correctly, as they are, and to succeed in a particular case is to have an actual state of affairs revealed to one. As an act for which one is responsible, then, judgment is a rule-following and an act of freedom, but because it is successful only if it achieves a correct representation of some actual state of affairs, it is like perception in being world to mind. A successful judgment "mirrors nature". It reflects things as they are. Judgment, on this view, makes explicit in a saying the otherwise implicit structure of the world.

Imagine, first, the following game of "Epistemological Solitaire". To play this game, one has, let us say, a sheet of paper divided into two parts. In the one, entries just appear (much as one just finds things to be thus and so in perception). Entries into the second are one's own responsibility and are constrained only by the inferential rules of the language as they apply to entries on the page. So, for example, seeing something as red (finding an entry to that effect) gives one a *prima facie* entitlement to enter a statement of one's own to that effect (as it were, to commit oneself to the truth of the statement); but other entries one has made can override this entitlement. Perhaps, for example, one

has already an entry to the effect that the object is being seen in circumstances in which white things appear red. In such a case, the rules prohibit an entry to the effect that the object is red. The point of the game is to make entries that are entitling by those that just appear consistent with the rules and other entries one has made.

Epistemological Solitaire, unlike the verbal game described above, is not essentially a socially instituted game, though such games underlie its constitution. Entries appear independent both of the player and of anyone else. They are just there, given as fodder for one's moves. Entries that the player makes, by contrast, are wholly that player's own responsibility: the only constraint on them is provided by the player's commitment to the rules of the game. So, for example, the distinction between veridical and illusory experience is not now directly grounded in a socially instituted distinction between standard and nonstandard conditions, but is rather so grounded through one's acceptance of rules governing what can legitimately be inferred from the appearances of things. The player of Epistemological Solitaire, like players of more familiar forms of solitaire, has only herself to answer to. As should also be evident, she is in no position to claim that her judgments have any objective validity. Because such a player has no grounds for claiming that anything really is as it appears to her to be, the player of Epistemological Solitaire has no basis on which to claim that her considered judgments are revelatory of things as they are. She has, at best, a coherent view of things as they show up for a creature like herself.

On the view taken here, the autonomy of the subject and the objectivity of the world are to be understood in terms of the notion of a locus of authority as it is illustrated by the nature of transactions in a credit economy. To say that a subject is autonomous is to recognize her as having absolute authority over what she is responsible for. She is bound only by those norms to which she takes herself to be bound. To say that the world is objective, on the other hand, is to recognize it as the locus of all entitlements, as that to which one is responsible in all one's judgments. What is not yet clear is why we are entitled to think that the notion of objective truth, rather than a weaker pragmatic notion of assertibility, has any role to play in the account. By what right do we claim that the world (as the object of our empirical investigations) is anything more than, as Rorty puts it (1982, p. 15), "the purely vacuous notion of the ineffable cause of sense and goal of intellect, or else a name for the objects that inquiry at the moment is leaving alone"? Our picture suggests the form an answer might take.

Credit, we have seen, is not a form of money. The balance of credits and debits is rather an equilibrium property of the whole economic system. Because it is, it can in principle be altered at will. That is, one can affect the functioning of a credit economy not only through particular transactions one makes but also by tinkering with the relationship of credits to debits in transactions. A related difference between a credit economy and a money economy is the fact that the notion of counterfeit has no place in the former and is a constitutive feature of

the latter. There is nothing to counterfeit in a credit economy — which is not to say that cheating the system in other ways is not possible. What I want now to propose is that certain sorts of concepts — which, for reasons that will become clear, should be thought of as theoretical concepts — have features that are fundamentally analogous in these two respects to these features of a system of credits and debits. Because they are, it will be suggested, they are properly understood as descriptive of things as they are in themselves.

According to a familiar conception of concepts that derives ultimately from Kant, concepts have at once logical form and empirical content. A predicate like 'is red', for example, has the logical form of a color term: it is incompatible with other color terms like 'is green' or 'is blue', is entailed by various predicates, for example, 'is crimson', and it entails yet other predicates, for instance 'is extended'. But knowing only the logical form of such a predicate, the inferential and incompatibility relations it bears to other predicates in the language, does not amount to knowing which predicate it is, or that of which it is true. The empirical content of a predicate like 'is red' essentially involves the idea that it is correctly applied to all and only red things. Much as fiat money is made from something that is found (e.g., coins from metal), so such concepts are in some sense "made" from similarities that creatures like us find perceptually salient. Not that we derive such concepts from our preconceptual experience of things through a process of abstraction. As Sellars has argued, the sort of prelinguistic awareness of things as thus and so that would be required by such a process is unintelligible.<sup>15</sup> The point is rather that it is part of the logic of such terms that (suitably placed perceivers (of the relevant sort) will experience objects as having these properties, or will perceive them to have properties from which the presence of the relevant properties can be inferred. In this way, such terms are directly or indirectly (i.e., inferentially) tied to things as they show up for us. They essentially involve the idea of things as they appear to creatures with our sensory capacities and our (language-based) responsive dispositions. Through one's acculturation into a language containing such concepts, the world acquires a face. It comes to show up for one as thus and so.

Consider, by contrast, terms like 'phlogiston' or 'H<sub>2</sub>O'. The meanings of such terms seem to involve not so much the stuffs of which they are true as the theories within which they occur. One does not, for example, learn the meaning of 'phlogiston' ostensibly, by being shown cases of it. One could not learn the meaning of this word this way for there are not, and according to our best theories could not be, any cases of it. Yet the term has meaning. Its meaning derives from the theory to which it belongs; and to learn what it means is to learn the relevant theory. Similarly, one could learn the theory that is codified in outline in the periodic table, and thereby learn what H<sub>2</sub>O is, without yet knowing that water is H<sub>2</sub>O. Of course, the theory would not have been developed without the study of water and of much else besides, and we would have no reason to accept the theory as true if we did not recognize its power to

explain phenomena we do have (observational) beliefs about, including beliefs about water. But there seems nevertheless to be an important difference between the two sorts of concepts and so also between the ways they are applied to entities in the world. Theoretical concepts like that of H<sub>2</sub>O or phlogiston are, I suggest, exhaustively characterized by their inferential relations to other concepts in a theory.<sup>16</sup> The theory, which ideally is codified in a set of axioms, fixes the meanings of the terms it contains by articulating the various and variously complex inferential relations these terms bear one to another. According to this view, then, the meanings of the terms in the theory are not tied, either directly or indirectly via inference, to observable states of affairs (i.e., to claims made in the "Kantian" language). Terms in the theory bear no semantic relation to observables. Instead, the theory as a whole is epistemically related to things as they show up for us. It is the whole theory that is accepted or rejected as an explanatory framework adequate to the task of making sense of the appearances of things to us. The truth of the theory is not determined by its capacity correctly to represent things as they are, but rather by its capacity *adequately to explain things as they appear* — though it is also true that its explanatory adequacy is reason to believe that it is a correct representation of things as they are.

Theoretical concepts, I have suggested, are wholly articulated by their inferential relations to one another as specified in a theory. The meaning of such a concept is thus an equilibrium property of a whole family of such concepts, and it can be changed at will through changes made in the relations of antecedent to consequent that various terms bear to each other. Like credits and debits in a pure credit economy, meaning of this sort is a pure potency; it is independent in principle of how things show up for us, both of our sensory capacities and of the "natural" languages we find ourselves with. The meanings of such concepts are not constitutively connected to our distinctively human standpoint. If concepts can have meaning of this sort, if they can be inferentially articulated rather than sensory (if they can be in this respect like a system of credits and debits rather than like money that is made from what is found), then they can be created expressly for the task of understanding what things must be that they show up as they do to creatures like us. The aim of science, on this view, is to generate new concepts, in effect, new languages that map in their inferential structures the various causal structures or orders of intelligibility actually to be found in the world.

The Kantian conception of concepts essentially involves the idea that our capacity to generate new concepts is limited by our particular sensory endowment. According to this conception, what we cannot perceive to be so, or infer to be so from what we perceive, we cannot know. Since we have no reason to think that our perceptions of things are of them as they are rather than merely of them as they show up to creatures like us, we cannot claim to know things as they are — as Kant argues.<sup>17</sup> This argument does not, however, apply to a

conception of concepts according to which they are articulated solely by their inferential relations one to another. Given such a conception of concepts, the fact that we are finite, perspectival beings provides no basis for arguing that our knowledge is not of things as they are in themselves.

But, while this conception of concepts may allow us to see in principle how our theoretical claims might purport to describe things as they are on the basis of how they show up to creatures like us, it is not yet clear that there is any positive reason to think that such claims can succeed in describing things as they are. After all, the adequacy of any theory is measured against what we observe to be the case. It might seem, then, that our essentially perspectival view of things continues to infect our theories — not semantically (since, we suppose, the meanings of theoretical terms are wholly defined within the theory), but as it were epistemically, by what counts as the data to be explained. Again the economic analogy is suggestive.

We saw above that where utterances are conceived as moves in a socially constituted game, a distinction between real and counterfeit moves can be instituted through the institution of a distinction between “standard” and “nonstandard” conditions. As was also indicated, players of such a game are entitled only to an intersubjective notion of truth, a notion of truth as what any of us would, or ought according to the rules of the game, assent to. What is perceived by a standard observer in standard conditions is authorized and so entitling. Anyone — or at least anyone who is in the game — ought to see it so. Where either observer or conditions are nonstandard, the perception is counterfeit and does not entitle any claims. But the project of science does not rely on appeal to the notion of standard conditions. Rather *all* appearances are to be explained, both things as they show up in one set of conditions to one sort of perceiver, and things as they show up in another set of conditions and/or to another sort of perceiver. Put in terms of our model, properly intentional perceptions as the data to be explained by our theories cannot be “counterfeited”. They are not material things, either overt responses or states of perceiving organisms, but are rather pure potencies that are entitling; all are (or at least ought to be) treated equally as data. All are equally entitling. The point, then, is that once we have in place the model of a credit economy, perceptions can no longer be thought of as sometimes entitling and sometimes not (depending on whether conditions are standard, hence authorizing, or not). They are instead pure potencies that are intrinsically authorized in the sense that each just is how such things show up to such perceivers in such circumstances. They are given as the data to be explained, and the task of science is to describe on this basis how things actually are. Perceptions, on this view, are entitling potencies that are (if only indirectly, by way of the theory that is to explain the whole of one’s data) revelations of states of affairs. The theory is to explain the appearances, all the ways things do or could show up to perceivers like ourselves or to other sorts of perceivers; and its explanatory

adequacy is reason to hold it true, a correct representation of things as they are in themselves.

The philosophy of mind has long been dominated by the picture of a functional whole with parts posited to explain the behavior of the whole. This picture has borne many fruits, for example in psychology, cognitive science, and linguistics. We understand much better than we did the processes that underlie our properly intentional involvements. But, like the practices they seek to explain, such processes only underlie our intentional commerce with the world; they do not constitute this commerce. The pragmatist’s picture of our intentional acts as moves in various socially constituted games is similarly suggestive. Much of our everyday commerce, both with one another and with the world in which we find ourselves, is (according to the view taken here) usefully conceived on the model of a game. Our everyday (“Kantian”) language, I have suggested, is just such a game. But the task of saying of what is that it is cannot, finally, be made intelligible in such terms. For this, I have suggested, we need a new model, that of market transactions in a credit economy.

A picture, of course, is only a picture. At best, it can incline us to see things in a new way, to ask new questions and to seek new kinds of answers. It is only a first step on the way to an adequate account. But it can be an essential first step. The fundamental problem left to us as the legacy of modern philosophy is the problem of understanding the nature of human freedom and our capacity for knowledge of the world as it is. Kant already saw that knowledge requires at once a faculty of spontaneity, the capacity to follow self-imposed rules, and also a faculty of receptivity, the capacity to be impressed upon by things outside the mind. But for Kant the two coexist in an uneasy tension. In the end, for Kant, we can know only what we have made of what we have been given. But Kant’s productive model of knowing is not mandatory. Perhaps if we think of ourselves as buyers and as sellers, rather than as makers or as synthesizers, then we can come to understand how it is that we are at once wholly spontaneous and also properly receptive to things as they are.

#### 4. EPILOGUE

“When we do philosophy”, Wittgenstein once remarked (1953, § 194), “we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it.” As primitive people thrust into a credit economy would marvel at mere boxes of wires that contain what they can only think of as ghostly money, so we marvel at ourselves, biological organisms that contain ghostly minds. As they would gape at the magical instantaneous transfer across huge distances of this money that can be neither lost nor stolen nor counterfeited, so we gape at the magical way in

which a mind without extension or causal powers can reach out to the world. Their ghostly money cannot be seen and exerts no mechanical force; yet it has very real power. And so it is with minds. But credit is not a ghostly money and mind cannot be a ghostly thing. Perhaps both are as Aristotle described the intellect to be: actually nothing and potentially anything.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Dennett (1987, Chapters 2 and 3, 1991a, and 1991b, Chapter 7) explores and defends the legitimacy of this way of thinking.

<sup>2</sup> These brief remarks do not, of course, amount to an argument for the legitimacy of the idea of real patterns. The idea is motivated here only indirectly, by way of showing how it can be applied in explanation of various sorts of phenomena without thereby introducing such ontologically suspect entities as, say, an immaterial mind stuff or the Grand Designer of Nature.

<sup>3</sup> Sellars (1963) makes the point. It is applied specifically to functionalist theories of mind in McDowell (1985). See also Kripke's (1982) discussion of rule following, especially, pp. 22-37.

<sup>4</sup> Rorty is perhaps the most notable proponent of such a view. The strategy has been pursued in detail by Brandom. See, for example, Brandom (1983a and forthcoming).

<sup>5</sup> It should be remembered that, like any picture or model, the analogy provided by the various economic markets does not exactly reproduce all and only the features of the phenomenon it is meant to clarify. Only some features of the market, though quite fundamental ones, are appealed to here; and only some aspects of our intentional involvements are thereby clarified. I have, moreover, taken various liberties in describing the market so as to make the central points clearer. For example, many of the features that are here treated as distinctive of a credit economy are also characteristic of a commodity money market in which there is fractional reserve banking (or so I am told by my economist friends). The points I wish to make there could have been made, though with more difficulty, through dissection and discussion of the various and variously embedded structures to be found in a commodity money market in which such banking practices have arisen. It is also worth remarking that we can, for present purposes, assume that all market commodities are goods. Labor enters into the picture only at the margins, as it affects the market price of goods by affecting their relative desirability to participants.

<sup>6</sup> Although evolution is only "as if" design — since there is no intention involved in the process, no aim it hopes to realize — it is nevertheless a process that realizes new sorts of patterns, patterns that count as the norm and from which individuals can deviate. In such a case, it is correct to say that individuals are or are not normal in various respects. This implies neither that they ought to have certain characteristics (namely, those that normal instances have), nor that the features of normal instances are optimal for survival. Abnormal cases can be better fitted for survival than their more normal

relatives. But it is also stronger than saying only that an individual that is the product of an evolutionary process is typical or atypical of the kind. Evolutionary theory enables us to see just why it is legitimate to explain certain sorts of phenomena by appeal to the notion of a function, a notion that in turn brings into play the idea of proper functioning and so also that of a norm, one which the normal individual meets. That is why we say that biological organisms are as if designed.

<sup>7</sup> It is not in fact necessary to assume that participants seek the most advantageous terms. Various weaker assumptions (e.g., that participants seek to satisfy rather than maximize) yield the same result, namely, prices.

<sup>8</sup> Clearly, only highly evolved systems with sophisticated perceptual and computational capacities could evolve such a socially articulated way of life. This is not to say, however, that these creatures are in any principled way different from (mere) animals. The capacities they are supposed to have are biological capacities they could have evolved to have. By virtue of their as-if biological design they become the instruments of a distinctively social design that is "mindless" in just the way biological evolution is. According to Haugeland, such a process realizes norms rather than merely typical or atypical behavior "precisely because they are generated and maintained by censoriousness" (1982, p. 16). It is not clear, however, that the notion of censoriousness properly applies in this case. Various types of behavior are negatively reinforced, but not because they are wrong. Following Brandom (1983b), I take it that norms proper emerge only through mutual recognition, of which more below.

<sup>9</sup> Brandom (1983b) introduces the idea of the synthesis of social substance through mutual recognition. As he points out, the idea originates with Hegel.

<sup>10</sup> In a weak sense, a trade involving commodity money involves a buying and a selling. But because commodity money is also a good, and so can be taken away and used, no principled distinction between buying and selling can be drawn for transactions in a commodity money market.

<sup>11</sup> Brandom (1983a and 1985) details some of what such practices would involve. See Brandom (forthcoming) for a comprehensive and compelling account.

<sup>12</sup> Sellars (1963, § IV) explores the development of such a notion of 'looks'.

<sup>13</sup> As already indicated, where there is banking, and so lending and borrowing, the relevant notions of credit and debit will already be in play. In such a case, the distinctions here marked by the replacement of money by a system of credits and debits would instead be marked by the institution of lending and borrowing. Furthermore, where there is fractional reserve banking, the idea that the match of credit and debit is an equilibrium property of the system as a whole (rather than a necessary concomitant of the flow of money) is also realized. What matters for purposes here is not so much how these features of the market are instituted as that they are and in what order. I employ the notion of a credit economy only because it most clearly illustrates the features that are relevant to the analogy.

<sup>14</sup> In saying that perception is wholly passive, I do not mean to suggest that it does not, at a sub-personal level, involve activity. Perception involves not only motion on the part of the perceiver (as J.J. Gibson has emphasized), but also a great deal of cognitive processing. Nevertheless, as a specifically intentional involvement, perception is appropriately described as altogether passive. From the perspective of the perceiver, perceiving a thing as thus and so is something that just happens. As the point might be put, while at one level (where one sort of pattern comes into view) perception is properly described as an activity, something we do, at another, the properly intentional level (where the patterns of concern here come into view), it is properly characterized as passive.

<sup>15</sup> See his extended discussion of the Myth of the Given in Sellars (1963).



<sup>16</sup> Although I cannot defend the claim here, this conception of theoretical concepts, and as well the account to be given of their relationship to an observational (or Kantian) language, are, I believe, prefigured already in Sellars' work. See, for example, §§IX and XVI of Sellars (1963).

<sup>17</sup> Kant also had other reasons, connected to his understanding of space and time, for thinking that the world as we know it is transcendently ideal. Nothing said here speaks to these arguments.

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(a) Bibliographical references should be incorporated into the text, using the author-date system, with page numbers where necessary e.g. Smith (1980). All references should be listed alphabetically at the end of the article with the date appearing immediately after the author's name and initials. In the case of a journal article ((i) below) the reference should also include the title of the article, the name in full of the journal in which it appears together with the volume and issue number and the inclusive page numbers. References to books and to chapters in books should be as follows ((ii) and (iii)):

- (i) GERGEN, K. J. (1985). The Social constructionist movement in modern psychology. *American Psychologist*, 40, (3), 266–275.
- (ii) HARRE, R. (1983). *Personal being: A theory of individual psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (iii) DEUTSCHER, I. (1984). Choosing ancestors: some consequences of the selection from intellectual traditions. In R. M. Farr and S. Moscovici (eds) *Social Representations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 71–100.

(b) Avoid, wherever possible, the use of footnotes. When they are used they should be numbered consecutively throughout the article and typed separately at the end of the manuscript.

(c) Tables should be typed on a separate sheet and supplied at the end of the manuscript. Their location in the main text should be indicated by notes such as 'Table 1 here'.

(d) Figures should be supplied on separate sheets at the end of the typescript. Unless they are supplied in a quality suitable for reproduction they will be redrawn. Original artwork is preferred, drawn black on white, with lettering in pencil. Their position in the text should be indicated by notes such as 'Insert Figure 1 here'.